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ABSTRACT 
 
JAMES SIAS: Emotion, Virtue, and Moral Perception: A Defense of Moral Intuitions 
(Under the direction of Robert M. Adams) 
 
Many think that, if our moral intuitions are grounded in emotion, then they are 
probably not justified beliefs about objective moral values, as our ordinary practices of 
moral thought and discourse seem to assume. So in order to protect the epistemic status 
of these intuitions, some have felt it necessary to deny that our moral intuitions are 
grounded in emotion. But such denials are getting harder and harder to take seriously, for 
there is now a large, and growing, body of research in empirical moral psychology that 
strongly suggests that people's ordinary moral intuitions are the products of a process in 
which emotion figures centrally. So if we grant that this research is on point, what then 
can be said of the epistemic status of our moral intuitions?  Skeptics insist that the 
empirical research forces us into the uncomfortable position of having to admit that our 
ordinary moral intuitions are really not what they seem—i.e., they are either not beliefs 
about objective moral values, or, if they are, they are not justified.  In this dissertation, I 
resist this skepticism by constructing an account of how our moral intuitions might be 
trustworthy because they are grounded in emotion, and not despite this fact.   
The project begins with an inquiry into the nature of emotion. On the view that I 
defend, emotions are complex states of mind, consisting of construals, concerns, and 
feelings, related to each other in a particular way. Then, after re-examining the empirical 
work in light of my account of emotion, I use the account—along with an account of how 
iv 
 
emotion relates to moral virtue—to develop a theory of moral perception.  According to 
the theory, virtue shapes emotions in such a way as to make them perceptions of moral 
value. If my argument is on point, it turns out that what is commonly assumed about the 
relation between emotion and the epistemic security of our moral intuitions is false—
rather than threatening the epistemic security of ordinary moral intuitions, these intuitions 
are (or can be) epistemically secure because they are grounded in emotion. 
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Moral intuitions are important things, to philosophers and non-philosophers alike.  
Outside of philosophy, moral intuitions play an integral role in our effort to make sense 
of ourselves, and of the world around us.  We regularly make plans and decisions, form 
opinions about people and their actions, and behave in ways that are shaped by how 
things seem to us morally—often despite our spending little, if any, time reflecting 
critically upon these moral ‘seemings’. 
 
Within philosophy, there are many who think that moral intuitions—for better or 
worse—are the beginning and end of moral theory.  The conventional wisdom seems to 
be that moral theorizing begins with a relatively unstructured set of pre-theoretical 
intuitions about cases.  From here, the theorist attempts to construct general moral 
principles that are supposed to cohere with those intuitions.  And then those principles are 
subjected to a variety of tests, many of which involve weighing the principles against 
more moral intuitions about previously unconsidered cases.  If ETHICAL THEORY A 
implies that acts of type x are always morally permissible, but one can imagine a case in 
which, intuitively, some token of an x-type action is morally wrong, this counts as a strike 
against ETHICAL THEORY A, and perhaps even a reason for rejecting it.  Theorizing in 
moral philosophy at all levels—from some of the most abstract inquiries in metaethics to 
the most practical points of applied ethics—is generally thought to owe much to our 
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moral intuitions, and not the other way around (at least, not as much).  Kant, for instance, 
adds some credence to his own moral theory by comparing its implications to his readers’ 
intuitions about an honest shopkeeper.  Mill attempts the same by comparing the 
implications of utilitarianism to our intuitions about such things as the desirability of 
happiness and the dissatisfaction of Socrates versus the satisfaction of a pig.  And of 
course, anyone who has taken an introductory ethics course has heard these two theories 
criticized for failing to accord with our intuitions about, say, the permissibility of lying to 
a Nazi soldier or the wrongness of causing non-human animals to suffer in order to 
entertain humans (e.g., bull fighting).  For as long as people have been doing ethics, 
ethical theories have often risen or fallen on the basis of their coherence with our pre-
theoretical moral intuitions. 
 
Now, to be sure, it is no small controversy whether or not this is how ethics ought 
to be done.  In his influential paper “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” for instance, 
Peter Singer raises some serious questions about the sort of authority that we typically 
grant to our ordinary ways of thinking about moral issues.  Of course, while defending 
his claim that we are morally obligated to give to those in need until the cost of giving 
exceeds its benefit (in terms of moral significance),
1
 Singer himself appeals to his 
readers’ moral intuitions on more than one occasion.  But he also does not shy away from 
pointing out potential conflicts between his argument and those intuitions.  And on those 
points, Singer is unapologetic in urging people to disregard their ordinary ways of 
                                                 
1
 This is the stronger version of Singer’s claim.  According to the weaker version, we are obligated 
to give until doing so involves the sacrifice of something with any moral significance.  The difference here 
is unimportant, since both versions have counterintuitive implications.   
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thinking about charitable giving and our duties to help others, and to follow the 
arguments wherever the arguments happen to lead.   
People do not ordinarily judge in the way I have suggested they should. 
[...] But given that I did not set out to present a morally neutral description 
of the way people make moral judgments, the way people do in fact judge 
has nothing to do with the validity of my conclusion.  My conclusion 
follows from the principle which I advanced earlier, and unless that 
principle is rejected, or the arguments shown to be unsound, I think the 
conclusion must stand, however strange it appears.
2
 
 
In other words, our intuitions may be at odds with Singer’s argument, but as long as the 
argument is sound, why should our intuitions matter?  Besides, as Singer urges, on a 
number of points, our intuitions appear to be a jumbled mess.  For instance, people have 
the intuition that it would be wrong to refrain from saving a drowning child at the cost 
ruining a new outfit, but they do not typically think the same about refraining to make an 
equivalent (to the cost of the outfit) donation to an organization that would use that 
money to save lives.  Singer thinks discrepancies like this one are unjustifiable, and that 
they tell strongly against granting any real authority to our ordinary moral intuitions 
when doing ethics.      
 
If that weren’t enough to give someone pause, Singer takes his attack upon our 
moral intuitions even further by offering a kind of debunking explanation—i.e., an 
explanation of the origin or cause of these intuitions according to which they are unlikely 
to be true.   The reason that we do not typically judge it wrong to refrain from giving to 
those in need, he explains, is that our moral intuitions depend strongly upon the strength 
of our social bonds with others; so the needs of people sufficiently removed from our 
closest social circles (family, community, subcultures, etc.) are likely to be of little 
                                                 
2
 Singer 1972: 236. 
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significance in our moral judgment of things.  But, Singer continues, this is clearly not 
the way it ought to be, since morality is not so partial: “The moral point of view requires 
us to look beyond the interests of our own society.”3  So it’s not just that our intuitions 
are sometimes jumbled; more concerning is the possibility that they are systematically at 
odds with “the moral point of view.”  (Elsewhere, Singer goes into greater detail arguing 
that the socio-biological origins of our moral intuitions suggest that these beliefs could be 
little more than untrustworthy bits of moral bias.
4
)  And again, the implication is 
supposed to be that our ordinary moral intuitions ought to be ignored, repressed, and 
abandoned—by both philosophers and non-philosophers alike.   
 
As Singer no doubt realizes, however, this is profoundly difficult.  Underlying the 
difficulty, I think, is not just the fact that it is so common for us to grant our moral 
intuitions a great deal of authority, but more so the reason why we do this.  And this has 
to do with what it is that we take moral intuitions to be.  For one thing, at least on its face, 
our behavior suggests that we regard moral intuitions as genuine beliefs, rather than, say, 
expressions of attitudes or preferences.
5
  Though my wife thinks differently than I do 
about the superiority of cookies ‘n’ cream to all other flavors of ice cream, I do not hold 
her thoughts here to the sorts of norms to which we typically hold beliefs.  I do not judge 
her to be mistaken; I do not assume that she can be convinced otherwise on the basis of 
things like evidence or arguments; I do not wonder if her perceptual faculties are 
malfunctioning; etc.  On the other hand, in many cases, if she and I were to witness the 
                                                 
3
 Singer 1972: 237. 
 
4
 See Singer 1981. 
 
5
 I address the meaning of ‘intuition’, and other terms relevant to my project, in §3 below. 
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same action, but form opposing moral intuitions in response, I would think these things 
about her moral intuition.  So regardless of whether or not we’re right to do this, it is hard 
to deny that we do ordinarily regard moral intuitions as beliefs.   
 
Furthermore—still reading off of our behavior—we apparently think of our moral 
intuitions as beliefs about objective matters of fact.  J. L. Mackie famously argued that 
there are no objective moral values; but before doing so, he was careful to point out that 
his argument is interesting precisely because our ordinary practices of judging things 
morally seem to take for granted that there are such values.   
The ordinary user of moral language means to say something about 
whatever it is that he characterizes morally, for example a possible action, 
as it is in itself, or would be if it were realized, and not about, or even 
simply expressive of, his, or anyone else’s, attitude or relation to it. ... I 
conclude, then, that ordinary moral judgments include a claim to 
objectivity, an assumption that there are objective values in just the sense 
in which I am concerned to deny this.
6
 
 
Here again, it is instructive to note the differences between disagreements over things like 
ice cream flavors and disagreements over things like, say, the year in which the Treaty of 
Paris was signed.  Our behavior during disagreements of the latter sort suggests that we 
simply take it for granted that there is a fact of the matter to which our beliefs must 
correspond if they are to be true.  Our behavior during disagreements of the former sort, 
however, is importantly different.  We might express astonishment at another’s 
preferences, but not as if those preferences are in any sense false.  More often than not, 
moral disagreements more closely resemble disagreements over things like the date of the 
Treaty of Paris than they do disagreements over ice cream flavors.  If my wife were to 
believe differently than I do about the moral permissibility of abortion, we would not 
                                                 
6
 Mackie 1977: 33, 35. 
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simply express surprise at each other’s different moral taste; rather, we’d each think that 
the other has a false belief—and false in the same way that non-moral beliefs can be 
false.  So moral intuitions are (sometimes, at least) beliefs about objective moral values, 
whether there are any such values or not.   
 
Finally, given the sort of authority that we grant to moral intuitions, both in our 
ordinary lives and in ethics, we apparently assume that our moral intuitions are 
sometimes justified as well.
7
  After all, it would be odd for us to lean upon these beliefs 
as heavily as we so often do if we did not think that they were had for good reason(s).  It 
would be odd, that is, for us to so regularly make plans, form opinions, and behave in 
ways based upon beliefs with the epistemic status of mere guesses or worse.  And it 
would be remarkable if it turned out that the whole history of Western moral philosophy 
was riddled with philosophers resting their cases (even slightly) upon unfounded moral 
hunches.  Ordinarily, whenever we are skeptical of the justificatory status of a belief, 
whether our own or someone else’s, we do exactly as Singer urges—we either discard it, 
or at least subject it to some degree of suspicion until its epistemic status is resolved.  
With our moral intuitions, however, we generally only do this if we are presented with 
some compelling reason to doubt their justification—which suggests that our default is to 
regard them as justified.    
 
In short, though we may sometimes deny this when pressed, we nonetheless go on 
as if our ordinary moral intuitions are instances of moral knowledge.  This explains the 
profound difficulty of disregarding them, as Singer urges us to do.  In fact, as I’ll go on to 
                                                 
7
 I do not have any particular theory of epistemic justification in mind here.  I mean only to 
suggest that we often behave as if our moral intuitions have a sufficient degree of whatever it is that 
separates knowledge from mere true belief.   
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argue in this dissertation, moral intuitions resemble instances of perceptual beliefs.  We 
trust the process by which our ordinary moral intuitions are formed like we trust the 
process by which our ordinary perceptual beliefs are formed.  It is no wonder, then, that 
Singer’s recommendation that we occasionally disregard our intuitions can seem so 
foreign and upsetting.  No matter how compellingly I’ve argued that p, if you see things 
in a way that implies not-p (and you don’t have any additional reasons for doubting the 
veracity of your perceptual experiences), you’ll likely go on as if it is the argument, and 
not the perception, that must be disregarded. 
 
1. Moral intuitions and moral skepticism 
 
While we apparently treat our moral intuitions like they are bits of moral knowledge, 
there are some who deny that such knowledge is possible (even if we grant that there are 
moral values), and their reasons for doing so have directly to do with epistemic status of 
moral intuitions.  According to Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, the “deepest challenge in 
moral epistemology” is essentially an application of the famous regress argument:  
Someone is justified in believing something only if the believer has a 
reason that is expressible in an inference with premises that the believer is 
already justified in believing.  This requires a chain of inferences that must 
continue infinitely, close into a circle, or stop arbitrarily.  Academic 
skeptics reject all three options and conclude that there is no way for 
anyone to be justified in believing anything.  The same regress arises for 
moral beliefs.
8
 
 
As Sinnott-Armstrong goes on to acknowledge, the simplest way to avoid the regress is 
to argue that there is some belief in the chain of inferences that is justified non-
inferentially, i.e., justified without needing to be inferred from some other justified belief.  
What would this look like in the case of moral beliefs?  Well, presumably, the non-
                                                 
8
 Sinnott-Armstrong 2006: 340. 
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inferentially justified belief would have to be either another moral belief or a non-moral 
belief.  But many think that it cannot be a non-moral belief, because non-moral beliefs 
cannot be taken to justify moral beliefs, else we risk violating Hume’s famous Is-Ought 
prohibition.
9
  So if moral knowledge is possible, it will have to turn out there are some 
moral beliefs that are non-inferentially justified.   
 
Now, the good news is that there is an entire tradition in moral epistemology, 
known as ethical intuitionism, according to which some moral beliefs are non-
inferentially justified.
10
  As we can see, then, ethical intuitionism offers an immediate 
reply to the regress argument: if some moral beliefs are able to be justified without 
receiving any kind of inferential support from other beliefs, then there is a legitimate 
place for the regress to terminate, and so a legitimate ground for moral knowledge claims.  
Furthermore, if it turns out that enough of our ordinary moral intuitions are among those 
that are non-inferentially justified for the process by which those intuitions are formed to 
count as reliable, then perhaps we’re right to go on as if our moral intuitions are instances 
of moral knowledge, as it appears we do.   
 
The bad news, however, is that ethical intuitionism is thought by many to be a 
hopelessly flawed view.
11
  The main point of contention seems to be the claim made by 
                                                 
9
 For more on this, see Shafer-Landau 2004: 118-121. 
 
10
 Ethical intuitionism is often understood as a view that takes a position upon not only the 
epistemology of moral beliefs, but the metaphysics and semantics of morality as well.  Typically, 
intuitionists are realists and non-naturalists about moral values, and they are cognitivists and descriptivists 
about moral claims.  On other occasions, however, intuitionism is understood only as the moral 
epistemological view that I describe in the text.   
 
11
 Much of the criticism that intuitionism has received over the years has focused upon its close 
association with ethical non-naturalism (see n. 10).  Many (including most intuitionists) see the view as 
committed to the belief that moral values are things metaphysically distinct from the natural world.  And 
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many intuitionists that moral beliefs are justified non-inferentially when their contents—
moral propositions—are self-evident, i.e., knowable solely on the basis of an 
understanding of the terms and concepts of which they are made up.  This is how many 
believe that basic truths in mathematics are known, for instance, and so it comes as no 
surprise that intuitionists have for centuries likened moral knowledge to knowledge in 
mathematics.  But there are a number of problems with this approach.  For one thing, 
depending upon how high one sets the standards for understanding the relevant terms and 
concepts, it may turn out that far fewer people have moral knowledge than we might like 
to admit.  And this would be ironic indeed, given that intuitionists often promote their 
view as amounting to a defense of moral knowledge as “common sense.”12   
 
Another problem with the analogy that intuitionists sometimes try to draw 
between moral and mathematical knowledge is the fact that there seems to be so much 
more disagreement over moral matters than there is over matters of mathematics.  Now, 
to be sure, it would be a mistake to think that it simply follows from the fact of 
widespread moral disagreement that there cannot be self-evident moral propositions.  But 
a slightly weaker charge may nonetheless have a bit more force: even if self-evidence 
does not guarantee agreement of beliefs, it surely lends itself to such agreement, as we 
see in mathematics; so if there is significantly more disagreement in ethics than there is in 
mathematics, this would be a prima facie reason to doubt that moral propositions admit 
of self-evidence; and in fact, there is significantly more disagreement in ethics.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
this is controversial, to say the very least.  But since my interests here are epistemological, I’ll ignore 
whatever metaphysical controversies there may be associated with ethical intuitionism.   
 
12
 See, e.g., Stratton-Lake 2002: 1. 
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Finally, a perhaps more interesting difference between math and morality is the 
oft-noticed fact that beliefs about the latter seem to engage us motivationally in ways that 
beliefs about the former do not.  Whatever the relation between having a moral belief and 
being motivated to act accordingly is supposed to be exactly, the fact that there is some 
close relation has led many to think that the process by which moral beliefs are formed 
must be fundamentally different than that by which mathematical beliefs are formed.  It 
cannot be the purely rational process that many intuitionists describe.  What, then, is the 
unique process by which beliefs about moral values are formed, some of which are 
supposed to be justified?  For reasons I’ve already noted, intuitionists should no longer be 
comfortable falling back upon the analogy to knowledge in mathematics.  But then it is 
unclear what intuitionists can say.  As Wedgwood notes, 
Many ... say little more than that we have some cognitive faculty—
sometimes called “intuition” or “reason” or “conscience”—which enables 
us to come to know and have justified beliefs in normative propositions; 
but they rarely give any account of how exactly this alleged faculty 
operates, or how it could serve as a reliable source of knowledge, or what 
could justify us in relying on it.  For this reason, anti-realists often accuse 
realists of failing to meet certain crucial demands for explanation.
13
 
 
And because of their unfortunate silence on this point, Wedgwood goes on to note, 
intuitionists open themselves up to Mackie’s famous attack on grounds of queerness: 
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or 
relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the 
universe.  Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be 
by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different 
from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else.
14
 
 
Intuitionists would have a handy response to the regress argument, if only they 
could explain how it is that moral beliefs could be non-inferentially justified.  But the 
                                                 
13
 Wedgwood 2007: 225. 
 
14
 Mackie 1977: 38. 
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way in which they have typically done this—via an analogy to the self-evidence of 
propositions about other subjects, like mathematics—seems to many to be devastatingly 
problematic, ultimately raising more questions than it answers.  Despite a recent swelling 
of interest in intuitionism, I think there are many who would still echo G. J. Warnock’s 
1967 verdict: “Intuitionism seems, in retrospect, so strange a phenomenon—a body of 
writing so acute and at the same time so totally unilluminating—that one may wonder 
how to explain it, what its genesis was.”15   
 
So things are not looking particularly good for the status of our ordinary moral 
intuitions.  As I said above, we go on as if they are justified beliefs about objective moral 
values.  But in light of the challenge posed by the regress argument, and the apparent 
difficulty of accounting for how moral propositions could be self-evident, it just is not 
clear how moral intuitions could be justified.  Given the way in which they are formed, it 
does not seem as if our moral intuitions are ordinarily the conclusions of any kind of 
inference from justified beliefs.  And the prospects of non-inferential justification of 
moral intuitions now seem pretty bleak.   
 
Making matters worse, apparently, is the fact that recent work in empirical moral 
psychology strongly suggests that, far from being the products of some sort of rational 
faculty, our ordinary moral intuitions are in fact the effects of emotion.  So ethical 
intuitionism—or at least, many versions of the view—may suffer from a kind of 
empirical inadequacy as well.  Summarizing the past 20 years or so of research into the 
                                                 
15
 Warnock 1967: 16.  For what it’s worth, Warnock’s own explanation of the genesis of intuition-
ism was that intuitionists were lacking in both curiosity and doubt.   
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neuro-psychological underpinnings of moral judgment, psychologists Joshua Greene and 
Jonathan Haidt write,  
[H]ow do we decide that someone else has done something wrong? [...] 
Recently, [...] findings from several areas of cognitive neuroscience have 
begun to converge on an answer: emotions and reasoning both matter, but 
automatic emotional processes tend to dominate.
16
 
 
Thorough discussion of this research will have to be put off until chapter III.  For now, I 
want only to explain what the research seems to imply, and why this matters to the 
foregoing discussion of the epistemology of moral intuitions.  Roughly, the research 
implies that our ordinary moral intuitions—the ones we form while watching the news, or 
talking with a friend, or even reading a piece of fiction—are the products of a process in 
which emotion figures centrally as a cause.  In other words, at least in ordinary cases, we 
have the intuitions that we have because we respond emotionally to things in the ways 
that we do.   
 
This is significant to the epistemic status of our moral intuitions because there is a 
long-standing assumption, shared by philosophers and non-philosophers, according to 
which emotions are at best distractions or obstacles to clear thinking.  As Alison Jaggar 
notes, “Within the Western philosophical tradition, emotions have usually been 
considered potentially or actually subversive of knowledge.”17  In a 2007 article entitled 
“Should We Trust Our Moral Intuitions?” Singer describes some of the relevant empirical 
psychological research—agreeing that it shows our moral intuitions to be grounded in 
emotion—and concludes, “[T]hese findings should make us more skeptical about relying 
                                                 
16
 Greene and Haidt 2002: 517. 
 
17
 Jaggar 2008: 378. 
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on our intuitions.”18  And of course, outside of philosophy, we regularly remark about the 
distorting influences of emotions upon our thoughts and behavior.  We say things like, “I 
was blinded by anger,” “He was overcome with fear,” and the like.  When the stakes of a 
particular belief or decision are relatively high, we are careful to recommend that people 
“keep a cool head,” and try not to let their emotions “get the best of them.”  So even if 
moral beliefs could be non-inferentially justified, it would be easy to conclude on the 
basis of this empirical research that our ordinary moral intuitions are not.     
 
Let me pause here to briefly take some stock, before going on in the next section 
to describe my project.  On the one hand, it is hard to deny that moral intuitions do, in 
fact, play the sorts of roles described above, both in the ordering and conducting of our 
everyday lives and in the task of doing ethics.  But on the other hand, I think it would be 
equally hard to deny, as Singer and others have pointed out, that our moral intuitions 
sometimes exhibit signs of being undeserving of the sort of trust that we apparently give 
to them.  Cutting even deeper than this is a kind of origins problem for moral intuitions: 
there is a large, and growing, body of empirical research into the psychological origins of 
our ordinary moral intuitions, and the evidence seems strongly to suggest that these 
intuitions are the products of a process in which emotion figures most prominently as a 
cause.  And when this is coupled with the popular assumption that emotion is at best a 
distraction or obstacle to clear thinking, it looks as if we’ve got a serious problem on our 
hands.  It is not just that our moral intuitions are sometimes untrustworthy—this could 
probably be said of all kinds of beliefs, under certain conditions.  Rather, if the empirical 
research is on point, it appears as if moral intuitions are systematically untrustworthy.   
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Something has got to give.  If the empirical research does indeed establish what it 
purports to establish—and in chapter III, I argue that it does—then we must either (i) 
somehow abandon the trust we apparently place in our ordinary moral intuitions, and also 
cease using them even as data points for moral theory; or else (ii) reject the popular 
assumption that our moral intuitions cannot be trusted if they are grounded in emotion.   
 
2. The project 
 
This dissertation is an attempt to defend the epistemic status of our moral intuitions in 
light of the recent empirical evidence of their being grounded in emotion.  At the end of 
the day, there may be other reasons for being “skeptical about relying on our intuitions,” 
as Singer puts it; but the fact that they are ordinarily the products of a process in which 
emotion figures centrally, I’ll argue, is not one of them.  And this is because the popular 
assumption is false: it is not the case that emotion could only be a distraction or obstacle 
to the formation of justified beliefs about objective moral values.  On some occasions, I’ll 
argue, a person’s intuitions will count as justified beliefs about objective moral values 
because they are grounded causally in emotion.   
 
On my account, the sort of justification that ordinary moral intuitions can enjoy is 
indeed non-inferential—and so, if my account is successful, there may be hope for 
intuitionists to stop the regress after all.  In defense of the non-inferential justification of 
(some) moral intuitions, I will follow-up on an analogy at which I hinted earlier, i.e., an 
analogy between moral intuitions and ordinary perceptual beliefs.  Ordinary perceptual 
beliefs count as non-inferentially justified, but not because their contents are self-evident 
in the sense described above.  Rather, they count as non-inferentially justified because of 
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the process by which they are ordinarily formed.  Likewise, I’ll argue, the process by 
which moral intuitions are ordinarily formed is one that can confer upon them a similar 
sort of non-inferential justification.  (I have more to say about justification in moral and 
non-moral cases in chapter IV.)  Interestingly, I think my account of the process by which 
moral intuitions are formed will also provide me with unique explanations for both the 
amount of disagreement over moral matters and the apparent connection between moral 
judgment and motivation.    
 
Furthermore, as far as the “special faculty of moral perception or intuition” is 
concerned, I intend to posit nothing more “queer” than the emotions with which we are 
already quite familiar.  To be sure, I will assume that there are objective moral values, 
something that Mackie obviously thought queer.  But as is evident from the quotation 
above, he, too, helps himself to an assumption that objective moral values exist, if only to 
speculate about the relative queerness of whatever faculty allows us to be aware of them.  
In fact, moral skeptics routinely begin their arguments by assuming that there are 
objective moral values—after all, if we do not at least assume that there is an x to be 
known, why bother arguing that knowledge of x is impossible?  And since my aims in 
this dissertation are purely epistemological, I intend to do the same, i.e., simply assuming 
that some variety of moral realism is the case.  Only then can I go on to explain, over the 
course of chapters II-IV, how it is that ordinary moral intuitions are, or can be, justified 
beliefs about real, objective moral values.  
 
Here is how the project will unfold.  In the next chapter, I’ll ask, “What is an 
emotion?”  Given how many philosophers and psychologists have speculated about the 
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impact of emotion upon the epistemic status of moral intuitions, it is remarkable how few 
of them have had anything to say about the actual nature of emotion.  Historically, 
theories of emotion have fallen into one of two camps.  On the one hand, feeling theorists 
argue that emotions are essentially just that—feelings.  These feelings are typically bodily 
in nature, but strictly speaking, a feeling theory of emotion could allow that there are 
non-bodily emotional feelings.  On the other hand, judgment theorists claim that 
emotions are a species of judgment or belief—typically, evaluative judgment or belief.  
More recently, philosophers have grown interested in the prospects of hybrid, or 
compound, theories of emotion—i.e., theories according to which emotions exhibit 
features similar to both feelings and judgment.  After briefly reviewing two prominent 
feeling theories and one judgment theory, I’ll go on to defend a hybrid theory according 
to which emotions are complex mental states, consisting of what I will call construals, 
concerns, and feelings, all related to each other in particular ways.   
 
Then, in chapter III, with a working account of the nature of emotion in hand, I’ll 
review some of the empirical research mentioned above, especially those studies that I 
think most strongly implicate a causal relationship between emotion and moral intuitions.  
Some of the evidence will come from neuroimaging studies, some from social 
psychological studies, and some from studies in abnormal psychology.  Together, 
however, I believe it all amounts to a strong case for what is sometimes called 
psychological sentimentalism, which I define as the view that ordinary moral intuitions 
17 
 
are the products of a psychological process in which emotion figures centrally as a 
cause.
19
 
 
Chapter IV is the centerpiece of the project.  In this chapter, I bring the 
discussions from chapters II and III together in defense of the claim that moral judgment 
can be a process that confers non-inferential justification upon moral intuitions.  My 
argument depends heavily upon the theory of emotion that I defend in chapter II, and also 
upon an account of the relationship between emotion and moral virtue that I develop in 
chapter IV.  
 
Finally, in chapter V, I respond to four arguments against thinking that moral 
intuitions are justified beliefs about objective moral values.  The first three arguments 
directly address the significance of emotion to moral judgment.  One way or another, they 
all claim either that moral intuitions cannot be, or at least that they are probably not, 
justified beliefs about objective moral values if they are causally grounded in emotion.  
The fourth argument, also from Sinnott-Armstrong, has to do with the susceptibility of 
moral judgment to what are sometimes called framing effects.  Rather than arguing that 
moral judgment is not susceptible in this way, I’ll argue that these studies actually 
provide an interesting sort of confirmation of my overall view.  I conclude this chapter, 
and the dissertation, by speculating about further avenues of research that may be opened 
up by my view.  
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3. ‘Moral intuition’ and ‘moral judgment’: clarifying two key terms 
 
Before proceeding, I should clarify my use of two key terms.  This will be especially 
important for following the discussion in chapters III-V.   
 
The term ‘moral intuition’ is sometimes used to refer to a kind of capacity, i.e., an 
instinct or insight into moral matters.  Indeed, in general, the term ‘intuition’ is often used 
in this way, as when my mother-in-law suggests that she has a “mother’s intuition,” by 
which she apparently means a kind of insight into the thoughts and behavior of her 
children.  Other times, however, the term ‘moral intuition’ is clearly used to refer to a 
kind of propositional attitude, like belief.  For instance, we sometimes say things like, “I 
have the intuition that such-and-such would be wrong,” or, “I have conflicting intuitions 
about what would be the right thing to do.”  Throughout this dissertation, as I have done 
here in the Introduction, I will use the term ‘moral intuition’ only in this latter sense, i.e., 
to refer to a moral belief with certain distinctive features.   
 
Interestingly, while both philosophers and psychologists regularly discuss moral 
intuitions, the two groups seem to isolate different—though related—features that they 
take to be characteristic of moral intuitions.  On the one hand, philosophers generally 
focus on the non-inferential nature of these beliefs.  Saying nothing at all (for now) about 
the justificatory status of moral intuitions, philosophers nonetheless generally concede 
that moral intuitions are distinctive in that they are not formed on the basis of any kind of 
inference from other beliefs.  As I’ve already noted, moral intuitions are typically where 
moral reasoning begins, both in our ordinary lives and in ethical theory.  On the other 
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hand, psychologists often note the speed and effortlessness with which moral intuitions 
are formed.  Jonathan Haidt explains, 
Commentators on intuition have generally stressed the fact that a 
judgment, solution, or other conclusion appears suddenly and effortlessly 
in consciousness, without any awareness by the person of the mental 
processes that led to the outcome.
20
 
 
I think it is clear enough that philosophers and psychologists are talking about the same 
thing, just with different concerns in mind.  Since philosophers are more likely to be 
concerned about the epistemic status of moral intuitions, it makes sense that they would 
focus on the fact that moral intuitions are not formed on the basis of any sort of inference.  
And since psychologists are more likely to be concerned about the causal mechanisms 
underlying moral intuitions, it makes sense for them to focus on the automaticity and 
effortlessness with which they are formed.  But at the end of the day, both groups are 
talking about a set of moral beliefs distinguished by the fact that they are not the products 
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 Haidt 2001: 818.  I actually think Haidt is unclear in his use of the term ‘moral intuition’.  At 
times, he uses it to refer to the psychological process underlying the sudden appearance in consciousness of 
an attitude or belief: “Moral intuition is therefore the psychological process that Scottish philosophers 
talked about, a process akin to aesthetic jugdgment” (ibid.).  At other times, it seems he is using it to refer 
not to the psychological process underlying this appearance, but to the appearance itself: “moral intuition 
can be defined as the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment” (ibid.).  To make matters 
even less clear, while he here uses the term ‘moral judgment’ to refer to the attitude or belief that appears in 
one’s consciousness, elsewhere, he clearly uses the term ‘moral judgment’ to refer instead to the 
psychological process underlying this appearance—a process which, again, he sometimes calls ‘moral 
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I say this not to pick on Haidt, but to highlight the fact that it is awfully easy to let one’s use of 
these terms go unchecked; and as a result, one risks making claims about one thing—e.g., the attitude or 
belief, the appearance of the attitude or belief in consciousness, the process underling the appearance, 
etc.—that would be more accurately made about something else.  If, for instance, I were to say that moral 
judgment is based upon emotion, but I were also to vacillate in this way with my use of the term ‘moral 
judgment’, my audience is liable to interpret me as making any number of importantly different claims.  I 
might be saying that the psychological process by which moral intuitions (as beliefs) are formed is one in 
which emotion figures centrally.  Or I might be saying that, in certain contexts, moral judgments and 
emotions are identical.  Or I might be saying something completely different.  It is for precisely this reason 
that it is important for me to clarify my use of these terms early, and then to stay consistent in my use of 
them throughout the entire dissertation.  
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of a cognitively effortful (and so, slower) process of inference or conscious reasoning.
21
  
I, too, will use ‘moral intuition’ to refer to moral beliefs with these features—i.e., moral 
beliefs formed relatively quickly and effortlessly, not on the basis of any inference.   
 
The term ‘moral judgment’ is perhaps even more diverse in its usage among 
philosophers and psychologists.  Like ‘moral intuition’, ‘moral judgment’ is sometimes 
used to refer to a belief or propositional attitude of some sort—as when we say, “It’s my 
judgment that it would be wrong to tell a lie.”  In examples like this, ‘(moral) judgment’ 
is apparently interchangeable with ‘(moral) belief’.  And like ‘moral intuition’, we also 
sometimes use ‘moral judgment’ to refer to a kind of capacity, like sight or creativity.  
Used in this way, moral judgment is something you exercise, something in which you 
engage; and some can be better at it than others—e.g., “She has excellent judgment in 
these (moral) matters.”   
 
Other times, the term ‘moral judgment’ is used to refer to a kind of mental act—
i.e., the act of forming a particular moral belief or attitude.  At still other times, ‘moral 
judgment’ is used to refer not to a belief or the act of forming a belief, but rather to the 
content of a belief—something like a Fregean thought.  In this sense, moral judgments 
are expressible in sentences, bearers of semantic value, and also truth-evaluable.  And 
finally, some (especially psychologists) use the term ‘moral judgment’ to refer to a kind 
of psychological process—specifically, the term is often used to refer to the 
psychological process responsible for the production of moral intuitions (see, e.g., n. 20).   
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For my part, I will only use the term ‘moral judgment’ in this last way.  Moral 
intuitions are moral beliefs that are formed quickly and effortlessly, not on the basis of 
any inference; and moral judgment is the psychological process that is ordinarily 
(causally) responsible for their production.  To be clear, I do not assume that our moral 
intuitions are always formed in exactly the same way.  But I do assume that there is 
something that can be identified as the process by which they are ordinarily formed.  I’ll 
use ‘moral judgment’ to refer to that process, whatever it might involve. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
II 
WHAT IS AN EMOTION? 
 
 
As I explained in the last chapter, the focus of my project is upon the role of emotion in 
moral judgment, and the implications of this upon the epistemic status of moral 
intuitions.  Since it will be difficult to draw any conclusions about either of these issues 
without first having some idea of what an emotion is, that is where my inquiry will begin: 
What is an emotion? 
 
Let me start by identifying a few of what I take to be ordinary features of 
emotion.  First of all, emotional experiences typically involve feelings of various sorts.  
For instance, fear is often accompanied by such things as an increased heart rate, 
shortness of breath, trembling limbs, and the sensation of being frozen, unable to move, 
etc.  Second, there are conceptual ties between emotions and the conditions that typically 
elicit them.  In paradigmatic cases, for instance, fear is elicited by dangers; anger by 
offenses; grief by losses; etc.  And these elicitors figure into our conceptions of the 
corresponding emotions—e.g., danger figures into our conception of what fear is.  Third, 
emotions are intentional states, in the sense that they are directed at, or about, things in 
the world.
1
  When we are afraid, there is something we are afraid of; when angry, there is 
something we are angry with or at; and so forth.  And finally, emotions are sometimes 
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 This point about the intentionality of emotion is often taken to mark the distinction between 
emotions and moods.  Emotions take objects; moods do not.  Fear and anxiety are both affective states, but 
unlike fear, anxiety can occur without an object.  That is, we can be anxious about nothing at all—in such a 
case, the anxiety is a mood, not an emotion.  Fear, however, must always be of something.   
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subject to evaluation—both rational and moral.  It is right (in some sense) to fear a 
ferocious bear, and wrong (in a related sense) to fear Yogi bear.  If someone is not 
ashamed of some terrible behavior, we regard the lack of shame as a moral failure in 
itself.  So here are four ordinary features of emotion: emotions are accompanied by 
feelings; there are conceptual ties between emotions and their elicitors; emotions are 
intentional; and emotions are sometimes subject to evaluation.  There certainly may be 
more features that emotions share, but for now, I’ll assume that a satisfactory account of 
the nature of emotion should at least be able to account for these four.   
 
So what sort of thing is an emotion?  What sort of thing could have all of these 
features?  In this chapter, I’ll argue that emotions are complex states, consisting of three 
things—construals, concerns, and feelings—bearing particular relations to each other.  As 
I’ll explain later (in §4), a construal is a type of mental state in which one thing is seen in 
terms of something else.  Construals are cases of seeing-as—e.g., when I see a coffee cup 
as empty (as opposed to seeing it as dirty, or as a gift from my wife), I construe the cup in 
terms of the concept empty.  Often times, my construal of a thing, i.e., the way I see it, 
will either clash or accord with my concerns.  My construal of the coffee cup as empty, 
for instance, will clash with my concern, my desire, for more coffee.  My construal of a 
snake as a threat to my wellbeing will clash with my concern for my wellbeing.  And 
finally, sometimes, the relation between construals and concerns will give rise to feelings 
of various sorts.  When these three things come together like this—i.e., when construals 
relate to concerns in ways that give rise to feelings—the result is an emotion.   
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This may sound more complicated than we might have expected from an account 
of something as commonplace as emotion, but as I’ll attempt to show in the next few 
sections, the account is nonetheless well motivated, as it does a better job than other 
emotion theories of accommodating the four features of emotion that I describe above.  In 
§§1-3, I’ll discuss three prominent theories of emotion—William James’ feeling theory, 
Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory, and Robert Solomon’s judgment theory, 
respectively.  Each theory, I’ll argue, does a better job than the one before it of 
accounting for the four ordinary features of emotion, but none can accommodate all of 
them.  And it will be important to see not only that they fail to accommodate them, but 
also how and why this is the case, for this will allow us to get a clearer picture of what a 
satisfactory account will have to look like.   
 
Before getting into it, though, I want to issue two quick caveats.  First, to those 
who doubt that a coherent and unifying theory of emotion is possible,
2
 I’ll have basically 
nothing to say.  I assume that there is something that unites the emotions, and I’ll explain 
what I think that is in §4.  But I’ll certainly not be running through the myriad things that 
have ever been called “emotions,” and considering whether or not they can be accounted 
for by the theory I endorse.  Throughout the chapter, my discussion will focus upon only 
the most paradigmatic of emotions—e.g., fear, anger, grief, etc.  If anything is an 
emotion, these are emotions.   
 
Second, I am only interested in getting a sufficient handle on the nature of 
emotion so that I can go on in subsequent chapters to explore the role that emotion plays 
in moral judgment.  So my aim here will not be to establish a complete theory of 
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 See, e.g., Rorty 1980 and Griffiths 2004. 
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emotion, i.e., one that addresses everything we might expect a theory of emotion to 
address.  That would require much more space than a single chapter, and likely involve 
discussions of issues not obviously relevant to moral judgment (e.g., similarities and 
differences between emotions, moods, and other affective phenomena; the roles played 
by different parts of the brain in the experience of particular emotions; etc.). 
 
1. Emotions as feelings 
 
In his seminal work The Principles of Psychology (1890), William James defends a 
theory of emotion according to which emotions are perceived (i.e., felt) changes to a 
subject’s physiology.  When I am angry, for instance, my face and neck may feel warmer, 
and my heart may seem to beat faster and with greater force.  According to a feeling 
theory of emotion, my perception, or feeling, of these physiological changes (and others) 
just is my anger. 
Our natural way of thinking about these […] emotions is that the mental 
perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, 
and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression.  My 
theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the 
perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as 
they occur IS the emotion.
3
 
 
In support of his theory, James has us imagine abstracting away all such feelings, and 
then asks: what is left of the emotion?  If we take away the warming of my face and neck, 
the increased heart rate, and any other such “feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find that 
we have nothing left behind, no ‘mind-stuff’ out of which the [anger] can be 
constituted.”4  In fact, in the case of anger, James thinks, once we take away all feelings 
of associated physiological changes, all that will be left is a certain sort of judgment, i.e., 
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 James 1950: 449-450; italics in original. 
 
4
 James 1950: 451. 
 26 
“some cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined to the intellectual 
realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons merits chastisement for their sins.”5 
 
It is certainly true that emotions often manifest themselves physiologically, and 
that these physiological changes are a part of what it is to feel the emotion.  Anger has a 
certain feel to it, one that often includes an increased heart rate, warming of the face and 
neck, and tightening of certain muscles.  Feeling theorists may even be right to suggest 
that each emotion has its own unique physiological signature.  James writes,  
The various permutations and combinations of which these organic 
activities [i.e., the physiological changes our perception of which, he 
thinks, constitutes an emotion] are susceptible make it abstractly possible 
that no shade of emotion, however slight, should be without a bodily 
reverberation as unique, when taken in its totality, as is the mental mood 
itself.
6
 
 
Fellow feeling theorist Carl Lange agrees, adding that it is their unique physiological 
signatures that allow us to distinguish between emotions.  What distinguishes anger from 
fear, for instance, is the fact that the former involves swelling of the blood vessels, an 
increase in the secretion of saliva, and the onset of irregular breathing, while the latter 
involves heart palpitations, dryness of the mouth, and trembling of limbs.
7
   
 
So maybe we should concede that James’ theory has indeed captured one of the 
four ordinary features of emotion I described earlier—i.e., that they are accompanied by 
feelings of various sorts.
8
  I do not, however, think that his theory can account for the 
other three features.  For starters, while James does acknowledge that emotions are 
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6
 James 1950: 450. 
 
7
 Lange 1967: 46-54. 
 
8
 In §4, I’ll suggest that emotional feelings are sometimes more psychological than physiological.   
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elicited by things, he seems not to recognize the conceptual ties between emotions and 
their elicitors.  Contrary to what James and Lange suggest, what distinguishes anger from 
fear is not just the set of differences between their physiological signatures, but also—
and, I would argue, primarily—the relations they bear to such things as dangers and 
offenses, respectively.   
 
Furthermore, James’ feeling theory is notorious for its failure to account for the 
intentionality of emotion.  Of course, the feelings with which James identifies emotions 
are intentional in a sense.  They are feelings of something—namely, physiological 
changes.  But this is obviously not what anyone has in mind when they claim that 
emotions are intentional states.  When I am lied to, for instance, my anger is direct at the 
liar, and not anything going on in my body.  So even if James’ theory allows some sense 
in which emotions are intentional, he has obviously not accounted for the intentionality of 
emotion in the right way.  And it’s not clear how he could: how could the feeling of 
certain physiological changes ever be directed at something else?   
 
James wrongly assumes that the object of an emotion is just whatever caused it, 
but as many have since realized, the relationship between an emotion and its object 
cannot be a causal one.  Even if emotions are sometimes directed at their causes, this is 
not always the case.  Suppose Susan tells me that she overheard John, a colleague of 
mine, slandering me, but she is lying—John did not actually slander me.  I will be angry, 
and my anger will be directed at John.  He is the object of my anger.  But in what sense is 
John the cause of my anger?  Maybe John doesn’t even exist—I’ve fallen victim to an 
elaborate hoax, set up to get me to believe that I have a colleague named John who 
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slanders me behind my back.  Yet I am genuinely angry, and angry at John.  This case 
may be contrived, but I think it nonetheless highlights the fact that the object-of and 
cause-of relations operate fundamentally differently with respect to emotion.  (This point 
is perhaps familiar from discussions in other areas of the philosophy of mind.)  An 
acceptable account of the intentionality of emotion, it seems, will have to allow for 
emotions to sometimes be directed at things other than their causes.  
 
Finally, it is hard to imagine how mere feelings of physiological changes could 
ever be subject to rational or moral evaluation.  On at least a simple feeling theory, like 
the one that James defends, emotions are apparently no different, from a rational or moral 
perspective, than feelings of other physiological phenomena—e.g., the feeling of hunger, 
the feeling of a headache, a sunburn, etc.  Without making any reference at all to the 
conceptual ties that exist between emotions and the sorts of things that typically elicit 
them, there doesn’t seem to be any grounds left upon which James might claim that we 
ought or ought not have certain emotions in certain circumstances.  If fear, for instance, is 
really nothing more than the feeling of such things as an increased heart rate, dryness of 
the mouth, and trembling limbs, then what makes it the case that I ought to be afraid of 
poisonous snakes and not, say, images of poisonous snakes on the pages of a magazine?  
How could I ever be morally blameworthy or praiseworthy for feeling (or failing to feel) 
certain changes to my body?  If emotions are nothing more than feelings of physiological 
changes, I could be no more blameworthy for my failure to feel shame upon humiliating 
another person than for also failing to feeling hungry, or cold, or exhausted.   
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So by my count, James’ feeling theory can account for only one of the four 
ordinary features of emotion that I describe above.  Emotions are typically accompanied 
by feelings, and James can explain why this is the case.  But he cannot explain the sorts 
of conceptual ties that exist between the emotions and their elicitors; he cannot 
adequately account for the intentionality of emotion; and he cannot explain why emotions 
are sometimes subject to rational and moral evaluation.  Perhaps a more sophisticated 
feeling theory will do the trick.  In the next section, I consider just such a theory.   
 
2. Emotions as embodied appraisals 
 
In his book Gut Reactions (2004), Jesse Prinz attempts to vindicate James by modifying 
the basic feeling theory in a way that is supposed to allow it to avoid the problems I just 
raised for it.  So according to Prinz’s theory, emotions are still embodied in the sense that 
they are essentially feelings of physiological changes.  But, Prinz adds, emotions are also 
mental representations, and what they represent are “organism-environment relations that 
bear upon wellbeing” (following Lazarus,9 Prinz calls these relations “core relational 
themes”).  When an organism is in danger, it bears a certain sort of relation to its 
environment; and it is this relation that fear represents.  In virtue of their capacity to 
represent core relational themes like danger, Prinz thinks, emotions count as appraisals.  
So the main innovation of Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is supposed to be that it 
allows for a sense in which emotions can be directed at things outside of the body (e.g., 
danger), while still being identified with feelings of changes in the body.   
 
Why think that emotions are mental representations?  On the account of 
representation that Prinz prefers, mental representations are mental states that satisfy two 
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 Lazarus 1991. 
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conditions: first, they must carry information; and second, it must be possible for the 
states to be erroneous in some sense.
10
  How does a mental state carry information, and 
what sort of information will it carry?  Basically, whenever some thing x is reliably 
caused by some other thing y, Prinz thinks, x will carry information about y.  Smoke 
carries information because it has a reliable cause, and it carries information about fire 
because fire is its reliable cause.  If some mental state M, then, has a reliable cause C, 
then M will carry information about C.  But this is not yet to say that M represents C, for 
it remains to be determined whether or not M satisfies the second condition for mental 
representation—i.e., the possibility of error.  Smoke only carries information about fire, 
and does not represent fire, because even in cases in which there is smoke but no fire, it 
does not make sense to say that the smoke is mistaken. 
 
What makes it possible for representations to be erroneous, says Prinz, is the fact 
that they have been “set up” to carry information, i.e., they have the function of carrying 
the information that they carry.  Smoke was not “set up” to carry information about fire; 
it just does.  Our concepts, on the other hand, do seem to have the function of carrying 
certain information. 
A dog concept is different [than something like smoke].  It is set up—that 
is, learned—in order to reliably respond to dogs.  A dog concept is a 
mental state that is reliably caused by dogs and was acquired for that 
purpose.  In the simplest cases, this just means that the mental state was 
initially formed as a result of dog encounters, rather than encounters with 
something else.
11
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 This is a theory of mental representation that Prinz attributes to Dretske (1981, 1986), but Prinz 
himself has also defended a version of the theory (2000, 2002). 
 
11
 Prinz 2004: 53. 
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Our dog concept represents dogs, then, because the concept was “set up to be set off” by 
dogs.  This is its function.  But importantly, our dog concept can malfunction, by being 
elicited by non-dogs (e.g., wolves, foxes, etc.).  In such cases, the concept will be applied 
erroneously.  So it is this feature of mental states—i.e., their being set up to be set off by 
certain things—that allows them to be not just information carriers, but representations.   
 
How is this account of mental representation supposed to provide Prinz with 
solutions to the problems I raised earlier for James’ feeling theory?  According to Prinz, 
emotions are mental representations because they have been set up (by evolution and 
learning) to be set off by certain things.  Suppose this is the case.  Now we must ask, 
what have they been set up to be set off by?  That is, what do emotions represent?  For an 
answer, Prinz suggests we reflect upon the conditions that typically elicit emotions: fear 
typically occurs in circumstances of danger; anger typically occurs in circumstances in 
which someone has committed an offense; grief typically occurs in circumstances of loss; 
etc.  All of these circumstances involve some kind of organism-environment relation that 
bears upon wellbeing—i.e., core relational themes.  The fact that emotional experiences 
are patterned in this way, he thinks, is evidence that they have been set up to be set off 
by—i.e., that they represent—these core relational themes.  Furthermore, it is certainly 
plausible that evolution would be interested in equipping us with mechanisms for 
detecting such organism-environment relations as being in danger.  Surely, having a 
mechanism for detecting dangers is advantageous for the purpose of survival—whereas, 
for instance, being equipped with a mechanism for detecting things like trembling limbs 
and dryness of the mouth does not appear to be advantageous in this way.  So, Prinz 
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concludes, “emotions are reliably caused by both bodily changes and core relational 
themes, but they seem to have the function of detecting only the latter.”12  
 
Does Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory fare any better than James’ feeling theory 
when it comes to accounting for the four features of emotion described earlier?  I think it 
does.  For starters, if James accounts for the fact that emotions are closely associated with 
feelings, then so does Prinz.  After all, Prinz agrees with James in conceiving of emotions 
as feelings of physiological changes.  So Prinz’s theory can apparently fare no worse than 
James’ theory.  Further, Prinz’s account of mental representation allows him to explain 
the sorts of conceptual ties described above between emotions and their eliciting 
conditions.  On James’ theory, you will recall, it is as if danger has nothing to do with 
what fear is—fear is just the feeling of a particular set of physiological changes, 
regardless of what happens to elicit those changes.  But according to Prinz, fear is the 
feeling of a set of physiological changes set up to be elicited by dangers.  Let’s allow, 
then, that Prinz can account both for the fact that emotions are paradigmatically felt, and 
also for the sorts of patterns that exist between emotions and their eliciting conditions.  
So Prinz does a better job than James of accounting for the ordinary features of emotion.  
But I nonetheless think that Prinz’s theory fails adequately to account both for the 
intentionality of emotion and also for the fact that emotions are sometimes subject to 
rational and moral evaluation. 
 
Before I explain why I think Prinz does not adequately account for the 
intentionality of emotion, let me briefly say two more things about the way in which he 
attempts to do so.  First, Prinz thinks that emotions actually have two kinds of objects:   
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A formal object is the property in virtue of which an event elicits an 
emotion, and a particular object is the event itself.  The death of a child 
can be a particular object of one’s sadness, but it causes sadness in virtue 
of being a loss.  Being a loss is the formal object of sadness.  Emotions 
represent their formal objects, not their particular objects.
13
 
 
If emotions only ever represent their formal objects, though, how do particular objects get 
represented?  According to Prinz, an emotion’s particular object is represented by some 
non-emotional mental state that, in some sense, accompanies the emotion.   
If I am sad about the death of a child, I have one mental representation 
[e.g., a belief] that corresponds to the child’s death and another, my 
sadness, that corresponds to there having been a loss.  Together, we can 
think of these as constituting a complex representation that means the 
child’s death has been a loss to me.  We might think of the compound as 
meaning something like: a child has died, and what a loss!
14
 
 
And second, like James, Prinz apparently believes that the relationship between an 
emotion and its object—whether its formal or particular object—is a causal relationship.  
“The conditions (real or imagined) that elicit an emotion,” he writes, “can be referred to 
as its objects.”15  He is even more explicit a few lines later: “Saying that my sadness is 
about the death does not mean that my sadness represents the death; rather it means that 
the death is what caused me to become sad.”16 
 
As we saw earlier, though, however it is that emotions take their objects, it is 
apparently not by being caused by them.  In the earlier example, my anger was directed at 
a slandering co-worker who may or may not even exist.  Interestingly, Prinz himself 
appears to countenance cases of non-existent and imaginary objects of emotion—“The 
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conditions (real or imagined) that elicit an emotion can be referred to as its objects.”  But 
it is unclear how an imaginary object—i.e., the object, not the imagining of it—can cause 
a person to experience an emotion.  Again, in the example, I am angry at John.  He is the 
object of my anger.  Surely, though, John could not have caused me to become angry.   
 
Furthermore, even if Prinz’s analysis seems correct in some cases, he owes us 
more by way of an explanation of why only one cause of an emotion, and not others, 
turns out to be the emotion’s object.  It is not enough to say that the death caused me to 
be sad, for presumably, my sadness could have been caused by more than just the death.  
Maybe this particular death only causes me to become sad because of how close I’ve 
recently grown to a relative of the deceased.  Had I not recently grown so close to this 
person, I would not be at all saddened by the death.  So what is the cause of the sadness?  
The death?  Or my close relationship to the relative?  Both, it seems.  But of course, my 
sadness is only about one of these things.  If emotions take their objects in virtue of being 
caused by them, however, one wonders why we do not also say that my sadness is about 
the close relationship.  Maybe I had too much coffee to drink on the day that Susan 
reports my non-existent colleague’s slanderous behavior, and the effect of the coffee also 
has a role to play in eliciting my anger.  So why is my anger only at John, and not also at 
the coffee (or its effects), or Susan’s reporting, or the elaborate hoax to get me to believe 
that John exists in the first place?  If not for any of these other things, I wouldn’t be 
angry.  But none is the object of my anger.  Prinz offers us no way to explain why, on his 
causal account of the way in which emotions take their objects, emotions only take some 
 35 
causes as their objects and not others.
17
  All the more reason, I submit, for thinking that 
the object-of and cause-of relations operate fundamentally differently when it comes to 
emotion. 
 
Can Prinz account for the fact that emotions are sometimes subject to evaluation?  
In one sense, yes; but in other important senses, no.  According to Prinz, emotions can be 
“misapplied,” just as, for instance, concepts can be misapplied.  I might see a wolf and 
think to myself, “That dog is huge.”  Here a particular mental representation—the dog 
concept—is being applied erroneously.  Likewise, if fear has been “set up to be set off 
by” dangers, then whenever I am afraid of a non-danger, my fear is similarly erroneous.  
This is the sense in which Prinz can account for emotions being subject to evaluation: for 
any emotion, it ought always and only to be caused by whatever it has been set up to be 
set off by; and whenever it is not, the emotion is in this sense mistaken.  This, indeed, is 
an improvement upon James’ theory, which apparently could not account for any sense in 
which emotions are subject to evaluation.  But there are still cases in which our emotions 
are subject to types of evaluation for which Prinz apparently cannot account.  First of all, 
he cannot account for any sense in which emotions are subject to moral evaluation.  
When I say of someone else, “You ought to be ashamed of yourself,” the ‘ought’ here is 
clearly a moral ought.  What I mean to be saying is that, in this circumstance, a lack of 
shame constitutes a moral failing.  But nothing about Prinz’s account of emotion explains 
why this should be the case. 
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 Of course, he could say that the answer lies in whatever non-emotional state has come to be 
“attached” to the emotion—e.g., in the case of the death, it is a thought about the death, and not a thought 
about my close relationship with the relative.  But this would only be to push the problem back a step: Why 
is it that that thought, and not another, comes to be attached in this way to the emotion?   
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There also appear to be cases of emotions that are “erroneous” in the sense that 
Prinz describes, but are also evaluable along a further dimension for which he cannot 
account.  Consider two people who are deathly afraid of flying.  One, my mother-in-law 
Martha, knows that flying is a relatively very safe way to travel.  She was a flight 
attendant for many years, and her husband was a pilot for his entire professional life.  She 
has memories of trying to talk terrified passengers out of their own fear, and to this day, 
could give lectures on the safety of flying relative to other forms of travel.  But for all 
that, she is now too scared to step foot on a plane.  The other person, Stewart, shares 
Martha’s fear of flying, but also believes (falsely) that flying is one of the most dangerous 
ways to travel.  Notice, both fears are erroneous in the sense that Prinz describes—i.e., 
they’re both apparently being “set off” by non-dangers.  But there is something else that 
is going wrong, something else that is out of order, in the case of Martha’s fear, but not in 
the case of Stewart’s.  There is a sense in which Martha’s fear shouldn’t be there, but 
Stewart’s should, even though they’re both erroneous in Prinz’s sense.  And it is difficult 
to see how his view could account for this further kind of error.  Irrational fear is not 
simply fear of a non-danger; rather, for me to have an irrational fear is for me to be afraid 
of something I do not see as a danger.  Cases like my mother-in-law’s fear of flying 
suggest that our emotions owe something not just to the way things are—as Prinz 
explains—but also to the way we see things.  
 
The embodied appraisal theory of emotion is no doubt an improvement upon 
James’ feeling theory.  Prinz can still account for the fact that emotions are closely 
associated with feelings, and it also appears that he can accommodate the clear 
conceptual ties between emotions and their eliciting conditions.  But I do not think that he 
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accounts for the intentionality of emotion in the right way.  And I think we should prefer 
a theory that better accommodates the various dimensions along which our emotions 
seem subject to rational and moral evaluation.   
 
3. Emotions as judgments
18
 
 
Switching gears a bit, I’ll now briefly consider a theory according to which emotions are 
not anything physiological.  Rather, on this theory, emotions are judgments of a certain 
sort.  Here is Robert Solomon stating the theory:  
“I am angry at John for taking (“stealing” begs the question) my car” 
entails that I believe that John has somehow wronged me.  (This must be 
true even if, all things considered, I also believe that John was justified in 
taking my car.)  The (moral) judgment entailed by my anger is not a 
judgment about my anger […]  My anger is that judgment.  If I do not 
believe that I have somehow been wronged, I cannot be angry (though I 
might be upset, or sad).  Similarly, if I cannot praise my lover, I cannot be 
in love (though I might want her or need her, which, traditional wisdom 
aside, is entirely different).  If I do not find my situation awkward, I 
cannot be ashamed or embarrassed.  If I do not judge that I have suffered a 
loss, I cannot be sad or jealous.  I am not sure whether all emotions entail 
judgments […]  But emotions in general do appear to require this feature: 
to have an emotion is to hold a normative judgment about one’s 
situation.
19
 
 
Right off the bat, we can make a few observations about Solomon’s theory.  First of all, it 
probably ought to be tweaked a bit in order to allow for cases of genuine anger even 
when the subject does not judge that he is the one who has been wronged.  My anger at 
some child abuser I hear about on the news surely does not entail a judgment to the effect 
that the child abuser has wronged me, but rather only that he has wronged someone—or 
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perhaps even more broadly, that he has committed some kind of offense.  And of course, 
something similar will likely have to be said about many other emotions—I can be afraid 
even if I am not the one in danger; I can grieve even if I am not the one who as suffered a 
loss; etc. 
 
Second, Solomon’s theory will apparently have no trouble accounting for the sorts 
of conceptual ties that exist between emotions and their eliciting conditions, since the 
eliciting conditions typical of a particular emotion will presumably be referenced in the 
very judgment to which the emotion is supposed to be identical.  Fear is related to danger, 
Solomon will say, because to fear x is just to judge that x is a danger.  Anger is related to 
offense, because to be angry at x is just to judge that x has committed an offense.  And so 
on and so forth. 
 
And third, this sort of theory is clearly better suited to account for the 
intentionality of emotion than the other two.  According to Solomon, emotions are just 
judgments, and judgments are obviously among the sorts of things that can be intentional.  
This theory can explain not only why it is, for instance, that sadness or grief is about loss-
in-general, but also how it is that particular emotions have the particular objects that they 
do.  When I grieve my grandfather’s death, my grief is not just about loss-in-general, but 
about that loss in particular.  For my grief in this case is my judgment that my 
grandfather’s death is a loss.  In fact, the apparent ease with which a theory like 
Solomon’s can account for the intentionality of emotion has led many to believe that the 
best theory of emotion will have to be one that brings some kind of “cognitive” 
element—at least, something more cognitive than a mere feeling, like a belief, judgment, 
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etc.—into the analysis of what an emotion is.20  Obviously, Solomon does this by saying 
that emotions are constituted by, if they are not identical to, judgments of a certain kind; 
but as we’ll see later, this is certainly not our only option.   
 
How about the other features of emotion?  Can Solomon account for various ways 
in which our emotions are sometimes subject to evaluation?  He thinks he can.  If 
emotions are just a species of judgment, then they are subject to all the same criticisms to 
which judgments are typically subject.  This includes criticisms made on the basis of 
inaccuracy: to be afraid of a non-danger is to make the same sort of mistake one makes in 
judging that a non-dog is a dog.  So Solomon can apparently account for the same sense 
in which emotions are subject to evaluation for which Prinz could account.  But Solomon 
thinks he can also account for the moral responsibility that we sometimes attach to people 
for their emotions.   
[I]t always makes sense, at least (as it does not, for example, for 
headaches, heart attacks, and hormones) to praise or blame a person, not 
just for contributing to the situation that caused the emotion but, […] for 
having the emotion itself, as one blames a person for bigotry, for example, 
or praises them for courage.
21
 
 
This is because, as Solomon argues, rather than happening to us, emotions are things that 
we do.  Emotions are judgments, and judgments are things we choose to make. They are 
actions.  And so we are every bit as much to blame for feeling contempt or disgust toward 
someone of a different race as we are for using a racial slur.   
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On the one hand, Solomon certainly deserves credit for establishing some sense in 
which people can be morally responsible for their emotions.  Prinz, apparently, could not 
do this.
22
  But on the other hand, it is surely false that emotions are always chosen by us 
in the sense that Solomon thinks they are.  Suppose Tom was raised in a racist household, 
conditioned over years to feel contempt and disgust toward black people.  As an adult, 
however, Tom has since disavowed the racism of his upbringing.  He has friends and co-
workers who are black, and he now sincerely judges that black people are his equals in 
every relevant sense.  But for all that, there are times at which he cannot help himself.  
When his daughter begins dating a young black man, for instance, he finds himself 
overcome by the sorts of feelings he once had toward black people.  He is ashamed by 
this, but finds that there is little he can do to change his feelings toward this young man.   
 
It is no doubt regrettable that Tom feels this way toward his daughter’s boyfriend, 
but given all that we know about him, it cannot be right to say that he is choosing to feel 
contempt and disgust toward the young man.  This is the difference between Tom and his 
relatives (who, presumably, would feel the same toward the young man), and it is a 
difference that is surely relevant to our evaluation of these people and their emotions.  
Given the circumstances, I’m certainly inclined to blame the relatives for their emotions 
(and maybe also for Tom’s); but I’m more inclined to pity Tom than to blame him.  At 
the very least, he is surely less blameworthy than his relatives, despite having the same 
emotions.  If, however, as Solomon argues, “emotions are rational and purposive rather 
than irrational and disruptive,” and “we choose an emotion much as we choose a course 
of action,” it is difficult to see how we could really draw this sort of distinction between 
                                                 
22
 At least, not without an account of moral responsibility according to which one can be morally 
blameworthy for failing to be caused to have certain feelings.   
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Tom and his racist relatives.
23
  So while I think Solomon has gone some way toward 
adequately accounting for the various ways in which we hold people responsible for their 
emotions—certainly more so than Prinz—we still might hope for an account that allows 
us to distinguish between emotions that are chosen, or under our control, and emotions 
that are not.   
 
And finally, Solomon’s theory suffers for its inability to account for the fact that it 
is characteristic of emotions that they be accompanied by feelings of various sorts.  He 
presents the theory as a kind of reaction to the prevailing Jamesian view that emotions are 
“physiological disturbances.”  Against such a view, he argues, “One can be angry without 
feeling angry: one can be angry for three days or five years and not feel anything 
identifiable as a feeling of anger continuously through the prolonged period.”24  On the 
basis of cases like this, Solomon concludes, “[A]n emotion is never simply a feeling, not 
even a feeling plus anything.”25  And as we’ve seen, he ends up with an analysis of 
emotion on which feelings are nowhere relevant.  As far as Solomon’s theory is 
concerned, someone completely incapable of experiencing any of the feelings we 
ordinarily associate with emotions—think of someone like Data from Star Trek—could 
nonetheless have every bit as much of the emotional life as anyone else.  That is, as long 
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as this unfeeling person has whatever is required for judging things to be dangers, 
offenses, losses, etc.   
 
This looks to me like an over-reaction to the Jamesian view.  James may go too 
far in identifying emotions with feelings, but Solomon goes similarly too far in severing 
feelings from emotion altogether.  Even if he is right that emotions can sometimes be 
unfelt,
26
 such cases are atypical, and nothing about Solomon’s view explains why this is 
the case.  In fact, feelings are apparently so integral to our emotional lives that we have 
developed a habit of talking about emotions as if they were nothing more than feelings.  
When I want to know how some event affected my friend emotionally, I ask him, “How 
did that make you feel?”  We say things like, “That makes me feel angry,” or, “I felt so 
afraid.”  If emotions are just judgments, though, it is hard to imagine what an expression 
like “feeling afraid” could even mean.  Feeling as if (I’ve judged that) something is a 
danger?  What does that mean?  The fact of the matter is that there are feelings 
characteristic of the emotions, and we should prefer a theory of emotion that 
accommodates this fact. 
 
I think Solomon’s theory is a step in the right direction from Prinz’s.  Solomon 
can account both for the conceptual ties between emotions and their elicitors, and also for 
the intentionality of emotion (at both the general and particular levels).  He can also 
account for a sense in which emotions are subject to both rational and moral evaluation, 
though I think there are problems with the way he does this.  So perhaps we should grant 
that he’s captured three of the four ordinary features of emotion described in my 
introduction.  Each section has gotten us closer and closer to a satisfactory account of 
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emotion, and in the next section, I’ll attempt to bring the discussion home with an 
account that captures all of the ordinary features of emotion that I have been discussing. 
 
4. My account of emotion 
 
In this section, I develop an account of emotion according to which emotions are 
complex states, consisting of three things: construals, concerns, and feelings.  My account 
of emotion owes much to the account defended by Robert Roberts (1988, 2003), 
according to which emotions are “concern-based construals.”  In fact, construals are 
central to my own account as well, so I’ll happily draw upon relevant parts of his work in 
order to expound my view.  In the end, it may turn out that the differences between our 
two accounts are negligible at best, but I’ll nonetheless argue that my own account does a 
better job than Roberts’ account of explaining certain cases. 
 
Following Roberts, I understand a construal as “a mental event or state in which 
one thing is grasped in terms of something else.” 27   This definition is intentionally 
imprecise, as the set of events or states that can count as construals is actually quite 
varied.  For instance, the sort of “grasping” that I have in mind can take many forms: 
perceiving, thinking of, imagining, judging, etc.  And the set of things in terms of which 
other things can be grasped is similarly diverse, including perceptions, images, thoughts, 
concepts, etc.  In Philosophical Investigations (1953), Wittgenstein considers a case in 
which “I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another.  I see that it 
has not changed; and yet I see it differently.”28  Here, for instance, we might say that 
Wittgenstein is grasping the first face in terms of the second—i.e., he has gone from 
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simply seeing a face, to seeing the same face as (similar to) another.  We can also see 
faces in terms of concepts, e.g., seeing the face as rugged, or as kindly, etc.  Construals, 
then, are always cases of seeing-as, but the “seeing” is not always straightforwardly 
perceptual.   
I can imagine my living room in terms of furniture in the store, which I am 
presently perceiving; or in terms of either the image or the thought of my 
parents’ living room, or in terms of the concept grandiose or well-
coordinated; or I can think of myself (which is quite different from 
imagining myself or perceiving myself) in respect of likeness to my father, 
whom I am presently perceiving; or in terms of an image, such as coming 
sweating and triumphant across the finish line; or in terms of a concept, 
like intelligent or moody.
29
 
 
So construals are not always perceptual, but as Roberts explains, they very often “have an 
immediacy reminiscent of sense perception.  They are impressions, ways things appear to 
the subject.”30  Just as soon as I see a man raise his auction paddle, I see him as bidding; 
just as soon as I see a gray cloud, I see it as a rain cloud; and so on and so forth.   
 
Construals are sometimes under our control, and sometimes not.  The coffee cup 
before me appears white, and barring some sort of intervention (putting on colored 
lenses, etc.), there’s little that I can do about that.  However, I might construe the cup in 
any number of ways: as a gift from my wife, as in need of cleaning, as half-empty, as 
half-full, etc.  And in many cases, I will be able to switch back and forth between these 
construals voluntarily.  Consider the famous duck-rabbit figure:   
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Initially, I might only be able to see this as a duck.  But once I get the hang of seeing the 
rabbit as well, I may soon be able to switch back and forth at my leisure.  Of course, I am 
no more in control of the visual input in this case than I was in the case of my white 
coffee cup, i.e., I am not in control of what I see.  But I am—or can be—in control of the 
way I see it.  Sometimes, however, a particular way of seeing something can have a kind 
of grip on you, so that you cannot help but see it in that way.  And this need not be 
because you haven’t yet learned how to see it differently, as in the case of a visual 
illusion like the duck-rabbit.  For example, it can sometimes be incredibly difficult to see 
a person as anything but a political opponent, an unfaithful lover, or a character that he or 
she once played on television.   
 
Some construals are unconscious.  If you’ve ever found yourself consistently 
referring to a person by someone else’s name, for instance, it may be that you are 
unconsciously construing the one in terms of the other.  Here is another example: 
I am reading a journal article in which a quotation appears at the end of 
one page and extends by three words onto the next.  I turn the page and 
can’t find the end of the quotation.  I turn back again to see whether the 
quotation has in fact ended on the preceding page.  No.  On further 
examination of the succeeding page I see the three words hanging there 
isolated at the top, and realize that I have been construing them as a 
header, with the result that I did not consciously see them at all.
31
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Other examples are more serious.  As in the case of Tom above, if you were raised in a 
racist household, for instance, you may find that you respond negatively to people of a 
different race even if you have since disavowed the racism around which you were 
brought up.  And this is because, unconsciously, you still construe people of a different 
race in the terms in which they were once characterized by those around you.  
Interestingly, unconscious construals may also lie behind a phenomenon highlighted by 
Prinz in his critique of cognitive theories of emotion like Solomon’s.  Prinz cites studies 
that suggest that we can alter our emotions by simply making the facial expression 
characteristic of a particular emotion (e.g., we can make ourselves happier by smiling, 
angrier by scowling, etc.).
32
  According to Prinz, this is evidence that emotions can be 
activated without the mediation of an intentional attitude like judgment.  However, if 
construals can be unconscious, there is another interpretation available.  Here is Roberts: 
When facing that fearsome interviewer, try sitting up straight, leaning 
forward in a slightly assertive bodily attitude, looking her in the eye, and 
talking in an even voice.  Doing so will make you appear (to the 
interviewer, but more importantly, to yourself) to be in control of the 
situation.  You help out the prescribed construal by making the situation 
more plausibly construable in its terms.
33
 
 
Perhaps something similar is taking place in the case of facial expressions: In making a 
certain facial expression, we help ourselves to (unconsciously) see a particular 
circumstance as one that warrants whatever emotion is relevant to the expression.  As far 
as I can tell, Prinz does not seriously consider this possibility.   
 
How is all of this talk about construals relevant to emotion?  According to my 
preferred account of emotion, emotions essentially involve construals, so one cannot have 
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an emotion without construing something in some way.  But not every construal is 
involved in an emotion.  The difference between a construal that is involved in an 
emotion and one that is not has to do with the ways in which the two construals relate to 
our concerns.  According to my account, if Smith and Jones both construe themselves as 
having endured a loss of some sort (e.g., the death of a relative), but only Smith had any 
concern for the thing lost (e.g., Smith, but not Jones, loved the deceased), then only 
Smith will be sad.  Likewise, if Smith and Jones both construe themselves as having been 
mocked by Davis in front of their colleagues, but only Jones is concerned about his 
professional reputation, then only Jones will feel embarrassed, or angry with Davis.  
Suppose I’m given a giant, gaudy lawn ornament as a gift, but for whatever reason, can 
neither refuse it nor keep it hidden.  I spend my days and nights hoping and praying that 
it will be taken from me.  When it eventually is stolen, I may construe the thief as having 
stolen something from me; but even if I do, I may not be angry with him.  On the other 
hand, if he had stolen my car, something for which I have a great deal of concern, I 
would be furious.  So emotions involve construals, but not just any construals—rather, 
emotions involve only those construals that either clash or accord with our concerns.  
 
Before moving on, let me make two quick notes about the concerns to which 
construals are supposed to relate in these ways.  First, I mean for the term ‘concerns’ to 
be understood very broadly.  Included will be everything from aesthetic preferences, to 
loves (of perhaps all kinds), to moral, political, and religious commitments, to desires, 
goals, etc.  And second, the concern in question will have to be of a sufficient magnitude 
(from the subject’s perspective) in order for a construal to give rise to an emotion.  For 
instance, I can construe my coffee cup as empty, and that construal might clash with my 
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mild desire for more coffee, but it is unlikely that this will result in anything I’d consider 
to be an emotional experience.  On the other hand, if I have a deep love for coffee and 
know that this cup will be my last ever, then my construal of the cup as empty might lead 
to great sorrow on my part.  (I’ll have more to say about construals in chapter IV.) 
 
Here is where my account of emotion differs from Roberts’ concern-based 
construal account.  Roberts thinks that concerns must be a part of the construals 
themselves, i.e., a part of the way we see things.  He writes, “[T]he concern enters into 
the construal so as to characterize the appearance of the object.”34  This implies that two 
people with a different set of concerns with respect to x cannot construe x in the same 
way, i.e., they must see x differently.  But that doesn’t seem right.  In the above 
examples, it is not that Smith and Jones see themselves differently—each sees himself as 
having lost a relative, or as having been mocked by Davis.  If Roberts is right, though, it 
would seem that Smith just cannot construe Davis as mocking him, or as threatening his 
professional reputation, since he lacks the relevant concern.  But why think this?  
Consider another case.  There is an activity known as “BASE jumping” that involves 
jumping off of some fixed object (e.g., buildings, bridges, cliffs, etc.) and quickly 
deploying a parachute, the canopy of which the jumper holds in his or her hand.  It is 
widely considered to be one of the world’s most dangerous recreational activities.  
Suppose that a BASE jumper and I (not a thrill-seeker by any stretch of the imagination) 
stand on the edge of Angel Falls in Venezuela, the world’s highest waterfall.  The 
thought of jumping off of the 3,212-foot-high waterfall terrifies me.  But the BASE 
jumper is positively giddy with excitement.  Roberts’ view implies that this BASE 
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 Roberts 1988: 192. 
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jumper and I must be seeing things differently, and to be sure, it is not hard to understand 
why one would be inclined to think so.  After all, we respond to the situation in very 
different ways.  But if this thrill-seeker did not see the very same danger that I see when 
construing the situation, presumably, she would not be as excited as she is.  After all, if 
thrill-seekers themselves are to be believed, the sense that one’s safety is seriously 
threatened is precisely what makes it thrilling.  According to Roberts’ view, however, it 
seems we’d have to say that she cannot see jumping off the waterfall as a real threat, or 
else she’d be afraid.35  Perhaps there is a way for Roberts to account for cases like this.  
For now, though, I maintain that this one difference between our accounts—i.e., that he 
builds concerns into construals, and I do not—represents an advantage of my view: I am 
able to accommodate cases in which two people see things similarly but respond 
emotionally in different ways, whereas Roberts must insist that this is impossible.   
 
On the account of emotion that I have been developing, emotions involve 
(essentially) construals and their relations to our concerns.  But there is still one more 
piece to put in place: feelings.  While I think James and Prinz are mistaken to identify 
emotions with feelings, I do agree that emotions always involve feelings.  I do not, 
however, conceive of the relevant feelings as only perceptions of physiological changes.  
Unfortunately, surely due in no small part to the influence of James’ work, emotion 
theorists often speak of feelings in this context as if they are essentially bodily in nature.  
But this does little justice, I think, to the ways in which we ordinarily talk about 
                                                 
35
 Indeed, in conversation, Roberts has explained, “She [the thrill-seeker] doesn’t see it as a threat, 
although she is no doubt aware that she is doing something a bit dangerous, even for someone who has her 
equipment and skill. But it doesn’t appear anywhere near as dangerous to her as it does to you.”  I think this 
is precisely what we will have to say if we think that concerns are a part of the construals themselves, but I 
maintain that it does not really do justice to the psychology of the thrill-seeker.  
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emotional feelings.  Of course, many of the feelings involved in an emotion are somatic, 
but what about things like the feeling of down-ness associated with emotions like grief, 
or the feeling of triumph one experiences in victory, or the awkwardness one feels when 
traveling abroad and trying to speak a language in which one is far from fluent?  These 
feelings seem to be more psychological than physiological.  (Oakley calls them “psychic 
feelings,” and contrasts them with bodily feelings.36)  One of the ways in which shame 
might be felt, for instance, is in an inability to look people in the face (especially those 
with knowledge of the situation).   
 
What about cases of so-called “unfelt emotions”?  Consider a case like the one 
mentioned by Solomon in which someone is supposed to have been angry at x for years, 
and yet has not felt anything identifiable as the feeling of anger continuously through this 
period.  The assumption is supposed to be that, even at those times at which the subject 
feels nothing of the anger, he is still angry.  In such a case, however, I want to say that the 
person has not actually been angry at x for years, but rather has been disposed for years 
to be angry at x because, apparently, his anger at x has gone unresolved for years.  This is 
just what we mean when we say things like, “He’s been angry for years.”37  Consider 
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 Oakley 1992: 7ff. 
 
37
 Here is a related example: Someone who says, “I don’t get angry; I get even.”  One might think 
it plausible that, while such a person may not feel angry, she nonetheless is angry; and in getting even, she 
is acting out of anger.  I have a few things to say about this case.  First of all, there are real-life cases of 
people who perform vengeful actions despite an apparent deficit in relevant emotions—psychopaths, for 
instance.  These people presumably do not experience the sorts of feelings that we associate with certain 
emotions, but this is because they’re not experiencing the emotions at all—they don’t feel angry because 
they are not angry.  So the fact that one acts so as to “get even” is no guarantee that one is acting out of 
anger, or any other emotion.  Second, in normal cases, when people say things like this, I don’t think they 
mean to be giving an honest report of their psychological state.  Think, for instance, of the saying, “I don’t 
think it; I know it.”  This is pretty clearly not meant as a report of one’s epistemic position with respect to 
some proposition or state of affairs; rather, it is meant as an expression of confidence.  Likewise, the 
saying, “I don’t get angry; I get even” is meant not as a report of one’s psychological state, but rather as an 
expression of one’s intention to settle a score.  At least, this is how I’ve always interpreted someone who 
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another example: Rachel says that, throughout her entire engagement period, she was 
anxious about getting married.  But of course, on any one of the days during this period, 
we might have found her, say, typing away at her dissertation, engrossed in research, her 
upcoming nuptials the furthest thing from her mind.  In what sense is Rachel, in that 
moment, anxious about getting married?  She is anxious in the sense of being disposed to 
anxiety: if I interrupt her work and begin asking about her wedding plans, she’ll be 
anxious, and her anxiety will be accompanied by feelings of various sorts.  But at the 
moment, she is not actually anxious—just disposed to it.  Cases of so-called unfelt 
emotions are always cases of dispositions to feel emotions.  Emotions, I maintain, are 
always felt in some way.   
 
So, in my view, emotions are felt harmonies or disharmonies between the ways in 
which we see things (construals) and our concerns, and the sort of “feeling” I have in 
mind can involve any combination of physiological and psychological feelings.  To be 
clear, on this view, emotions are neither construals, nor concerns, nor feelings; rather, 
emotions are complexes consisting of all three, and the relations they bear to each other. 
 
How does this view accommodate the four ordinary features of emotion that I’ve 
been discussing throughout the chapter?  First, obviously, the view can accommodate the 
fact that emotions typically involve feelings of various sorts—on this view, as with the 
views of James and Prinz, those feelings are a part of the emotion itself.  Second, it nicely 
captures the connections between things like fear and danger, anger and offense, grief 
and loss, etc., because the latter items in these pairings will be among the terms in which 
                                                                                                                                                 
says something like this.  And finally, if this person really is angry, then I’d simply insist that she is 
experiencing some sort of emotional feelings, even if those feelings are currently being swamped, 
phenomenologically, by her desire to get even. 
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the subject of the emotion construes things.  For instance, fear will typically involve a 
construal of something as a danger.  And third, it accounts for the intentionality of 
emotion in virtue of the fact that construals are themselves intentional states.  The object 
of my emotion will always be whatever is the object of the relevant construal.  The snake 
is the object of my fear because it is the snake that I am seeing as dangerous.  Davis is the 
object of my anger because it is Davis that I construe as having committed some offense 
against me.  I am the object of my shame because I see myself as having done something 
terrible. 
 
In these ways, construals operate on my account a bit like judgments operate on 
Solomon’s.  But construals are importantly different from judgments, in that construing x 
as F does not entail that the construing subject actually believes that x is F—whereas one 
cannot judge that x is F without also believing that x is F.  This is important because it 
allows me to avoid a problem raised above for Solomon’s theory (see n. 23): the problem 
of accounting for the occasional dissociation between our emotions, on the one hand, and 
our beliefs, judgments, and the like, on the other.  If fear of x is a judgment that x is a 
danger, then one can apparently not fear something that one judges to be safe.  But this is 
precisely what’s happening in the case of my mother-in-law’s fear of flying.  On my 
view, cases of dissociation are easily accounted for, since I can judge that x is F and still 
see x as not-F.  My mother-in-law may sincerely judge that flying is among the safest 
ways to travel, and yet still construe flying (perhaps unconsciously) as a danger.  
Likewise, Tom may now judge that black people are his equals and still see his 
daughter’s boyfriend as having one or another of the qualities he was raised to associate 
with black people.   
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This brings me to my explanation of the ways in which emotions are sometimes 
subject to rational and moral evaluation.  To begin with, other things being equal, we 
ought to see things as they are.  Now, in some cases, there will be more than one way to 
do this.  For instance, in the case of the duck-rabbit, it is no more (or less) appropriate to 
see it as a duck than it is to see it as a rabbit.  To see it as a copy of Herman Melville’s 
Moby Dick, however, is to see it as something that it isn’t—and so, to construe it 
inaccurately.  Construals, I submit, are subject to norms of accuracy.  When I construe 
the coffee cup as a gift from someone other than my wife; whenever someone construes a 
wolf as a huge dog; and when my mother-in-law construes flying as a serious danger—
we are all violating a general norm that we ought to see things as they are.
38
  This is just 
one sense in which emotions, on my view, can be subject to evaluation, and it is the sense 
for which both Prinz and Solomon could account.  (To return to an earlier example, on 
my account of emotion, this is why it is right to fear a ferocious bear and wrong to fear 
Yogi bear—because only the former, and not the latter, is accurately construed as a 
danger.) 
 
Now recall the earlier contrast between my mother-in-law Martha and Stewart, a 
person who shares her fear of flying, but also sincerely believes that flying is a real 
danger.  In response to this case, I suggested that there are actually two kinds of mistakes 
being made here, one that both Martha and Stewart are making, and another that only 
                                                 
38
 Of course, there are contexts in which these norms do not apply, i.e., contexts in which violating 
these norms does not count as any kind of mistake or wrongdoing on our part.  In order to better understand 
someone else’s perspective, for instance, I might try “seeing things through her eyes,” i.e., construing 
things as (I think) she construes them.  And this might involve construing a thing as something that it 
isn’t—e.g., construing flying as a relatively dangerous way to travel.  In such a case, it surely wouldn’t be 
right to say that I’m guilty of some sort of error.  
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Martha is making.  (And Prinz, I argued, cannot account for the second of these 
mistakes.)  The mistake that both are making is the one described in the last paragraph: 
each fails to see flying as it is, namely, a safe way to travel.  The mistake that only 
Martha makes, however, is different.  Construals owe something not only to the way 
things are, but also to our beliefs or judgments about the way things are.  If I believe that 
x is F, then I have a defeasible reason for seeing x as F (or at least, a defeasible reason for 
not seeing x as not-F).  Martha’s belief that flying is relatively safe gives her a reason for 
seeing it that way, whether it is in fact safe or not.  If she construes flying as dangerous, 
then, she either does so for some other reason, or else she does so irrationally.  Likewise, 
Stewart’s belief that flying is dangerous gives him a defeasible reason for seeing flying as 
dangerous, but it will presumably be a pretty weak reason, given that both construals and 
beliefs are subject to norms of accuracy.    
 
Finally, my account of emotion nicely explains why it is that our emotions are 
sometimes subject to moral evaluation as well.  And it is not because emotions are 
always choices, or actions, as Solomon controversially argued.  Rather, it is because there 
are some concerns that we ought or ought not have.  If you have a desire to see other 
people humiliated, then you will likely feel delighted or amused whenever you construe a 
person as such.  But if you have this desire, there is something wrong with your 
character, a blemish brought to light by your amusement.  And it is for this reason that, 
upon noticing that you are amused by another’s humiliation, I might say, “That’s awful of 
you.  You shouldn’t feel that way.”  Likewise, a failure to feel indignation when another 
treats you unfairly may be rooted in an unfortunate—and, in some sense, blameworthy—
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lack of self-respect.  And so, when I notice your lack of indignation, I might say, “What’s 
wrong with you?  You should be indignant!”   
 
Solomon is mistaken to think that emotions are always choices, or actions, but it 
cannot be denied that there are similarities between emotions and actions.  And just as we 
often coordinate the degree to which we hold people morally responsible for their actions 
with the degree to which we think they are in control of those actions, the same can be 
said of the emotions.  Perhaps in most cases, people are sufficiently in control of their 
emotions—they’ve chosen to construe things in a certain way, and the relevant concerns 
are ones with which they fully identify, etc.—and so, they are rightly held fully 
responsible for them.  But as we’ve seen, this is not always the case.  Maybe, after 
saying, “What’s wrong with you?  You should be indignant!” I discover that the person’s 
lack of self-respect is rooted in years of psychological manipulation and abuse.  In such a 
case, it may still be the case that she ought to feel indignation, and I may still wish that 
she did, but I can hardly blame her for not feeling indignant.  In the case of Tom from 
earlier, it is certainly the case that he ought not feel the way he does toward his 
daughter’s boyfriend, and we will certainly wish that he didn’t.  But we are at least less 
inclined to blame him for his emotions than we are to blame his racist relatives for theirs.  
He is trying to see people differently; he is trying to have the right sorts of concerns.  His 
relatives are not.     
 
5. Why this has been important 
 
Judging by the size and scope of historical and contemporary treatises on emotion, I think 
it is safe to assume that there is quite a bit more that can be said about the nature of 
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emotion.  In this chapter, I have only attempted to develop a rough sketch of what an 
emotion is, one that I hope to have shown does a better job of accounting for ordinary 
features of emotion than a few of the more prominent theories on offer.  I think an 
account of the sort that I defend has a number of other explanatory fruits as well.  For 
instance, conceiving of emotions in the way that I do allows us to explain the fact that our 
emotions sometimes reveal our concerns, both to others and even to ourselves.  
Sometimes, we do not realize how much a thing matters to us until we respond to it 
emotionally—e.g., “I didn’t realize how much I loved her until she left me and I grieved 
for months.”  This is easy to explain if we allow that emotions always involve concerns, 
even if they are sometimes concerns of which we are not aware.  Further, the relations 
that may exist between construals and concerns might help to explain the positive and 
negative valences that emotions typically have.  Emotions like anger, fear, disgust, and 
grief are negative because they all involve construals that clash with our concerns, 
whereas emotions like pride, joy, and gratitude are positive because they all involve 
construals that accord with our concerns.
39
 
 
So I will now proceed on the assumption that emotions are roughly as I have 
characterized them in this chapter.  Why has this been important?  As I mentioned in 
chapter 1, the purpose of this dissertation is to give an account of the role that emotion 
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 There are more explanatory fruits that I think my account of emotion can offer, but due to 
limitations of time and space, I just cannot pursue them at any length here.  For instance, conceiving of 
emotions in the way that I do may help explain phenomena associated with emotional maturity.  What is it 
that distinguishes the emotionally mature from the emotionally immature?  The emotionally mature person 
is not only more accurate in the ways in which she construes things (something that likely comes with a 
sufficiently wide range of experiences, etc.), but also has more of the concerns that a person ought to have.  
My account may also explain why the emotional repertoire of adult humans is typically more complex and 
sophisticated than that of children and non-human animals: because (a) the greater cognitive sophistication 
of human adults likely allows for a wider repertoire of possible construals, and (b) over time, adult humans 
are likely to develop a much larger set of concerns.   
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plays in moral judgment.  So now that we have some idea of what emotion is, we can ask: 
What sort of role does that play in moral judgment?  This question, though, actually has 
two meanings, and the picture that I’ve painted in this chapter of the nature of emotion 
will be relevant to both.   
 
Suppose a friend tells you that she landed a role in a play, and you ask, “What sort 
of role?”  If she responds by saying, “The lead,” then she may or may not have answered 
your question, depending upon how the question was meant.  If by “What sort of role?” 
you meant to be asking a question about the significance of the role—i.e., about how 
major or minor the role is, compared to others—then she will certainly have answered 
your question.  But if you meant to be asking about the nature of the role—i.e., about the 
character she’ll be playing, its background, relationships, and so forth—then her response 
will not have answered your question at all (that is, assuming you have no prior 
knowledge of what play it is).  So when we ask the “What sort of role?” question, we 
might be asking a question about either the significance or nature of a thing’s role.  And 
when, in this dissertation, I ask what role emotion plays in moral judgment, I mean to be 
asking both sorts of questions.   
 
I shall first want to determine the significance of the role that emotion plays in 
moral judgment.  To that end, in chapter III, I assess empirical evidence for thinking that 
emotion figures centrally in moral judgment.  At the end of the day, I agree with many in 
thinking that emotion has a hugely significant role to play; but as we’ll see, it will be 
important to review the evidence through the lens of the account of emotion defended in 
this chapter.  When studies purport to show evidence of emotional stimulation 
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influencing moral judgment, for instance, we’ll have to look closely at what is in fact 
being stimulated in these cases—maybe, in light of what I’ve argued in this chapter, it is 
indeed emotion; but maybe it is not.  When it is claimed that people with emotional 
deficits of various sorts—e.g., psychopaths, people with autism, etc.—have consequent 
struggles related to moral judgment, we’ll want to ask, in light of this chapter’s 
discussion, what it is that grounds the assumption that the relevant psychological 
malfunction in these cases is indeed an emotional one.  This is one reason it has been 
important to develop an account of what emotion is.   
 
Once I’ve examined the evidence for thinking that emotion plays a very 
significant role in moral judgment, I’ll move on in chapter IV to examine the exact nature 
of the role that it plays.  In a paper recently submitted by one of my undergraduate 
students, the author writes, “[T]hese emotions anger and hate are, in the end, just 
emotions.  Emotion should not factor into moral decision-making, as it clouds one’s 
ability to make objective, rational decisions.”  As I suggested in the last chapter, this is a 
very popular way of answering the question about the nature of the role that emotion 
plays in moral judgment and decision-making, and it is one that is by no means limited to 
non-philosophers.  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, for instance, has recently argued that the 
influence of emotion upon moral judgment often (if not always) renders moral judgment 
unreliable.
40
  (He, too, uses the term ‘cloud’ to describe the sort of influence that emotion 
has upon moral judgment.) 
 
If emotions were just feelings of changes in the body, then I could perhaps see 
why someone might think of them as distractions to clear (moral) thinking.  But as I’ve 
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 Sinnott-Armstrong 2006.   
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argued in this chapter, this is not what emotions are.  They involve construals and 
concerns, both of which are subject to rational and/or moral evaluation.  So it seems there 
is at least some sense in which we can get things right (or wrong) when responding 
emotionally.  And when things have gone right—when we are seeing things as they are, 
when our concerns are as they ought to be, etc.—why think that our emotions are 
clouding judgment?  Why not think that emotions could contribute positively, in some 
epistemic sense, to moral judgment?  These are the sorts of questions that I’ll explore in 
chapters III-V, and my answers will depend heavily upon the way I’ve conceived the 
nature of emotion here in chapter II.  
  
 
 
 
III 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SENTIMENTALISM 
 
 
At the end of the last chapter, I described two sorts of questions that one might ask about 
the role of emotion in moral judgment.  The first has to do with significance: How 
significant is the role that emotion plays in moral judgment?  Does emotion play a major 
role, a minor role, or no role at all?  The second question has to do with the exact nature 
of the role that emotion plays in moral judgment: Is emotion a distraction to moral 
judgment?  Does it cloud moral judgment?  Or might emotion’s contribution to moral 
judgment be something more positive?  In this chapter, I will address the question of 
significance, and my answer will be that emotion has a very significant role to play.  
Indeed, emotion figures centrally in moral judgment.   
 
I begin in §1 by explaining what I think it means to say that emotion “figures 
centrally” in moral judgment.  As we will see, there are quite a number of ways in which 
one might say that emotion figures centrally in moral judgment, only one of which is of 
interest to me in this dissertation.  On the view that I defend—sometimes called 
psychological sentimentalism—emotion figures centrally in moral judgment in that it is 
(among) the primary cause(s) of our moral intuitions.  Then, in §§2-4, I discuss work in 
empirical moral psychology that I think amounts to a compelling case for psychological 
sentimentalism.
1
  In §5, I critique what is arguably the most serious rival to the view that 
                                                 
1
 During my discussion of this empirical research, I will try to make note, whenever possible, of 
how my account of emotion from chapter II can help to explain what is going on in the relevant studies.  As 
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I endorse—namely, a dual-process model of moral judgment.  And finally, in the 
concluding section, I set the stage for a discussion of the epistemic status of moral 
intuitions, which shall be the focus of chapters IV and V.  
 
Before getting into my discussion, however, I should issue a brief reminder about 
how I’ll be using two key terms.  As I explained at the end of chapter I, I use the term 
‘moral intuition’ to refer to moral beliefs that are formed quickly and effortlessly, not on 
the basis of any kind of explicit inference.  We do not arrive at our moral intuitions; 
rather, ordinarily, we simply have them—often despite paying little, if any, attention to 
our reasons for having them, or the process by which they were formed.  In this way, I 
think our moral intuitions strongly resemble perceptual beliefs.  I do not infer my way to 
the belief that there’s a computer before me right now; rather, I simply have it—typically 
without paying any attention to my reasons for having it, or the process by which it was 
formed.  (I’ll revisit this resemblance between moral intuitions and perceptual beliefs in 
the next chapter.)  And I use the term ‘moral judgment’ to refer to the process that is 
ordinarily (causally) responsible for the formation of moral intuitions, whatever that 
process might involve exactly.  Again, I do not assume that moral intuitions are always 
formed in exactly the same way.  But I do assume that there is something that can be 
identified as the process by which moral intuitions are ordinarily formed, and that is what 
I am calling ‘moral judgment’.  Starting with this chapter, it will be especially important 
to keep these definitions in mind. 
                                                                                                                                                 
far as I can tell, this is the best that can be done at this point to confirm that mine is an empirically viable 
account of the nature of emotion, and that these are indeed studies of emotion as I conceive it.  But it will 
nonetheless be open to one to ask, of any one of these studies, “Why think that this is a study of emotion as 
conceived in chapter II?”  And there may be very little that I could say in response.  In my defense, I 
actually think it would be fair to ask this question with respect to any philosophical theory of emotion.  And 
until philosophers and psychologists do more work together on this topic, the answers are likely to be less 
than satisfactory.   
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1. What ‘figures centrally’ means 
 
The general claim that emotion figures centrally in moral judgment is an old one, and one 
that has been spun in a number of different ways.  Very roughly speaking, it might be 
understood as a semantic claim (about the meanings of moral terms in thought and 
speech), a metaphysical claim (about moral properties), a psychological claim (about the 
causal grounds of moral intuitions), or an epistemological claim (about epistemic grounds 
for moral intuitions).  In the hands of ethical expressivists, for instance, the idea that 
emotion figures centrally in moral judgment is one that has to do with the semantic 
content of the products of moral judgment, either in thought or in speech.  Moral 
language, expressivists tell us, functions to express non-cognitive states like emotions.
2
  
To think an action wrong, then, is to have a thought the meaning of which is in some 
sense a matter of the emotion (or similarly non-cognitive state) expressed by the term 
‘wrong’.  This is the sense in which an expressivist might claim that emotion figures 
centrally in moral judgment.   
 
Historically, the claim that emotion figures centrally in moral judgment has 
perhaps most often been understood as a claim about the status of moral properties, i.e., 
about that in which moral properties consist.  Hume begins his Enquiry Concerning the 
                                                 
2
 I should note that there is an interesting discussion to be had about whether or not emotions are 
in fact non-cognitive.  In the hands of feeling theorists, emotions sure seem to be non-cognitive states—no 
more cognitive, at least, than things like stomach aches and dizziness.  But in what sense are evaluative 
judgments non-cognitive? In fact, judgment theorists like Solomon are sometimes called cognitivists about 
emotion.  So one might consider the account of emotion that I defend in chapter II a kind of hybrid theory.  
I intentionally avoided using the labels ‘cognitive’ and ‘non-cognitive’ in chapter II, in part because I think 
it can lend more confusion than clarity to discussions of emotion theories.  But it may nonetheless be 
worthwhile to ask whether emotions themselves ought to count as cognitive or non-cognitive states.  
However, I will not pursue this matter here.  
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Principles of Morals by remarking upon a controversy that he takes himself to have 
inherited  
concerning the general foundation of MORALS; whether they be derived 
from REASON, or from SENTIMENT; whether we attain the knowledge 
of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling 
and finer internal sense.
3
 
 
It may sound as if Hume’s interests in the role of emotion in moral judgment are 
primarily epistemological in nature—“whether we attain the knowledge of them by … an 
immediate feeling and finer internal sense”—but by the end of the Enquiry, it is clear that 
Hume believes emotions (or sentiments) figure centrally in the make-up of moral 
properties. 
The hypothesis which we embrace is plain.  It maintains, that morality is 
determined by sentiment.  It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or 
quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and 
vice the contrary.
4
 
 
So in Hume’s hands, the claim that emotion figures centrally in moral judgment is 
ultimately a claim about the nature of morality itself.  It’s not just that thinking a thing 
virtuous involves responding to it emotionally in some way; rather, Hume is claiming, a 
thing’s being virtuous depends upon the emotional responses that it engenders.  Moral 
judgment depends upon the emotions because morality depends upon the emotions.   
 
The view that morality depends upon the emotions is often called philosophical 
sentimentalism, and it is a view that is still quite popular today.  Prinz, for instance, 
shares Hume’s belief that moral properties are response-dependent properties.  He writes, 
“When I say that something is wrong, I refer […] to the property of causing emotions of 
                                                 
3
 Hume 1983 [1751]: 13. 
 
4
 Hume 1983 [1751]: 85. 
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blame in me.”5  Other sentimentalist views hold that moral properties are dependent upon 
emotional responses in a slightly different way.  According to so-called neosentimentalist 
views, things have the moral properties they have in virtue of its being appropriate in 
some sense (e.g., rational) to have certain emotions in response to them.  So for instance, 
Allan Gibbard writes, “What a person does is morally wrong if and only if it is rational 
for him to feel guilty for doing it, and for others to resent him for doing it.”6  What all of 
these views have in common is the idea that emotion figures centrally in moral judgment 
in the sense that the domain of moral judgment—morality itself—depends upon the 
emotions.   
 
Compared to ethical expressivism and philosophical sentimentalism, the view that 
I wish to defend in this chapter is modest.  In fact, when it comes to the semantics of 
moral claims and the metaphysics of moral properties, the view to be defended here is 
entirely noncommittal.  In the remainder of this chapter, I’ll defend a version of what is 
sometimes called psychological sentimentalism—the view that the process by which our 
moral beliefs are ordinarily formed is one in which the emotions figure centrally.   
 
It may be helpful, in order to really draw out the contrast between psychological 
sentimentalism and the other two views, to consider an analogy to perceptual judgment.  
Suppose I grab a pot off the stove to clean it, unaware that it was recently used to boil 
water and is still very hot.  The pot burns my hand, and I shout (or just think to myself), 
“That’s hot!”  According to psychological sentimentalism, the role that emotion plays in 
moral judgment is very much like the role that perception—in this case, the burning 
                                                 
5
 Prinz 2006: 35. 
 
6
 Gibbard 1990: 42.   
 65 
sensation—plays in my judgment of the temperature of the pot.  The burn has nothing 
whatsoever to do with the semantic content of the claim “That’s hot!”  Nor does the 
relevant aspect of reality—i.e., the temperature of the pot—depend upon the burn in the 
way the Humean thinks morality depends upon the sentiments.  But the burn does cause 
me to judge that the pot is hot—I judge that it’s hot because of the burn.  Likewise, the 
psychological sentimentalist says, in most ordinary cases at least, we judge things 
morally as we do because of our emotional responses to them.   
 
So for my purposes, the sense in which emotion “figures centrally” in moral 
judgment is this: in ordinary cases of moral judgment, the products of moral judgment—
moral intuitions—are the effects of emotion, i.e., we have the moral intuitions that we 
have because of our emotional responses to things.  As I’ve explained, this is a 
semantically and metaphysically innocent claim, and I take that innocence to be an 
advantage that psychological sentimentalism has over the two other views mentioned.  
But psychological sentimentalism does have interesting epistemological implications: if 
moral intuitions are ordinarily the causal consequences of our emotions, then what is the 
epistemic status of these intuitions?  Assuming my physiology is in healthy, working 
order, presumably, the burning sensation I feel upon touching the pot contributes 
positively to the justification of my immediate and unreflective (i.e., intuition-like) belief 
about its hotness.  But can the same be said of emotions and their role in moral judgment?  
I’ll answer this question in the next chapter. 
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In what remains of this chapter, however, I will address the following question: 
What evidence is there for thinking that emotion figures centrally in moral judgment in 
the way that psychological sentimentalism claims that it does? 
 
2. Moral dumbfounding 
 
It may help to step back a bit and recall some of the history behind this debate.  For the 
better part of the 20
th
 century, the most influential approach to moral judgment was the 
one endorsed by the cognitive developmental tradition.  Proponents of this tradition—
most notably Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg—generally affirmed some version of 
psychological rationalism, which is the view that moral intuitions—or moral beliefs, 
more generally
7—are ordinarily the products of a conscious reasoning process, often 
involving the application of general moral principles to particular cases.  As these 
theorists describe it, moral judgment is a kind of skill that develops through a number of 
stages.  In the beginning, young children judge things morally in accordance with a set of 
moral rules, typically taught and enforced by a parent, or some other authority figure.  
But by the time people reach full moral maturity (stage 6, according to Kohlberg), they 
have internalized principles of a just society, and are able to apply those principles to 
particular actions, and even to the rules and laws that govern society.  Kohlberg 
conceived of the fully developed moral judge as essentially the realization of a Kantian or 
Rawlsian ideal—someone who consciously thinks in terms of such things as respect for 
persons, equal rights, and universalized principles of action.    
                                                 
7
 Note that, as I define the term in chapter I, it is apparently impossible for moral intuitions to be 
the products of a conscious reasoning process.  As I see things, this is indicative of a flaw in the cognitive 
developmental approach to moral judgment, and not in my definition of the term ‘moral intuition’.  I say 
more about this below, but the gist is that I believe that cognitive developmental theorists like Piaget and 
Kohlberg were actually investigating something other than moral judgment (and moral intuitions) all along.   
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This general approach to moral judgment has since been attacked from quite a 
number of angles.  For my part, I want to focus on the assumption made by psychological 
rationalists that moral judgment is ordinarily—or even often, for that matter—a process 
in which conscious reasoning figures centrally.  Kohlberg’s primary source of evidence 
for his theory, by far, comes from an impressive battery of moral judgment surveys, 
administered to subjects in studies that sometimes spanned more than two decades.  
Basically, Kohlberg and his colleagues just assumed that whatever considerations 
subjects cited in justifying their responses on these surveys were the very considerations 
about which subjects consciously reasoned when formulating their responses.  But in the 
decades since the completion of Kohlberg’s most influential study, social psychologists 
have found strong evidence for thinking that there is not this sort of connection between 
considerations cited by a believer in order to justify belief b and the process by which b 
was originally formed.   
 
In 1978, for instance, psychologists Timothy Wilson and Ross Nisbett published 
the results of a now famous study in which subjects were asked to choose from among 4 
pairs of nylon pantyhose, and then explain or justify their preference.  However, 
unbeknownst to the subjects, all 4 pairs of pantyhose were actually manufactured by the 
same company, and indeed pulled from the same package.  Despite expressing sometimes 
very firm beliefs in the superior quality of one pair over the others, the subjects’ 
judgment of pantyhose quality in this case was clearly influenced to a large degree by the 
physical position of the pantyhose.  Of the 4 identical pairs, 12% of participants judged 
the left-most pair to be best, 17% preferred left-center pair, 31% preferred the right-
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center pair, and 40% preferred the right-most pair.  While subjects offered no fewer than 
80 reasons in total for their preferences, not a single one of them mentioned the position 
of the pantyhose as a factor contributing to their judgment.  And in fact, when asked if 
such a thing could have influenced their judgment of the pantyhose, 51 of the 52 subjects 
insisted that it could not.
8
   
 
On the basis of studies like this one—and there are plenty of them—psychologists 
in general are wary of drawing conclusions about the causal genesis of people’s beliefs 
from the sorts of considerations that people cite when asked to justify their beliefs.  Until 
recently, however, these concerns hadn’t been explored in conjunction with moral 
judgment.  Is there any evidence for thinking that moral intuitions are often the causal 
effects of things quite different from the sorts of considerations that people cite when 
asked to justify those intuitions?  If so, this would apparently be a serious problem for 
psychological rationalists like Piaget and Kohlberg.   
 
For a series of studies, psychologist Jonathan Haidt and colleagues concocted a 
number of hypothetical scenarios meant to describe actions that people will find 
offensive, but harmless.
9
  In one scenario, for instance, a woman cuts her national flag 
(e.g., the American flag) into pieces and uses the rags to clean her toilet.  In another, a 
family thoroughly cooks and eats a pet dog after a car strikes and kills the dog in front of 
their house.  After reading the vignettes, subjects were asked six probe questions, 
                                                 
8
 Wilson and Nisbett 1978: 123-124.  The one subject who admitted that position could have 
influenced her evaluation also noted that she was currently taking three psychology courses. 
 
9
 It may be worth noting that Haidt’s primary interest with these studies had more to do with the 
boundaries of the moral domain than the psychology of moral judgment—e.g., we generally treat harmful 
actions as morally significant, but what about harmless actions that are nonetheless disgusting?   
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including: (a) Evaluation: “What do you think about this?  Is it very wrong, a little 
wrong, or is it perfectly OK for [act specified]?” (b) Justification: “Can you tell me 
why?” (c) Harm: “Is anyone hurt by what [the actor] did?  Who?  How?”  Here is how 
Haidt describes what turned out to be a common occurrence: 
Participants often stated immediately and emphatically that the action was 
wrong, and then began searching for plausible reasons.  Participants 
frequently tried to introduce an element of harm, for example by stating 
that eating dog meat would make a person sick, or by stating that a person 
would feel guilty after voluntarily using her flag as a rag.  When the 
interviewer repeated the facts of the story (e.g., that the dog was 
thoroughly cooked so no germs were present), participants would often 
drop one argument and begin searching for another.
10
 
 
So, rather than abandon their initial, intuitive response to the case, subjects would just 
search for other reasons to support it.  And whenever the search failed, subjects typically 
still would not give up their initial intuition about the case, instead offering what Haidt 
calls a “statement of moral dumbfounding,” i.e., a “statement to the effect that they 
thought an action was wrong but they could not find the words to explain themselves.”11  
For another study, Haidt and Hersh asked conservatives and liberals a number of 
questions about issues related to sexual morality—e.g., questions about homosexuality, 
incest, and unusual forms of masturbation.  Here again, subjects were often morally 
dumbfounded: “[T]hey would stutter, laugh, and express surprise at their inability to find 
supporting reasons [for their moral intuitions], yet they would not change their initial 
judgments of condemnation.”12 
 
                                                 
10
 Haidt, Bjorklund, and Murphy unpublished: 3. 
 
11
 Haidt, Bjorklund, and Murphy unpublished: 9.  
 
12
 Haidt 2001: 817. 
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How should we interpret the results of these studies?  According to Haidt, one 
thing that these studies show is that, while conscious reasoning may have something to do 
with moral judgment, it does not play the sort of role that psychological rationalists like 
Piaget and Kohlberg assume.  Compare two stereotypes, one of a scientist and the other 
of a lawyer.  The scientist collects data and then forms whatever conclusion is best 
supported by the data.  The lawyer, on the other hand, does the opposite: he begins with a 
conclusion—e.g., that his client is innocent—and then searches for evidence for this 
conclusion.  As Haidt sees things, his studies—and in particular, cases of moral 
dumbfounding—strongly suggest that the role that conscious reasoning plays in moral 
judgment is more like that of the lawyer than the scientist.  That is, people arrive at moral 
intuitions as the result of unconscious mental processes; it is only when they are asked to 
justify the intuitions that conscious reasoning steps in to serve as a kind of defense 
attorney, searching for reasons that support the original intuition.  The only difference 
between cases in which a person is morally dumbfounded and cases in which a person is 
not, then, is just that, in the latter cases, conscious reasoning is successful in its search for 
supporting reasons.   
 
If Haidt’s interpretation is on point, then the psychological rationalist is just 
wrong: moral judgment is not a process in which conscious reasoning figures centrally.  
Rather, conscious reasoning only enters the picture after the intuition has already been 
formed.  Indeed, it is hard to imagine how someone like Kohlberg would interpret the 
results of Haidt’s studies.  How could subjects be unable to provide reasons for beliefs in 
which they are so confident, if the beliefs themselves are supposed to be the products of a 
process of conscious reasoning?  Are these people reasoning their way to moral 
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intuitions, and then immediately forgetting how it was that they arrived at their newfound 
beliefs?  And why are they still so confident in their moral intuitions, even when, by their 
own admission, they cannot provide any reasons in support of those beliefs?   
 
Now, Haidt’s moral judgment studies do not by themselves provide particularly 
strong support for psychological sentimentalism.  It is one thing to problematize the 
rationalist’s claim that conscious reasoning figures centrally in moral judgment, as I 
believe these studies do.  It would be quite another thing, however, to show that emotion 
figures centrally in moral judgment.  After all, it would be perfectly consistent with the 
results of Haidt’s studies to think that moral judgment ordinarily involves a non-
emotional psychological process that just happens to operate at a subconscious level.
13
  If 
people’s moral intuitions are ordinarily the products of a mental process that is entirely 
non-emotional, but also unconscious, then it should not come as a surprise that subjects 
are often unaware of what causal factors first led them to have the beliefs that they have.  
So, even if we grant that moral intuitions are ordinarily the products of an unconscious 
process, what evidence is there for thinking that it is an emotional one?   
 
In the next two sections, I’ll discuss studies that more directly support the 
sentimentalist’s claim that it is emotion that figures centrally in moral judgment.   
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Marc Hauser, Susan Dwyer, and Bryce Huebner defend such an account of moral judgment 
(see, e.g., Hauser 2006; Dwyer 2009; and Dwyer, Huebner, and Hauser 2010).  They call it the “Linguistic 
Analogy,” since it builds upon an analogy to Chomsky’s suggestion that underlying the development of our 
capacity for language is a universal grammar, i.e., an innate set of principles of grammaticality, and the 
like.  Likewise, Hauser, Dwyer, and Huebner argue, moral judgment is guided by a kind of universal moral 
grammar, i.e., an innate set of moral principles against which we unconsciously analyze actions and events 
in order to arrive at moral intuitions.  Among the evidence they cite in defense of the Linguistic Analogy is 
the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding.   
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 3. Evidence of the effects of emotional stimulation upon moral judgment 
 
Suppose a chemist is trying to determine what sort of role, if any, substance A plays in 
chemical reaction X.  She might do a number of things to test this: she might increase or 
decrease the level or amount of A, to see if this has any effects upon X; she might 
introduce A to environments in which X would not otherwise occur, to see if A causes X 
there as well; or she might remove A entirely, to see if X continues, unaffected, in the 
absence of A.  Other things being equal, if changes in the amount of A result in 
corresponding changes to the frequency, intensity, or some other aspect of X; if the 
introduction of A to new environments results in the occurrence of X there as well; and if 
removing A causes X to change drastically, or to cease altogether—this would all amount 
to compelling evidence for thinking that A figures centrally (as a cause, or catalyst) in the 
production of X.   
 
Interestingly, psychologists and neuroscientists have come up with ways of 
simulating these sorts of tests in order to determine how significant a role, if any, emotion 
plays in moral judgment.  In this section, I’ll discuss studies in which the levels or 
intensity of subjects’ emotions are adjusted in various ways, with notable effects upon 
moral judgment.  And I’ll also discuss a study in which subjects’ emotions are stimulated 
in a context in which neither such emotions nor moral judgment would typically occur.  
Then, in the next section, I’ll discuss studies involving people with an emotional deficit 
of some sort.   
 
There are a number of recent studies in which an artificial induction, or increase, 
in some negative emotion has been shown to result in a corresponding increase in the 
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harshness or severity of people’s moral judgment, i.e., an increase in the degree to which 
they condemn a particular action or actor.  In one such study, for instance, subjects were 
asked to complete a moral judgment survey in which they were presented with six 
vignettes—three involving a disgusting violation (a man eating his dead dog, plane crash 
survivors considering cannibalism, and a man deriving sexual pleasure from playing with 
a kitten), and three involving violations unlikely to induce disgust (e.g., a man 
intentionally falsifying his resume).  Some of the subjects were directed to complete the 
survey at a particularly tidy and clean workspace, while others were directed to complete 
the survey at a workspace likely to induce a disgust response:  
An old chair with a torn and dirty cushion was placed in front of a desk 
that had various stains and was sticky.  On the desk there was a 
transparent plastic cup with the dried up remnants of a smoothie and a pen 
that was chewed up.  Next to the desk was a trashcan overflowing with 
garbage including greasy pizza boxes and dirty-looking tissues.
14
 
 
Experimenters predicted that subjects seated at the dirty desk would judge the actors 
described in the vignettes more harshly than subjects seated at the clean desk, and this is 
precisely the effect that was observed—especially when the experimenters factored in 
subjects’ attentiveness to their own internal states, as measured on a Private Body 
Consciousness (PBC) scale.   
Planned comparisons showed that when averaging across all six vignettes, 
high-PBC participants in the disgust condition perceived the actions of the 
story character as more wrong than participants in the no-disgust 
condition. [...]  In contrast, for low-PBC participants, ratings of moral 
condemnation did not differ between the disgust and no-disgust 
conditions.
15
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 Schnall et al. 2008: 1101. 
 
15
 Schnall et al. 2008: 1101. 
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In another study, the same experimenters asked subjects to complete a moral judgment 
survey in an outdoor setting.  This time, some subjects were seated approximately 6 feet 
away from a trash container in which a particularly odorous substance had just been 
sprayed.
16
  Here, too, subjects seated near the disgusting smell judged the actions, or 
actors, described in the vignettes more harshly than did subjects seated in an area with no 
such odor.
17
   
 
Another method used to artificially induce disgust responses in subjects is that of 
posthypnotic suggestion.
18
  In a study conducted by Haidt and Thalia Wheatley, sixty-
four highly hypnotizable subjects took part in a group hypnosis session that included a 
posthypnotic suggestion to feel “a brief pang of disgust” upon reading the word ‘often’, 
but to have no memory of this instruction until being prompted to remember (after 
                                                 
16
 The substance used was ammonium sulfide in a water solution.  Ammonium sulfide may be best 
known for its presence in such popular prank items as “stink bombs” and “fart spray.” 
 
17
 Schnall et al. 2008: 1097-1099. 
 
18
 While it may be worth noting that hypnosis is a notoriously controversial practice, I think there 
are few who doubt that it can be an effective means of altering such things as a person’s self-image, 
experience of pain, and disposition to affective states like emotions.  How does all of this happen, exactly?  
This is a matter of some controversy.  The picture painted by the most widely accepted theory of hypnosis 
in the clinical domain is quite complex, involving the manipulation by the hypnotist of divided and 
dissociated levels of consciousness (see, for instance, Alladin 2008: ch. 1).  In light of my discussion in 
chapter II, though, it may be helpful to understand hypnotic suggestion in terms of a subconscious 
conditioning of a patient’s construals.  In fact, hypnotherapists regularly speak of using hypnosis in order 
to alter the way a patient sees something.  One popular form of hypnotic suggestion, for instance, is known 
as “ego-strengthening,” and it is characterized as a means of helping patients “view themselves as self-
efficacious … in order to develop feelings of confidence and optimism and an improved self-image” 
(Alladin 2008: 45).  Hypnosis can be used to manipulate people’s emotions, then, because it is an effective 
means of altering their construals of various things (e.g., themselves).  If this is right, then we might 
interpret Wheatley and Haidt’s study along something like the following lines.  Rather than feeling “a brief 
pang of disgust” upon reading some word and then using that disgust response “as information for moral 
judgment,” as the experimenters themselves put it, what is actually going on is that subjects are seeing 
things differently (e.g., seeing the congressman as even more corrupt than they would have otherwise seen 
him), and then simply judging things as they see them. 
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completion of the survey).
19
  Subjects were then given a series of vignettes describing 
some sort of moral transgression, and asked to rate both “how morally wrong” and “how 
disgusting” they considered the action described in the vignette “by making a slash mark 
along a 14-cm line anchored by the endpoints not at all morally wrong and extremely 
morally wrong or not at all disgusting and extremely disgusting.”20  The slash marks were 
later converted to number on a scale from 0 to 100.  Importantly, the subjects were 
unaware of any connection between the hypnosis session and the moral judgment task. 
 
The results suggest that even hypnotically induced disgust can cause people to 
judge actions more harshly than they would otherwise judge them.  Here, for instance, is 
one of the vignettes: 
Congressman Arnold Paxton frequently gives speeches condemning 
corruption and arguing for campaign finance reform.  But he is just trying 
to cover up the fact that he himself [will take bribes from/is often bribed 
by] the tobacco lobby, and other special interests, to promote their 
legislation. 
 
Some subjects read the vignette with the hypnotic cue word ‘often’, while other subjects 
read the vignette without the cue.  When asked how disgusting the congressman’s 
behavior is, those who read the vignette without the cue word gave it an average rating of 
38.92, while those who read the vignette with the cue rated it much higher, at 72.37.  
When asked how morally wrong the congressman’s behavior is, those who read the 
vignette without the cue word gave it an average rating of 78.73, while those who read 
the vignette with the cue gave it an average rating of 91.28.  In response to a case 
describing a sexual encounter between second cousins, those who read the vignette 
                                                 
19
 Wheatley and Haidt 2005.  Of the 64 participants, 19 remembered the posthypnotic suggestion 
prior to being prompted to do so.  Wheatley and Haidt limited their analysis to the remaining 45 subjects.  
 
20
 Wheatley and Haidt 2005: 780. 
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without the cue give it a disgust rating of 43.24, while those who read the vignette with 
the cue rated it much higher at 72.46.  And again, the presence of the disgust cue 
increased ratings of moral wrongness, this time from 43.29 to 67.63.  So the posthypnotic 
suggestion seems to have succeeded in heightening subjects’ disgust response, and the 
heightened disgust response appears to have made people significantly harsher as moral 
judges.   
 
One should not, however, conclude that there is something especially efficacious 
about disgust in this regard.  In a study by Lerner and colleagues, subjects were asked to 
read 4 counterbalanced vignettes, all of which described some kind of harm resulting 
from worker negligence.
21
  Then, after reading the vignettes, subjects completed a series 
of Likert 7-point scales assessing their reactions to each case, including 5 items 
specifically designed to assess subjects’ judgment about the degree to which the workers 
are responsible and ought to be punished.  Just prior to reading the vignettes, however, 
some subjects were shown a video clip likely to induce an anger response (featuring a 
bully humiliating and beating up a teenager), while others were shown an emotionally 
neutral video clip (featuring abstract shapes and colors).  Here, too, subjects whose anger 
response had just been elicited by the video judged the workers more harshly than did 
subjects who watched the emotionally neutral video.  Psychologists have also found that 
inducing sadness in subjects can cause them to evaluate others more harshly than they 
otherwise would have.
22
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 Lerner et al. 1998. 
 
22
 Fogas and Bower 1987. 
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Nor should one conclude that it is only the stimulation of negative emotional 
states that can have effects upon people’s moral judgment of others.  Whereas inducing 
anger can lead people to be harsher in their judgment of the degree to which another 
ought to be punished, inducing a more positive affective response can apparently have 
precisely the opposite effect.  We know that physical attraction is likely to induce 
positive affect, and there are several studies according to which the more physically 
attractive we find a person, the more lenient we will be in our estimation of his or her 
deservingness of punishment.
23
  And while sadness can apparently lead to more negative 
appraisals of others, some studies suggest that the positive affective response that 
accompanies physical attraction can lead to more positive appraisals of others, including 
attributions of such virtuous traits as honesty and integrity.
24
  Psychologists can also 
induce positive emotional states (or reduce the intensity of negative emotional states) by 
showing subjects a humorous video clip; and in one study, subjects who viewed the 
humorous clip were significantly less harsh in their responses on a moral judgment 
survey than subjects who viewed an emotionally neutral video clip.
25
 
 
Many of the studies that I’ve just described involve an increase in levels of 
emotion that likely already would have been present.  Even in the absence of the hypnotic 
cue word, for instance, subjects still were disgusted by the congressman and believed that 
he behaved wrongly.  So the evidence may so far only provide a small amount of support 
to psychological sentimentalism—it does show that emotions can causally influence 
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 See, e.g., Darby and Jeffers 1988. 
 
24
 Dion et al. 1972. 
 
25
 Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006.  The humorous clip was from the comedy sketch program 
“Saturday Night Live,” and the emotionally neutral clip was taken from a documentary about a small 
Spanish village.   
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moral judgment, but, strictly speaking, anyone can admit that our emotions may 
sometimes cause us to judge things more harshly.  What would really be interesting—and 
would provide even stronger support for sentimentalism—would be if there were 
evidence of emotional stimulation causing people to judge things morally when they 
otherwise would not judge them morally at all.  
 
In a follow-up to their first experiment with hypnotic disgust, Wheatley and Haidt 
again induced a disgust response to the word ‘often’ via posthypnotic suggestion; then 
had subjects read and respond to vignettes describing various sorts of actions; and again 
asked subjects to rate “how morally wrong” and “how disgusting” they considered the 
actions described in the vignettes.  This time, however, they included a vignette in which 
someone performs an action of no moral significance whatsoever: 
Dan is a student council representative at his school.  This semester he is 
in charge of scheduling discussions about academic issues.  He [tries to 
take/often picks] topics that appeal to both professors and students in order 
to stimulate discussion. 
 
When asked how disgusting they consider Dan’s behavior, those who read the vignette 
without the cue word gave it an average rating of 2.3; and when they were asked how 
morally wrong they consider Dan’s behavior, the same subjects gave it an average rating 
of 2.7.  (Again, both of these numbers are on a scale of 0 to 100.  And given the 
researchers’ somewhat imprecise method for collecting, and then assigning numbers to, 
subjects’ ratings, a rating of 2.7 might as well be a rating of 0.)  On the other hand, when 
asked how disgusting they consider Dan’s behavior, subjects who read the vignette with 
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the cue rated it much higher, at an astonishing 20.9;
26
 and when they were asked how 
morally wrong they considered Dan’s behavior, subjects gave it an average rating of 
14.0.
27
  So, more than just causing people to morally judge things differently (e.g., more 
harshly) than they otherwise would, it appears as if emotional stimulation can even cause 
people to judge things morally when they otherwise would not judge them morally at all.   
 
Apparently, changes in the intensity of certain emotions can result in 
corresponding changes to the intensity of people’s moral judgment.  Furthermore, the 
stimulation of certain emotions can even cause people to engage in moral judgment 
when, presumably, they otherwise would not.  Here, too, this alone is not sufficient to 
make the case for psychological sentimentalism.  But I do think a picture is beginning to 
emerge of the (largely) unconscious psychological processes that ordinarily underlie the 
production of moral intuitions, and it is one in which emotion appears to play a 
significant role.  To return to the analogy at the beginning of the section, suppose the 
chemist finds that changes to the amount of substance A lead to corresponding changes in 
reaction X, and also that the introduction of A to other environment causes X to take 
place there as well.  If this is some evidence for thinking that A figures centrally as a 
cause of X, then, in this section, we’ve likewise seen some evidence for thinking that 
emotion figures centrally as a cause in the production of moral intuitions.   
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 For comparison, in the first study, subjects who read a vignette involving shoplifting (without 
the cue word) gave it an average disgust rating of just 19.79.  So these subjects apparently find Dan’s 
(totally morally neutral) behavior every bit as disgusting subjects in the control group find shop-lifting. 
 
27
 In discussion with the researchers, one participant who read the vignette with the hypnotic cue 
described Dan as a “popularity-seeking snob,” and another said, “It just seems like he’s up to something.” 
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4. Evidence of the effect of emotional deficit upon moral judgment 
 
Here is another useful analogy.  During the 2009 and 2010 football seasons, the 
Indianapolis Colts won 24 of 32 regular season games, had more total passing yards than 
any other team in the NFL, made it to the playoffs each season, and even to the Super 
Bowl at the conclusion of the 2009 season.  But after the 2010 season, Colts quarterback 
Peyton Manning had surgery on his neck, and was unable to play a single game of the 
following season.  In 2011, the Colts won only 2 of 16 games, finished near the very 
bottom of the NFL in passing yards, and of course, did not make it to the playoffs.  What 
sort of role did Peyton Manning play in the Colts’ success?  Apparently, a very 
significant one.  By the conclusion of the 2011 season, in light of the Colts’ dismal 
performance, sports commentators and journalists joked that Manning should be named 
the NFL’s Most Valuable Player for that season, despite having not played in a single 
game.  Sometimes, it seems, the best way to gauge the causal significance of x to y may 
simply be to remove x, and see what happens to y.   
 
How might this lesson be applied to the subject at hand—i.e., the causal 
significance of emotion to moral judgment?  If it turns out that an abnormal absence of 
emotion results in similarly abnormal effects upon moral judgment, this would lend 
further support to the sentimentalist’s claim that ordinary moral judgment is a process in 
which emotion figures centrally (just as their performance without Manning in 2011 
might lend support to the claim that he “figured centrally” in the Indianapolis Colts’ 
success in prior seasons).  In order to see the effects of “an abnormal absence of 
emotion,” we should look to people with conditions characterized by some sort of 
emotional deficit—i.e., a systematic absence or blunting of normal emotions. 
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Psychopathy is a type of anti-social personality disorder characterized by, among 
other things, a lack of guilt, remorse, and empathy.  What underlies this emotional 
deficit?  According to Blair, the psychopath’s lack of guilt, remorse, and empathy likely 
has something to do with a lack of concern for the wellbeing of others.
28
  This comes as 
no surprise, in light of my discussion from chapter 2: underlying the psychologically 
normal person’s empathetic emotional response, for instance, is both (a) a construal of 
another as being in some kind of distress, and (b) a concern for the wellbeing of the other 
(to which the construal relates disharmoniously).  Even if psychopaths are capable of 
(a)—and I assume they are—if they are unconcerned with the distress of others (or at 
least, much less concerned than is the normal person), they will consequently be 
unmoved emotionally by the sight of another in distress.
29
  
 
Does this emotional deficit affect a psychopath’s capacity for moral judgment in 
any way?  At first glance, it appears not.  After all, psychopaths are apparently just as 
likely to call something “wrong” as are non-psychopaths.  Consider, for instance, the 
following quote from serial killer Ted Bundy: 
It was almost as if he [I] said it was wrong for all these things to happen.  
“It is wrong for me to jaywalk.  It is wrong to rob a bank.  It is wrong to 
break into other people’s houses.  It is wrong for me to drive without a 
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 Blair 2007. 
 
29
 This example may put more pressure on Roberts (see ch. II, n. 35, and the relevant portion of 
the text).  If concerns must be built into construals in the way that Roberts thinks, then he apparently cannot 
allow that psychopaths see a person as distressed, in the way that non-psychopaths do.  My account of 
emotion, however, can easily allow for this, explaining the emotional differences entirely in terms of a 
difference of concern.  
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driver’s license.  It is wrong not to pay your parking tickets.  It is wrong 
not to vote in elections.  It is wrong to intentionally embarrass people.”30  
 
Bundy says all the right things—it is wrong to rob banks, it is wrong to break into other 
people’s homes, etc.—and so, it can be easy to assume that, regardless of any emotional 
or motivational deficits that Bundy may exhibit, his capacity for moral judgment is intact.  
But in this case, appearances are deceiving.   
 
Imagine someone who is totally colorblind, but nonetheless able to detect 
different wavelengths of light (perhaps by means of an instrument he carries with him).  
So while he cannot see red, he can know when light has a wavelength of about 650nm 
(the wavelength of visible red light).  Further, imagine that he learns that others use the 
term ‘red’ to describe things that radiate or reflect light with a wavelength of 650nm—
and so forth for the other color terms.  Just as Bundy seemed to say all the right things 
morally, our colorblind companion is likely to say all the right things when it comes to 
judging the colors of things.  But the process out of which his color beliefs are formed—
i.e., his color judgment—is fundamentally different than that of the (perceptually) normal 
person.  His color beliefs are, in a sense, parasitic upon the beliefs and practices of 
others—e.g., when he says, “That’s red,” it’s as if he is saying, “That’s what people call 
‘red’.”  Furthermore, this difference between his color judgment and that of the 
(perceptually) normal person will underlie various other failures of his associated with 
judgment about the colors of things—e.g., he’ll not understand the difference between 
warm and cool colors as we do; he’ll not understand what it means for colors to clash or 
coordinate; etc.  So even if we were unaware of the process by which he forms his color 
                                                 
30
 Michaud and Aynesworth 1989: 116.  For the record, at times during the interviews, Bundy 
would refer to himself in the third person.  So while it may sound like he’s reporting the opinions of 
someone else, he is actually reporting his own thoughts here. 
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beliefs—i.e., unaware of his use of the wavelength-detection instrument—we’d be right 
to suspect that something about the process is abnormal, defective even, when he 
consistently attaches the labels ‘warm’ and ‘cool’ to colors incorrectly, when he 
consistently fails to match and coordinate colors, etc.  
 
I think something very similar is going on with the psychopath’s moral judgment.  
Psychopaths do appear to have moral beliefs, but the process out of which those beliefs 
are formed is apparently quite different from that of the psychologically normal person, 
and probably similarly parasitic upon the beliefs and practices of others.  Intelligent, 
articulate, and observant as they are, psychopaths are capable of recognizing some of the 
norms that are in place around them—moral or otherwise—and also the sorts of linguistic 
constructions that people use when referring to violations of those norms (e.g., “That’s 
wrong,” “He shouldn’t have done that,” etc.).  So just as my colorblind friend can look at 
a red light and correctly judge that it is red, a psychopath can witness someone 
intentionally embarrassing another and correctly judge that the person thereby behaves 
wrongly.  But here again, even though the psychopath often gets things extensionally 
correct, there may still be reason to suspect that his capacity for moral judgment is 
deficient by comparison to the psychologically normal person.   
 
One such reason, for instance, is the apparent failure on the part of psychopaths to 
distinguish between moral and conventional wrongdoing.  Now, I think it would be a 
mistake to think that there is some sort of very clear line between these two categories of 
wrongs.  But in general, it seems, moral transgressions are more serious, less permissible, 
and less likely to be contingent upon authority—e.g., hitting a fellow student is more 
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serious and less permissible than chewing gum in class; and even if the teacher explicitly 
allows both, it will still be wrong to hit.  And from a very young age (around the third 
birthday), psychologically normal children seem to recognize the differences between 
moral and conventional wrongs along all three of these dimensions.
31
  In a study 
comparing psychopathic and non-psychopathic criminals, however, Blair found that 
psychopaths consistently fail to draw a significant distinction between moral and 
conventional wrongs along any of the three dimensions.
32
  Apparently, as far as the 
psychopath can tell, burping loudly in public is wrong in the same way that violent 
attacks are wrong.
33
  And of course, another reason for thinking that psychopaths’ 
capacity for moral judgment is deficient is their apparent failure to be motivated to act in 
accordance with their professed moral beliefs.  Regardless of how close one happens to 
think the connection is between moral judgment and motivation, it is certainly natural to 
think that, if a person really judges x to be morally wrong, then we can expect her to be 
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 See Smetana 1993. 
 
32
 Blair 1995. 
 
33
 Interestingly, contrary to what Blair predicted, rather than treating moral transgressions as 
conventional, psychopaths actually treat conventional transgressions as moral (i.e., as relatively more 
serious, less permissible, and not contingent upon authority).  This is especially interesting when one 
considers the sorts of justifications provided by the psychopathic and non-psychopathic subjects for their 
responses.  Non-psychopathic subjects typically cited harm to the victim as among their reasons for judging 
an action along characteristically moral lines.  Psychopaths, on the other hand, rarely made reference to the 
victim’s welfare; instead, they made reference (whether implicitly or explicitly) to social rules, 
expectations, and the like (e.g., “It’s not acceptable to do that”).  So why do psychopaths judge most or all 
transgressions along characteristically moral lines, if they apparently do not have the same reasons for 
doing so as non-psychopaths?  For an answer, Blair reminds us that the participants in his study were 
criminals serving time in prison: “These subjects were all incarcerated and presumably motivated to be 
released.  All wished to demonstrate that the treatments they were receiving were effective.  They therefore 
would be motivated to show how they had learned the rules of society … [The psychopaths’ inability to 
recognize a difference between moral and conventional transgressions], coupled with a desire to 
demonstrate an adherence to societal rules, results in their judgment of all the transgressions as authority 
independent.  The non-psychopaths, in contrast, though presumably equally motivated to be released, are 
incapable of ignoring the distinguishing features of moral and conventional transgressions … and thus 
answer the authority jurisdiction question appropriately” (1995: 23-24).  
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motivated to avoid doing x.  But these expectations are consistently flouted by 
psychopaths, who appear to be prone to immoral (and often criminal) behavior.   
 
So again, psychopaths may say the right things—they call moral and conventional 
transgressions “wrong,” just as we do—but the fact that they apparently do not see a 
moral difference between, say, breaking into people’s homes and driving without a 
driver’s license, coupled with their infamous motivational failures, suggests that there is a 
defect of some sort in their capacity for moral judgment.  When psychopaths say that a 
thing is morally wrong, they are not giving voice to a moral intuition in the way that we 
are when we say that things are morally wrong.  Rather, what the psychopath is doing is 
more akin to parroting the moral claims of those around him.  And what underlies this 
defect in the psychopath’s capacity for moral judgment, many think, is the emotional 
deficit noted earlier.   
 
Why think that it is an emotional deficit that underlies their deficient capacity for 
moral judgment?  Well, for one thing, all of the psychopath’s more stereotypically 
“cognitive” capacities appear for the most part to be intact. 34   As I noted earlier, 
psychopaths are often extremely intelligent, articulate, and observant people.  And for 
another thing, researchers have discovered similar moral judgment-related deficiencies in 
                                                 
34
 It might be argued that the psychopath’s apparent failure to recognize what is moral about a 
moral transgression has something to do with a deficient capacity for perspective-taking—i.e., the 
psychopath cannot “see” what makes intentionally embarrassing someone morally wrong because he 
cannot take the perspective of the person being wronged.  And perspective-taking is often thought to be a 
cognitive (opposed to affective, or emotional) mental exercise.  There are two ways for the psychological 
sentimentalist to say here.  First of all, it is unclear that psychopaths really cannot take the perspective of 
another.  Blair, for instance, believes that they can (see Blair et al. 1996), and that this explains why 
psychopaths are often so successful at manipulating others.  And second, it is unclear that perspective-
taking is really a cognitive mental exercise to begin with.  Peter Hobson, for instance, makes a compelling 
case for thinking that the autistic child’s struggle with perspective-taking is rooted in a kind of emotional 
impairment (see Hobson 2002 and 2005).  
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patients with significantly different conditions—e.g., people with autism, people with 
injuries to particular parts of the brain, etc.—and what is common to all of these cases is 
that the patients exhibit an emotional deficit or impairment of some sort.
35
   
 
Unlike psychopaths, people with autism have a particularly difficult time 
recognizing the mental states of others.
36
  In one study, for instance, two groups of 
children and adolescents—one with autism, and one without autism—were asked to 
watch a brief sequence of images in which points of light in the shape of people perform 
some action (gestures of surprise, sadness, fear, anger, and happiness), and then asked to 
identify “what’s happening” in the images.37  Despite the fact that both groups of children 
correctly identified the point-light displays as people, all but one of the non-autistic 
children commented on the person’s emotions (surprise, sadness, etc.), while 10 of the 13 
autistic children focused only on the person’s physical movements, never even 
mentioning the person’s emotional states.38 
In the case of the children and adolescents with autism, it was the person’s 
movements and actions rather than feelings that were reported.  For 
example, they described the sad figure as ‘walking and sitting down on a 
                                                 
35
 For more on the moral judgment of psychopaths, see Nichols 2004: 11-20 and Prinz 2007: 42-
47. For studies of the deficient moral judgment of patients with damage to their ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex, see Young et al. 2010.  Such patients also exhibit motivational deficiencies similar to those of the 
psychopath (see Doris and Stich 2005: 123-128; see also Damasio’s description of the famous case of 
Phineas Gage in 1994: 3-33).  And for studies of the deficient moral judgment of people with autism, see 
Grant et al. 2005 and Takeda et al. 2007).  I go on to say a bit about the connection between autism and 
moral judgment in the text.    
 
36
 See n. 34. 
 
37
 Hobson explains why he and his colleagues elected to use point-light displays instead of, for 
instance, pictures or video of real human expressions: “In previous studies, we had found evidence that, at 
least on occasion, children with autism appeared to be able to name bodily expressed emotions, for 
example in faces, but by employing unusual perceptual/cognitive strategies that might not reflect full 
experience and understanding of what the expressions signify for a person’s feelings” (2005: 191). 
 
38
 Hobson 2005: 192. 
 87 
chair’, ‘walking and flapping arms and bent down’, and ‘walking and 
waving his arms and kneeling down […] hands to face’.39 
 
Among the more consistent symptoms of autism, as is exhibited in these (and other) 
studies, is a deficient capacity to read the subjective states of other people off of their 
actions.  And what is it that lies at the (causal) root of this deficiency?  Many think that it 
stems from a socio-emotional impairment: 
[C]hildren with autism are unusual in their relative failure to become 
emotionally engaged with the emotional states of other people. […] Put 
simply, this limitation in the children’s experience of intersubjective 
contact and reciprocal engagement with others is a fundamental 
impediment to growth in their understanding of what it is to have a 
subjective mental orientation.
40
 
 
In other words, due (in part) to an insufficient emotional engagement early in life with the 
subjective states of others, children with autism struggle later in life to identify what 
those states might even be.  And many think that this impairment is what explains the 
peculiar sort of struggle that people with autism appear to have with moral judgment.   
 
For instance, Cathy Grant and colleagues found that, while children with autism 
were as likely as children without autism to judge that damaging people makes a person 
more culpable than does damaging property, the justifications provided by children with 
autism for their judgment were typically of a rather poor quality (e.g., they rarely made 
any mention at all of such things as the victim’s suffering, etc.).41  In fact, many think 
that the apparent ability of people with autism to correctly distinguish between moral and 
conventional wrongs (they often do quite well on Blair’s moral-conventional task) has 
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 Hobson 2005: 192. 
 
40
 Hobson 2005: 189, 190. 
 
41
 Grant et al. 2005. 
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more to do with their having memorized certain rules and other things that they were 
explicitly taught than it does with an ability to actually see a difference between the 
two.
42
  As Blair explains, “[T]he child with autism may not process as moral those 
transgressions (e.g., stealing) that require an individual to represent the mental state of 
another in order to realize that the other is a victim.”43  An autistic child, then, applies a 
concept like morally wrong in much the same way that our completely colorblind 
character from earlier applies a concept like red—mostly correctly, but nonetheless in a 
way unlike that of the normal (moral) judge.   
 
Just as we could see the causal significance of Peyton Manning to the 
Indianapolis Colts’ success during their unfortunate 2011 season without him, we can see 
the causal significance of emotion to moral judgment by observing the judgment of those 
with serious emotional deficits.  It is not the case that those with emotional deficits get 
things wrong, as it were—on the contrary, they seem to get things right more often than 
not.  Rather, it is apparently the case that a systematic deficit in emotion forces a person 
to take some abnormal route to correct moral beliefs, much as the colorblind person must 
take an abnormal route to correct beliefs about the colors of things.  This supports the 
psychological sentimentalist’s claim that the process by which our moral beliefs are 
ordinarily formed is one in which the emotions figure centrally.   
 
Things now seem doubly bad for the psychological rationalist.  For not only do 
the moral dumbfounding studies suggest that moral intuitions are really the products of a 
psychological process that operates (mostly) at a level below consciousness; but also, 
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 See Takeda et al. 2007. 
 
43
 Blair 1996: 578; emphasis mine.  See also Takeda et al. 2007. 
 89 
there is growing evidence for thinking that this unconscious process is one in which 
emotion figures centrally.  I have only discussed some of the relevant empirical research 
so far, but I nonetheless think that I’ve said enough to make a strong presumptive case for 
psychological sentimentalism.  In the next section, I’ll examine what I take to be 
sentimentalism’s most serious rival.    
 
 5. Dual-process models of moral judgment 
 
There are some who think that the traditional rationalist vs. sentimentalist debate in moral 
psychology is a misguided one, since it fails to acknowledge a kind of “middle ground” 
approach according to which both reason and emotion figure centrally in moral 
judgment.  For instance, in recent work, Fiery Cushman, Liane Young, and Joshua 
Greene have defended a dual-process model of moral judgment.   
[W]e pursue a dual-process approach in which moral judgment is the 
product of both intuitive [i.e., fast, effortless, unconscious] and rational 
[i.e., conscious, deliberative] processes, and it is the product of what are 
conventionally thought of as “affective” and “cognitive” mechanisms. [... 
A] dual-process model of moral judgment can explain features of the data 
that unitary models [like psychological rationalism and sentimentalism] 
cannot.
44
 
 
In my view, this dual-process approach is the most significant rival to sentimentalism in 
moral psychology, so I want to use this section to examine a few of the arguments in 
favor of dual-process models, and whether or not they really do a better job than 
sentimentalism of explaining certain phenomena associated with moral judgment.  
Cushman, Young, and Greene describe four reasons for thinking that reason—or some 
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 Cushman et al. 2010: 48-49.  Readers should note that while it is unclear exactly how the 
authors are using the term ‘moral judgment’ here, it is clear that they are not using it in the same way that I 
have been using it.  As I use the term, moral judgment is not the product of any psychological process; 
rather, moral judgment is the psychological process that produces moral intuitions.  If I were to rephrase 
this quotation, then, I would say, “Moral judgment involves both intuitive and rational processes, and also 
what are conventionally thought of as ‘affective’ and ‘cognitive’ mechanisms.” 
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non-emotional, cognitive process—also figures centrally in moral judgment, as the dual-
process model proposes: (i) the fact that people often are capable of offering principled 
justifications for their moral intuitions; (ii) the fact that people sometimes alter, or 
abandon, their initial moral intuitions when prompted to engage in conscious reasoning; 
(iii) the astonishing regularity in the development of moral justifications, as revealed by 
Kohlberg’s research; and (iv) evidence of heightened activity in areas of the brain 
associated with higher cognition during some cases of moral judgment. 
 
The first two reasons, I think, are quite weak.  First, while cases of moral 
dumbfounding—i.e., cases in which people are not able to offer principled justifications 
for moral intuitions they are nonetheless unwilling to give up—are admittedly somewhat 
uncommon, these cases are not supposed to be interesting because of how common or 
uncommon they are.  Rather, they are interesting because of what they might reveal about 
the more common cases in which people can apparently easily justify their moral 
intuitions—namely, that in these more common cases, it is not that reasoning played any 
role in the production of the intuitions; it is just that, in these cases, reasoning is 
successful in its post hoc rationalization of a moral intuition that has already been formed 
by some unconscious process.  So I hardly see how the fact that people are often able to 
provide principled justifications for their moral intuitions is any evidence for thinking 
that those intuitions are the products of a psychological process in which reasoning 
(conscious or unconscious) figures centrally.   
 
Likewise, to say that conscious reasoning can sometimes lead people to alter, or 
even abandon, their initial intuitions is to say nothing at all about the psychological 
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process that produced the beliefs in the first place.  This is still only to allow reasoning a 
post hoc role with respect to our moral intuitions.  It is not to allow reasoning any role at 
all in moral judgment, as I am using that term.
45
  So these first two reasons given by 
Cushman, Young, and Greene are not problems for the psychological sentimentalist.   
 
What are we to say, though, about the apparent regularities uncovered by 
Kohlberg in the sorts of justifications that people offer for their moral intuitions?  Even if 
one does not think that his methods were fit for his stated purposes, surely there is 
something to be said about how well his data fits his overall theory.  A thorough response 
to Kohlberg’s program would take much more space than I’m prepared to give it here, so 
my remarks in response to this point will have to be somewhat superficial.  Ultimately, I 
think Kohlberg has given us a theory of something, but it is a theory of moral justification 
and not a theory of moral judgment.  And as such, it is supported quite impressively by 
his research.  Again, as I am using the term, moral judgment is the psychological process 
that underlies the production of a certain type of belief in ordinary cases.  Moral 
justification, on the other hand, is every bit as much a social phenomenon as it is a 
psychological phenomenon, if not more so.  It is the process by which we make our 
beliefs understood, both to others and also to ourselves.  At its heart is the giving of 
reasons, for the purposes of both defense and persuasion.  To engage in moral 
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 To be sure, there is still plenty of room for one to believe that reasoning (conscious or not) has a 
very significant role to play in the shaping of our overall moral views.  It is compatible with everything that 
I say in this dissertation, for instance, that moral judgment (as I define the term) is only one of many moral 
doxastic practices in which humans regularly engage.  And reasoning may have a very significant role to 
play in those other processes by which moral beliefs are formed, shaped, and solidified.   
For reasons that I describe in chapter I, however, I do think that moral judgment has a certain 
prominence among other moral belief-forming processes.  In most cases, I think, even when we do reason 
about moral matters, we do so from our moral intuitions—they are, in a sense, the starting-point of moral 
reasoning.  And it is probably not a coincidence that, much more often than not, when we engage in moral 
reasoning, we tend to find more reasons for thinking that our initial moral intuitions were on point to begin 
with.  But this is only speculation, and I’ll not pursue the matter any further than this.   
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justification, then, is to engage in something that not only rational, but essentially 
rational.  It is a kind of skill, and like many skills, it develops over time, as we are 
exposed to new experiences, new sources of information, new methods, new standards, 
etc.  This is what I think Kohlberg spent the better part of his career studying, not moral 
judgment.   
 
Now, there is still the issue of explaining just why it is that people’s moral 
intuitions—however they are formed—seem so nicely to fit with the sorts of theoretical 
considerations that are supposed to be characteristic of moral judges at each stage of 
Kohlberg’s model.  Why, for instance, do so many people at stage 5 have moral intuitions 
that correspond so nicely with Kohlberg’s description of stage 5 moral reasoning, if these 
intuitions are really the products of a process in which emotion figures most centrally?  
There are two ways for a sentimentalist like myself to respond here, one cheaper than the 
other.  The cheap response is just to say that the correspondence was self-fulfilling.  As a 
matter of fact, there is a huge amount of overlap in the actions proscribed or prescribed 
by different moral theories.  If theories A, B and C all forbid actions of types x, y, and z, 
and I conduct a series of moral judgment surveys in which subjects judge x-, y-, and z-
type actions to be wrong, then adherents of A, B, and C are all likely to interpret this as 
evidence that people are, by and large, guided in their moral judgment by the principles 
of theories A, B, or C.  Kohlberg was an avowed Kantian, so it is not surprising that he 
interpreted people’s intuitions as conforming to Kantian principles of morality.  A 
utilitarian might see the data quite differently.   
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So much for the cheap response.  A more interesting response, I think, might take 
us back to my theory of emotion from the last chapter.  As you will recall, on my 
account, whenever someone has an emotion, she construes something in a way that 
clashes or accords with her concerns (which then gives rise to the sorts of feelings that 
we typically associate with emotions).  Now, suppose we grant that, as a matter of fact, 
many relatively mature moral judges are concerned about things like respect for persons, 
equality and fairness.  (We do not have to suppose that they are aware of this fact about 
themselves.)  If this is the case, then presumably, these people will have negative 
emotional responses whenever they construe an action in a way that clashes with one or 
more of these concerns.  The resulting moral intuitions, then, will likely fit with Kantian 
principles of morality on many occasions, even if they were not the products of a 
reasoning process in which Kantian principles are applied to particular cases, as Kohlberg 
believed.  So in a sense, this person would be emotionally sensitive to violations of 
Kantian moral principles, but she would not be sensitive to them as violations of Kantian 
moral principles.  Now, this is admittedly still a sketchy response; but I nonetheless think 
that a sentimentalist can satisfactorily explain Kohlberg’s data along roughly these lines.  
And as long as such an explanation is available to the sentimentalist, I do not think that 
Kohlberg’s data should count as evidence for a dual-process model of moral judgment—
i.e., as opposed to psychological sentimentalism.     
 
Finally, we have to consider the neuroimaging studies that implicate activity in 
regions of the brain associated with non-emotional, higher cognitive function as subjects 
engage in moral judgment.  In 2001, Greene and colleagues published the results of a 
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study in which subjects were asked to respond to two of the famous trolley scenarios.
46
  
In the first scenario—TROLLEY—a runaway trolley is headed for five people who are, for 
whatever reason, unable to remove themselves from the trolley’s path.  If the trolley 
continues unimpeded on its current course, it will surely kill all five of them.  You stand 
next to a switch that, if pulled, will redirect the runaway trolley onto an alternative track 
where it will strike and kill only one person.  When asked whether or not it is morally 
permissible to pull the switch and divert the trolley onto the alternative track, sparing five 
lives at the cost of one, the vast majority of people respond that it is indeed permissible to 
pull the switch.  In the second scenario—FOOTBRIDGE—you now stand on a bridge that 
spans the trolley track somewhere between the oncoming runaway trolley and the five 
people on the track.  With you on the bridge is a very fat man.  You know that if you 
were to push him down onto the track, his body is large enough that it would stop the 
trolley before it strikes and kills the five people.  But the fat man will surely die as a 
result of being hit by the trolley.  When asked whether or not it is morally permissible to 
push the fat man off the bridge, sparing five lives at the cost of one, the vast majority of 
people respond that it is not morally permissible to push him. 
 
The puzzle should be clear: Why do so many people judge it permissible to spare 
five lives at the cost of one when doing so only involves pulling switch, but not when 
doing so involves pushing someone off a bridge?  The puzzle becomes perhaps even 
more troublesome when we consider the sorts of justifications that people provide for 
their responses.  Whenever I present TROLLEY to my students, and then ask them why 
they think it’s permissible to pull the switch, the predominant justification is markedly 
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 Greene et al. 2001. 
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consequentialist: Because five deaths is a worse outcome than just one death.  But if a 
consideration of this basic form is what lead to their response that it is morally 
permissible to pull the switch, why did it not also lead them to think it permissible to 
push the fat man—after all, five deaths is still worse than just one death, right?  In fact, 
the justifications that people often offer for their response to FOOTBRIDGE are typically 
more deontological in nature, often referring to such things as the man’s rights, or a duty 
to refrain from using people in this way.    
 
Philosophers have attempted all sorts of principled defenses of people’s intuitions 
in response to TROLLEY and FOOTBRIDGE.  (Notice, apparently, the assumption is that the 
intuitions themselves are not the problem; rather, the problem is that of explaining why it 
is in fact permissible to pull the switch, but not to push the fat man.  Here is an instance 
of philosophers granting a certain measure of authority to people’s ordinary moral 
intuitions, as I mentioned in chapter I.)  One way to do so, for instance, is to point out the 
Kantian idea that it is impermissible to use a person as a mere means to some end.  The 
one person on the alternative track is not being used as a means to saving the five, but the 
fat man surely is.  And indeed, anecdotally, I have occasionally had students offer 
something like this defense of their intuitions in response to TROLLEY and FOOTBRIDGE.  
So maybe people’s intuitions here are the results of a process that is sensitive in some 
way to exactly the sorts of considerations that Kant would say are relevant to our thinking 
about the rightness or wrongness of pulling the switch and pushing the fat man.   
 
Greene is not concerned to defend people’s responses to the trolley scenarios, but 
he does want to explain why they respond in the confusing ways that they do.  And here 
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the explanation that he offers may be surprising to some: Contrary to what is often 
assumed, deontological moral intuitions (e.g., the majority response to FOOTBRIDGE) are 
actually the causal result of people’s emotional responses, while consequentialist moral 
intuitions result from a more cognitive, and emotionally neutral, process.  The 
implication is that, if only emotion were not to interfere, subjects would judge it 
permissible to push the fat man.  But the thought of heaving someone off of a bridge to 
his certain death triggers a kind of “alarm bell” emotional response, which then causes 
people to judge it wrong to push him.  Clearly, if the evidence confirms Greene’s 
hypothesis, this would lend support to his dual-process model of moral judgment against 
the sentimentalist’s model, since it would imply that moral judgment is a process in 
which emotion only sometimes figures centrally—i.e., whenever it competes with the 
default, cognitive process.  So what evidence is there? 
 
Greene’s hypothesis generates the following two predictions.  First, we should 
expect to see areas of the brain associated with emotion especially active as subjects 
consider FOOTBRIDGE, and areas of the brain associated with higher cognition especially 
active as subjects consider TROLLEY.  And second, when it comes to people’s responses 
to FOOTBRIDGE in particular, we should expect to see a significant difference in reaction 
time between those who judge it impermissible to push the fat man and those who judge 
it permissible.  After all, if the majority response to FOOTBRIDGE is the causal result of an 
automatic emotional reaction, then those in the minority who judge it permissible to push 
the fat man will presumably have to override this emotional reaction, and this overriding 
process will take time.   
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Both of these predictions have been confirmed.  The fMRI scans show increased 
activity in the posterior cingulate cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the 
amygdala—three areas closely associated with emotion—as subjects consider 
FOOTBRIDGE, and increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior 
parietal lobe—areas closely associated with more “cognitive” functions—as subjects 
consider TROLLEY.
47
  Furthermore, on average, subjects who approve of pushing the fat 
man take much longer to do so than subjects who disapprove of pushing him.
48
  So the 
evidence does seem to support Greene’s hypothesis that moral intuitions are sometimes 
the causal products of a process in which emotion figures centrally, and, other times, the 
products of a more emotionally neutral, “cognitive” process.  Unless the sentimentalist 
wants to claim that people’s intuitions about TROLLEY are somehow out of the ordinary—
and so, not spoken for by his account of moral judgment—he will have to offer some sort 
of counter-interpretation of Greene’s studies.   
 
Here is how I think such an interpretation should go.  When two or more 
emotional responses pull moral judgment in different directions, our brains recruit more 
neutral, cognitive processes to help adjudicate.  Otherwise, the “default” setting for moral 
judgment is just to let emotion take the lead (contrary to what Greene suggests).  If this is 
right, then here is what we should expect to see.  In cases in which emotion is, for 
whatever reason, unable to produce a stable moral intuition on its own (e.g., because we 
have comparably strong emotional responses that lend themselves to competing moral 
intuitions), there will be increased activity in areas of the brain associated with higher 
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48
 Greene et al. 2001: 2107. 
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cognition, and reaction times will generally be relatively high.  And in cases in which 
emotion has no difficulty producing a stable moral intuition on its own, there will be less 
activity in those cognitive areas of the brain, and reaction times will be significantly 
lower.   
 
This is what we observe in the cases of TROLLEY and FOOTBRIDGE.  In response 
to the TROLLEY scenario, emotional responses to the thought of pulling the switch, 
though perhaps relatively weak, are close enough in strength to subjects’ emotional 
responses to the thought of letting the trolley continue on its course; and so, more 
cognitive processes are recruited to locate some consideration that might “tip the scales,” 
as it were—e.g., the thought that five deaths would be worse than just one death.  In 
response to the FOOTBRIDGE dilemma, however, subjects’ emotional responses to the 
thought of pushing the fat man are strong enough to tip the scales on their own; so, as far 
as our brains are concerned, no help is needed in forming the intuition that it would be 
wrong to push him.   
 
Now consider two other cases given to subjects by Greene and his colleagues.  
Call the first one CRYING BABY: 
It is wartime, and you and some of your fellow villagers are hiding from 
enemy soldiers in a basement.  Your baby starts to cry, and you cover your 
baby’s mouth to block the sound.  If you remove your hand, your baby 
will cry loudly, the soldiers will hear, and they will find you and the others 
and kill everyone they find, including you and your baby.  If you do not 
remove your hand, your baby will smother to death.  Is it okay to smother 
your baby to death in order to save yourself and the other villagers?
49
 
 
The second case—INFANTICIDE—involves a teenage mother who must decide whether or 
not to kill her unwanted newborn.  As Greene reports, in the case of CRYING BABY, 
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 Greene 2008: 44. 
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“Different people give different responses, and nearly everyone takes a relatively long 
time.”50   But in the case of INFANTICIDE, subjects are quick and unanimous in their 
response that it is not permissible for the young mother to kill the unwanted newborn.   
 
Here again, while our negative emotional response to the thought of the teenage 
mother killing the newborn is strong enough on its own to cause us to have the intuition 
that doing so is impermissible, the CRYING BABY case is much more likely to give rise to 
an emotional conflict.  And since emotion is unable in this case to produce a stable moral 
intuition on its own, our brains recruit some more cognitive process in order to locate 
considerations that might “tip the scales.”  The result might be something 
consequentialist (e.g., “I suppose it’s better for just one person to die than for that same 
person and many others to die as well”), but it may also be something more deontological 
(e.g., “I don’t care if it means everyone has to die, it would be wrong of me to use the 
baby as a means to their survival”), or something unrecognizable as an instance of either 
substantive ethical framework (e.g., “I just could never do something like that”).  As 
Greene said, responses were varied.
51
  My point is only that, while moral judgment is, by 
default, driven by emotion, there will nonetheless be cases in which emotional responses 
alone are indecisive.  And in such cases, it should not be surprising that our brains recruit 
“outside help,” as it were.  In fact, one of the regions of the brain that is especially active 
as subjects consider CRYING BABY is the anterior cingulate cortex, which, as Cushman, 
Young, and Greene explain, “reliably responds when two or more incompatible 
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 So this is a case in which the data do not support Greene’s contention that there is some 
relationship between higher cognitive function and the production of characteristically consequentialist 
moral intuitions.   
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behavioral responses are simultaneously activated, i.e., under conditions of ‘response 
conflict’.”52  
 
This is all perfectly compatible with psychological sentimentalism.  In fact, 
sentimentalists of all stripes have generally been quite happy to allow that there may be 
some roles for non-emotional processes to figure in the production of our moral beliefs.  
They just insist that these roles are relatively minor compared to that played by emotion.  
As Hume famously remarked, “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, 
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.”53  Psychological 
sentimentalists carry the Humean torch, in a sense, echoing the conclusion of Schnall, 
Haidt, and others: “[M]oral reasoning is an important part of moral life, but for most 
people, most of the time, most of the action is in the quick, automatic, affective 
evaluations they make of people and events.”54 
 
 6. Is psychological sentimentalism an epistemic threat?  
 
The phenomenon of moral dumbfounding suggests that our moral intuitions are 
ordinarily the products of a psychological process that operates (mostly) at a 
subconscious level, contrary to what psychological rationalists believe.  And the research 
discussed in §§3-5 strongly suggests that this psychological process is one in which 
emotion figures centrally.  Henceforth, I will assume that some form of psychological 
sentimentalism is the case.  What sort of role does emotion play in moral judgment?  
Apparently, a very significant one.  In the next two chapters, my primary concern will be 
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the exact nature of the role that emotion plays in moral judgment: Is emotion a 
distraction to moral judgment?  Does it cloud moral judgment?  Or might emotion’s 
contribution to moral judgment be something more positive, epistemically speaking?   
 
As I mentioned in chapter I, there are some who argue that the centrality of 
emotion in moral judgment is somehow a threat to the epistemic status of moral intuitions 
(or would be a threat, if they also believed psychological sentimentalism to be the case).  
Generally speaking, underlying these arguments is a long-standing, and still very popular, 
assumption that if emotion figures centrally in moral judgment—as we’ve now 
established it does—then moral judgment probably cannot be relied upon to produce 
justified beliefs about objective moral values.  Joshua Greene makes this assumption 
when he moves from the observation that emotion figures centrally in moral judgment to 
the conclusion that our moral intuitions must then be projections of internal attitudes 
rather than beliefs about objective values.55  Sharon Street makes the assumption on the 
basis of observations about the purpose(s) for which emotions evolved.  Shaun Nichols 
also appears to make the assumption when, after defending his own version of 
psychological sentimentalism, he concludes, “so moral judgment, as we know it, is not 
objective.”56  And Walter Sinnott-Armstrong must have something like this assumption in 
mind when he argues that, whenever our moral intuitions are the products of a process in 
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which emotion figures centrally, some further inferential confirmation will be needed if 
they are to count as justified.
57
  
 
I’ll address all four of these arguments in much greater detail in chapter V.  First, 
though, I want to bring the discussions of chapters II and III together, and lay out my own 
account of the role of emotion in moral judgment and it epistemic implications.  That will 
be the focus of chapter IV. 
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IV 
MORAL PERCEPTION 
 
 
[F]ear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and 
in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and 
too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the 
right times, with reference to the right objects, toward the 
right people, with the right motive, and in the right way … 
is characteristic of virtue. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
 
When I say, “The sky is blue,” and then say, “The sky is 
beauti-ful,” a property is attributed to the sky in either case.  
In the second case a feeling participates in the apprehension 
of the property, as, in the first case, an idea does.   
Alexius Meinong, On Emotional Presentation 
 
 
 
At the end of chapter I, I made a point to clarify my use of two key terms: moral intuition 
and moral judgment.  Moral intuitions are a subspecies of moral beliefs, characterized 
(among psychologists) by the quickness and effortlessness with which they are formed, 
and (among philosophers) by their non-inferential grounds.  And moral judgment is the 
psychological process that is ordinarily responsible for the production of moral 
intuitions—in which, it now seems, emotion figures centrally.   
 
Now I want to introduce and define another term, one that will already be familiar 
to readers, but will have a specialized meaning here.  The term that I have in mind is 
trustworthiness, and I’ll apply it to moral intuitions.  As I explained in chapter I, we go 
on as if our moral intuitions are beliefs about objective moral values, and as if they are at 
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least sometimes justified—even if, as is typically the case, we never actually consider 
what grounds there are, or what grounds we have, for doing so.  I’ll say that ordinary 
moral intuitions are trustworthy, then, if it turns out that they actually do have the 
characteristics that we assume they have—i.e., if they actually are justified beliefs about 
objective moral values.
1
   
 
The central question of this dissertation can now be put in these terms: Can moral 
intuitions be trustworthy if they are grounded (causally) in emotion?  Or, since I’ve 
already argued that moral intuitions are grounded in emotion, we can now simply ask: 
Are moral intuitions trustworthy?  My answer will be that, yes, they are (or they can be, 
under conditions I specify in this chapter).  But as I’ve indicated elsewhere, this is not a 
popular answer—especially among philosophers and psychologists.  In general, the 
assumption seems to be that if emotion figures centrally in moral judgment, then its 
products are either (a) not beliefs about objective moral values (but rather, for instance, 
mere projections of emotions), or (b) if they are beliefs about objective moral values, 
then their justification is seriously threatened by their emotional basis.  In other words, it 
is commonly assumed that, other things being equal, moral intuitions cannot be 
trustworthy if they are grounded in emotion. 
 
Something has to give.  If psychological sentimentalism is the case—and again, 
I’m assuming at this point that it is—then we ought either somehow abandon the trust 
that we apparently place in our own moral intuitions (since apparently they are not 
worthy of our trust), or else reject the popular assumption that our moral intuitions cannot 
be justified beliefs about objective moral values if they are grounded in emotion.  Given 
                                                 
1
 I’ll say more below (in §4) about the sort of epistemic justification that I have in mind.   
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the sort of role that moral intuitions play in our lives and in the construction and 
assessment of moral theories, the first of these options would be difficult to accept, to say 
the very least.  And yet, it is precisely what some philosophers and psychologists 
recommend.  In this chapter, I attempt the second response—that is, I’ll offer an account 
of how it is that ordinary moral intuitions might be worthy of the trust that we apparently 
give to them.  
 
For now, consider a rough analogy: If my beliefs about the shapes of objects are 
grounded in my visual experiences of those objects, then, other things being equal, the 
beliefs are trustworthy (in an analogous sense of trustworthiness).  This is relatively 
uncontroversial because we already have a story to tell about how our sensory receptors 
are appropriately sensitive to such objective features of the world as the shapes of things.  
So in order to make such a claim about emotion and morality—i.e., in order to make the 
claim that moral intuitions grounded in one’s emotional responses can be similarly 
trustworthy—one will have to tell a story about how it is that our emotions can be (and 
sometimes are) sensitive to objective moral values.  Telling such a story shall be the main 
task of this chapter. 
 
Now, some readers may wonder, hasn’t this story been told before?  Indeed, John 
McDowell defends a sensibility theory according to which people might be sensitive, in a 
manner reminiscent of perception, to objective moral values.
2
  But McDowell’s approach 
involves—and indeed, on some readings, depends upon—the adoption of a secondary 
quality view of moral values, according to which a thing’s having a moral value is a 
matter of its being such as to elicit a certain response in perceivers.  While McDowell 
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 See McDowell 1998a and 1998b. 
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may be right to construe moral values in this way, though, it is obvious that skeptics like 
Nichols and Sinnott-Armstrong do not—for if they did, it would be difficult to make 
sense of their skepticism.  If being such as to elicit certain emotions, say, were all there is 
to objective moral values, then why think that having one’s moral intuitions grounded in 
emotion is any threat to their trustworthiness?  Taking McDowell’s secondary quality 
approach to moral values may be one way to protect moral intuitions from the sort of 
skepticism encouraged by Nichols and Sinnott-Armstrong, but I suspect this would feel 
like a hollow victory to some, especially those inclined to construe objective moral values 
more robustly than this.  And apparently, taking such an approach would amount to 
simply refusing to operate on the terms assumed by these skeptics. 
 
What I propose to do, then, is this: Assume—just for the sake of argument—a 
primary quality view of objective moral values, and then raise the epistemological 
question: What becomes of the trustworthiness of beliefs about moral values so 
construed, when it is granted that these beliefs are grounded in emotion?
3
  My answer 
will depend heavily upon the account of emotion that I defended in chapter II, and upon 
an account of the relation between emotion and virtue that I will describe in §1 of this 
chapter.  In §2, I return to the analogy to perception, arguing that the effect of moral 
virtue upon the emotions is such as to make the virtuous person emotionally sensitive to 
objective moral values in a manner much like perception—if you prefer, we might say 
that the virtuous person’s emotions amount to instances of moral perception.  And just as 
the perceptual experiences in which our perceptual beliefs are grounded (can) contribute 
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 To be clear, I take myself to be free to assume a primary quality view of objective moral values 
precisely because nothing I will say depends upon how objective moral values are construed.  As far as I 
can tell, everything I say in this chapter can be affirmed by someone who holds a secondary quality view 
like McDowell’s.  The point is just that we needn’t hold such a view. 
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positively to the justification of those beliefs, our emotions can make a similarly positive 
contribution to the justification of moral intuitions.  Other things being equal, I conclude, 
if a person is virtuous, then her moral intuitions are trustworthy because they are 
grounded in emotion, contrary to what is commonly assumed.   
 
In §3 and §4, I elaborate upon my view.  In §3, I do this by distinguishing it from 
a somewhat similar view defended very recently by Robert Roberts.  Roberts also argues 
that emotion can be a kind of epistemic aid to moral intuitions, but I think there are 
important differences between the ways in which he and I account for this.  And since my 
view can be understood as a form of reliabilism with respect to moral intuitions, I devote 
§4 to a brief discussion of the view in the broader context of process reliabilist accounts 
of epistemic justification.  Finally, in §5, I address a few lingering worries.   
 
 1. Why do good feelings happen to good people? 
 
Crucial to my overall argument that moral intuitions can sometimes be trustworthy when 
they are grounded in emotion is the establishment of a kind of connection between 
emotion and moral virtue.  It would certainly be nothing new to suggest that emotion and 
moral virtue are somehow related.  As Linda Zagzebski notes, “[A]lmost every writer on 
the moral virtues has connected them with feelings.”4  Perhaps most famous among them 
is Aristotle and his remarks about the connection between emotion and virtue in the 
Nicomachean Ethics.  Now, I should note that Aristotle seems to have thought differently 
about the nature of emotion than I do, and would consequently not attribute to emotion 
anything like the role in moral judgment that I will in this dissertation.  But for now, that 
is beside the point.  All I want to focus on, for the moment, is the basic sort of 
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relationship that Aristotle thought existed between emotions and moral character.  In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes this relationship as one in which character plays 
some role in determining the emotions, so that our emotional responses are at least often 
signs or symptoms of the state of our moral character.  He writes, 
[F]ear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general 
pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both 
cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the 
right objects, toward the right people, with the right motive, and in the 
right way […] is characteristic of virtue.5 
 
So, to be morally virtuous is (partly) to be disposed to having certain emotional 
responses; and at least generally, the emotional responses of the morally virtuous person 
will be better than those of the less virtuous.  Throughout what follows, I’ll assume that 
this broadly Aristotelian picture of the relation between emotion and moral character is 
correct. 
 
Why is it that morally virtuous people feel emotions well?  As I see it, there are 
basically two approaches that one might take to giving an answer to this question.  The 
first is certainly the easier of the two, but it is also explanatorily less satisfying: Simply 
define virtue in terms of having the right emotions.  The virtuous person feels emotions 
well, then, because that’s just (part of) what it is to be virtuous.  The problem with taking 
this approach, however, is essentially the same as the problem of trying to forge a 
conceptual link between virtue and right action: Responding emotionally to the right 
things, in the right ways, etc., is neither necessary nor sufficient for being virtuous (just 
as acting rightly is neither necessary nor sufficient for being virtuous).  It is not necessary 
because even the most virtuous person can occasionally fail to respond emotionally in the 
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ways that she should, perhaps because she is distracted, or ill-informed, or whatever.  
And it is not sufficient because someone who responds emotionally to things in all the 
right ways, but always ignores or resists those emotions, would hardly count as virtuous.  
So an answer to the question posed in the heading of this section—why do good feelings 
happen to good people?—just cannot be as simple as: Because that’s what it is to be 
good.  But then, what would a satisfactory answer look like? 
 
The other approach to an answer is decidedly more difficult, but explanatorily 
more satisfying: Give an account of what it is about virtue, specifically, that disposes a 
virtuous person to feeling emotions well.  In other words, we take the observation that 
moral virtue disposes a person to appropriate emotional responses as a datum to be 
explained by a theory of virtue, and not as a part of our theory of virtue.  In taking this 
sort of approach, one takes on an explanatory burden that the first approach bypasses; but 
it is a burden that I nonetheless think that I can shoulder, with the help of my account of 
the nature of emotion. 
 
On the view that I defend in chapter II, some concern or other is necessary if one 
is to experience an emotion.  If I somehow ceased being concerned about my own safety, 
for instance, then I’d no longer fear the approaching animal, even if I continued to see it 
as something likely to harm me.  To expound a bit upon my earlier description, I use 
‘concern’ in this context as a name for a set of ways of being oriented toward something.  
I might love or hate x, like or dislike x, admire or despise x, think highly of or think poorly 
of x, and so forth.  If I am oriented toward x in any of these ways, it would be correct 
(given the way that I am using the term) to say that I am concerned about x, that I have x 
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as an object of concern.  And all of these ways of being oriented toward x dispose a 
person to feel certain emotions toward or about x.  If I admire a person, for instance, and 
then come to see him as the perpetrator of some gross moral evil, then I will likely feel 
disappointment toward him.  (Think, for instance, of the responses of fans of the late 
Penn State head football coach Joe Paterno to the recent news of his alleged involvement 
in covering up a former coach’s crimes.)  In this way, having concerns disposes a person 
to certain emotions. 
 
Furthermore, we can be concerned about things in different ways and to varying 
degrees.  An investor in some company and an opponent of that company are both 
concerned about the company’s success, but obviously in very different ways.  And it is 
for this reason that the two are likely to respond emotionally in very different ways to 
news of the company’s success or demise.  Likewise, two fans of the same baseball team 
might nonetheless have quite different responses when the team wins a pennant, 
depending upon the degree of their concern for the team and its success. 
 
So having concerns disposes a person to certain emotions, and concerns can be 
had toward things in different ways and to varying degrees.  I suspect that this will strike 
the reader as mostly common sense, but it is important to keep in mind, for: (a) as I 
explained in chapter II, the fact that concerns have these features underlies the 
susceptibility of our emotional responses to moral evaluation (and perhaps other sorts of 
evaluation as well); and (b) as I will now go on to show, these features of concerns allow 
me to explain why it is that emotion bears the sort of relation to virtue and moral 
character that it does on the Aristotelian picture described above. 
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Moral virtue, I submit, is a matter of being concerned for the good.
6
  I use the 
term ‘the good’ here as a kind of blanket term for all that is, in fact, good.  So I am not 
assuming any sort of metaphysical unity to goodness.  Rather, I think there are many 
goods, some of which are in some sense objective.  (Again, we can assume, for the sake 
of argument, that these goods are objective in a primary quality sense; but nothing that I 
will say here depends upon this.)  Other things being equal, a person is morally virtuous 
to the extent that she is concerned about these things, i.e., to the extent that she has 
aligned her concerns with the good.  She loves, likes, and admires what is good; she 
thinks highly of the good; she encourages it, protects it, stands for it, and so forth.
7
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 Since I don’t think it’s important, given what I’m up to in this dissertation, I’ll leave open the 
issue of whether there might be more to virtue than this.  So, being concerned for the good may not be 
sufficient for moral virtue, but I do think it is necessary. 
Also, I should note that, when I say “being concerned for the good,” I mean this in a de re sense.  
Nomy Arpaly makes a similar point in her book Unprincipled Virtue, in which she is concerned to develop 
a new theory of moral praiseworthiness (and blameworthiness).  Arpaly understands moral praiseworthi-
ness partly in terms of responsiveness to moral reasons, and as she explains,  
I take a person to be responsive to moral reasons to the extent that she wants noninstru-
mentally to take courses of action that have those features that are (whether or not she 
describes them in this way) right-making and not to take courses of action that have those 
features that are (whether or not she describes them in this way) wrong-making features. 
(Arpaly 2003: 79; italics in original) 
In other words, what is most important when it comes to our evaluations of moral worth is not that agents 
are responsive to what they see as moral reasons (or even what they could see as moral reasons), but rather 
that agents are responsive to what really are moral reasons.  This is why, she thinks, Huck Finn may be 
praised for his failure to turn in his slave friend Jim.  As she reads the story, Huck counts as a praiseworthy 
agent because, despite his professed beliefs to the contrary, he is nonetheless responsive to moral reasons in 
a de re sense.  In this particular case, he is responsive to the fact that Jim is a person, even if he is unaware 
of this.  (It is tempting to cash this out in terms of construals: unconsciously, and as a result of the time he 
spends with Jim, Huck has come to see Jim as a person.)  The virtuous person is one who is excellent in 
being for the good in a similarly de re sense—that is, not in being for what she takes to be the good, but in 
being for what is in reality the good.  I’ll return to this issue briefly in §5. 
 
7
 For a full defense of a theory of virtue much like the one I describe here, see Adams 2006.  
According to Adams, moral virtue consists in what he calls “persisting excellence in being for the good.”  
And what he means by ‘being for the good’ is something very similar (if it is not identical) to what I have 
in mind when I say that a virtuous person is someone who is concerned for the good.  As he explains, 
“There are many ways of being for something. They include: loving it, liking it, respecting it, wanting it, 
wishing for it, appreciating it, thinking highly of it, speaking in favor of it and otherwise intentionally 
standing for it symbolically, acting to promote or protect it, and being disposed to do such things” (Adams 
2006: 15–16). 
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Now, as I noted in chapter II, there are ways of getting things wrong, morally, 
when it comes to one’s concerns—we can be concerned about the wrong sorts of things, 
for instance, or we can be concerned about the right things but to a wrong degree.  My 
two examples there were: (1) a person who desires to see others humiliated, and is 
consequently delighted or amused when he construes another as humiliated; and (2) a 
person who, due to a lack of self-respect, fails to be indignant upon being treated unfairly.  
Both of these people, I can now explain, represent different types of failures of moral 
virtue.  The first person represents a case of failing to be concerned for the good: other 
things equal, to want to see others humiliated is to want something that is altogether bad.  
And this is why we would not only disapprove of the delight that this person takes in 
another’s humiliation, but further, we would disapprove of the person who delights in 
such a thing.  The delight reflects poorly upon the person because it manifests a defect in 
the person’s moral character.   
 
The second person represents a different sort of failure.  Presumably, this person 
is concerned for his own dignity to some degree—just, apparently, to an insufficient 
degree.  That is, there are surely some offenses against his dignity that he would not 
tolerate, but being seriously mistreated by his boss in this particular way happens not to 
be one of them.  It should be, though, and that is why we not only disapprove of his lack 
of indignation, but also of what its absence reveals about his character—namely, a deeper 
failure to be concerned for his own dignity, his own good, to the degree that he ought.
8
  
                                                 
8
 On this point, I take myself to be in partial agreement with Aristotle when he writes, “Now 
neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are not called good or bad on the ground of our 
passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and vices, and because we are neither praised nor 
blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels 
anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are praised or 
 113 
Here we see that it is not enough to merely be concerned for the good in whatever way 
and to whatever degree.  Rather, moral virtue requires a kind of excellence in one’s 
concern for the good. 
 
Why is it, then, that our emotions bear the sort of relation to moral character that 
they do on the Aristotelian picture?  Because moral character consists in a particular set 
of persisting concerns, and having concerns disposes people to certain emotions.  In 
ordinary cases, at least, a person will be saddened by another’s death, joyed by news of a 
friend’s recovery from illness, and frightened by a dangerous animal in part because of 
her concerns.  And to the degree that her concerns are had excellently and for the good, 
hers is a virtuous character, one that disposes her to emotional responses that are better, 
in some sense, than those of someone less virtuous.  This is why, as Aristotle put it, 
feeling emotions “at the right times, with reference to the right objects, toward the right 
people, with the right motive, and in the right way [...] is characteristic of virtue.” 
 
Furthermore, if I am excellently concerned for the good, then I’ll also tend to 
construe things in ways relevant to goodness.  After all, in most cases, the features of a 
person’s circumstances that are most salient to her will to a large degree be determined 
by her concerns.  We get annoyed when we are awakened in the middle of the night by 
loud partiers outside because we are concerned both for our sleep health and for the 
consideration that we feel we’re owed by others.  And it is because of these concerns that 
the fact that they are waking us in the middle of the night—as opposed to the fact that, 
                                                                                                                                                 
blamed” (Aristotle 1105b29–1106a2).  Unlike Aristotle, I do think that we can legitimately be praised and 
blamed for our emotions (for more on this point, see Roberts 1989: 295ff.).  But like Aristotle, I think 
praise and blame in this context often imply a deeper sort of evaluation, i.e., evaluation of the character 
underlying the emotions. 
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say, they are singing “Copacabana” again—will seem especially salient to us.  But if an 
intruder wakes us in the middle of the night, it will not be annoyance that we feel, but 
fear.  Since we are generally more concerned for our survival than we are for things like 
sleep health and the consideration of others, we construe the intruder not as someone who 
interrupts our sleep, but rather as someone who threatens our survival.  In these sorts of 
ways, our concerns affect the way we see things.  So if moral virtue is ultimately a matter 
of having the right concerns, then the morally virtuous person will see things in ways 
relevant to that for which she is concerned—namely, the good.  Because of her concerns, 
certain features of her circumstances will stand out to her, and they will be features 
relevant to the possession and exercise of virtue.
9
 
 
So, to answer the question posed in the heading of this section—why do good 
feelings happen to good people?—we can now say the following.  First of all, concerns in 
general dispose us to certain emotional responses; and ‘good people’, in this context, are 
those whose concerns are aligned with the good.  And further, virtue can also influence 
the way we construe things, since our concerns often determine which features of our 
circumstances are most salient to us. 
 
How is all of this relevant to moral judgment?  And in particular, how is it 
relevant to the trustworthiness of the products of moral judgment—namely, ordinary 
moral intuitions?  I answer these questions in the next section. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 This is the sense in which I think McDowell is right to suggest that the virtuous person is “one 
who sees situations in a certain distinctive way” (McDowell 1998a: 73). 
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 2. Being good and feeling (the) good 
 
In Unprincipled Virtue (2003), Nomy Arpaly argues that moral psychology is 
undernourished because it has been feeding on what she thinks is an unbalanced diet of 
examples.  When they are not considering cases “involving bizarre, ill-understood 
individuals, artificial situations of the kind created by the television show Survivor, or 
horrible moral dilemmas that verge on the grotesque,” Arpaly complains, moral 
psychologists tend to focus their attention upon “[c]ases in which the mind of the agent 
seems quite transparent to her, cases in which she either acts for reasons that she 
understands and endorses or is carried to action by some atavistic force, […] and cases in 
which, even when she is irrational, she knows she is.”10  This is unfortunate because a 
great deal of our ordinary (moral) psychological lives seems not to be getting the sort of 
attention it deserves.  Lost in plain sight, for instance, are cases of ego-dystonic desires 
and emotions—i.e., desires and emotions that are seriously inconsistent with one’s self-
image—and cases of what she calls “inverse akrasia”—i.e., cases of people doing the 
right thing against their “best” judgment.11  These are phenomena that Arpaly thinks are 
actually rather common, but you would never guess this given the amount of attention 
they are typically given by moral psychologists. 
 
                                                 
10
 Arpaly 2003: 30, 29. 
 
11
 As Arpaly defines it, a person’s “best” judgment is “the judgment that one reaches, having taken 
into account all of the reasons one judges to be relevant, as to what would be best for one to do in a given 
situation” (2003: 35). 
Also, for the record, in saying that these phenomena are “lost in plain sight,” I do not mean to say 
that no one has noticed them.  Rather, I only mean to imply that the frequency with which they occur in real 
life vastly exceeds the frequency with which they are discussed in moral psychological literature.  These 
phenomena are much more familiar to our ordinary lives, for instance, than things like zombies, aliens, and 
evil demons; and yet, for whatever reason, one is far more likely to find moral psychologists discussing 
these latter sorts of cases. 
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Another phenomenon that Arpaly suggests deserves more attention is that of 
“rationality without deliberation,” which can apply to both action and belief formation.  
Given that my interests here are epistemological rather than action theoretic, I shall focus 
on cases of rational belief formation without deliberation, i.e., cases in which beliefs arise 
out of a process that does not involve any kind of reflection upon one’s reasons for belief, 
but that is nonetheless responsive to those reasons in a way that confers some degree of 
justification upon the resulting belief.  Consider, for instance, cases of what Arpaly calls 
“dawning.”  These are cases in which people arrive at some belief “sans deliberation, as a 
result of a long period of exposure to new evidence”: 
Candide, a young man who lives in an idyllic setting, accepts the 
authoritative Dr. Pangloss’s view that this is the best of all possible 
worlds, in which everything is for the good, humankind is nice, and so on. 
[…] Then, after gaining some experience with the wider world, Candide 
still swears that this is the best of all possible worlds, but there is less 
conviction in his voice, or perhaps there is an excess of conviction in his 
voice (as he protests too much) but his face is no longer that of the 
wholehearted optimist.  Then one day, when asked if he believes that this 
is the best of all possible worlds, he discovers that he does not think so and 
has not for some time.  Here we have a process, starting with firmly 
believing that this is the best of all possible worlds and ending with 
disbelieving the same proposition.  At no point in the process, let us 
suppose, did deliberation occur […] But we do not regard Candide’s 
change of mind as irrational.  In fact, we regard it as rational.  Finally, the 
young man came to his senses.
12
 
 
Two things are worth noting.  First, dawning is a relatively common phenomenon.  This 
is often how people describe, for instance, (i) conversions into, or out of, some moral, 
political, or religious view, (ii) the realization that a friend or co-worker has become an 
object of romantic love (or perhaps, the realization that one has fallen out of love with 
another), and (iii) the discovery of unfortunate psychological scars from past 
                                                 
12
 Arpaly 2003: 54. 
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experiences.
13
  And second, the fact that these newfound beliefs (sometimes) arise out of 
a process that involves exposure to evidence for their truth is important, for it suggests 
that, other things being equal, the new beliefs may be on a better epistemic footing than 
their alternatives.  In response to the question, “Is Candide justified, after years of 
‘experience with the wider world’, in believing that this is not the best of all possible 
worlds?” it is surely right to say that he is at least more justified in believing that than he 
would be in maintaining his former belief.  Even if we do not want to say that he is as 
justified as he could possibly be, it does seem right to say that the process out of which 
his newfound belief arose is one that contributes positively to its justification.  After all, it 
was formed on the basis of evidence, even though this fact about the belief was not itself 
transparent to Candide in the meantime.   
 
An even more common case of rational belief formation without deliberation is 
that of ordinary perceptual belief.  The epistemology of perception is a notoriously thorny 
subject, but there are two things upon which almost everyone seems to agree.  First, 
ordinary perceptual beliefs are not formed on the basis of any kind of deliberation.  It 
may of course be true that perception depends in some way upon concepts—so that, e.g., 
I cannot perceive a red cup without first having, and at some point deploying, the 
concepts red and cup.  But few, if any, think that we can only deploy concepts like this in 
deliberation.  We do form ordinary perceptual beliefs on the basis of perception, but not 
                                                 
13
 For the record, I do not mean to suggest that all such cases of dawning are rational.  As Arpaly 
is careful to note, just as we can deliberate irrationally, beliefs can dawn on us irrationally.  Her example is 
that of someone who describes his conversion from hopeless, despairing loneliness to belief in the 
existence of Jesus in the following way: “Suddenly, when I was in bed, trying to sleep, it dawned on me 
that I can’t really be so alone.  It is simply impossible for life to be so unbearable; someone must be 
watching me.  Jesus must be watching me” (2003: 56).  The difference here, as Arpaly puts it, is that the 
relationship between the evidence (e.g., her loneliness, and other sources of misery in her life) and the 
conclusion (that Jesus must be watching her) is not a compelling one.   
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in the same sense that, for instance, we arrive at conclusions on the basis of consideration 
of premises.  I do not think to myself, “Well, I have the perception of a red cup, my 
perceptual faculties are in general reliable,” and so forth, and then infer my way to the 
belief that there is a red cup before me.  Rather, I just see the red cup and then believe 
that there’s a red cup.  In fact, there are some who think that perception is itself sufficient 
for belief (as they say, “seeing is believing”).   
 
And second, regardless of one’s views on the epistemology of perception, most 
agree that ordinary perceptual beliefs—i.e., those formed as a result of the normal 
functioning of our perceptual faculties, in conditions sufficiently optimal for the 
functioning of the relevant faculty, etc.—despite their non-deliberative basis, are 
nonetheless on-balance justified.  There may of course be more that I can do to justify my 
belief that there’s a red cup before me—e.g., I could confirm that others similarly situated 
have the same perceptual experience; I could better optimize the conditions in which the 
perceptual experience is had (brightening the lights in the room, cleaning the lenses of 
my glasses, and so forth); etc.  But even without doing these things, I’m surely justified 
to some degree in believing that there’s a red cup before me, if the belief is grounded in 
my perceptual experience of a red cup (and, of course, the experience is had in conditions 
optimal for the functioning of the relevant faculty).  The perceptual experience itself 
contributes positively to the justification of the relevant belief.  And this must have 
something to do with the nature and function of my perceptual faculties.  My visual 
system, for instance, when conditions are sufficiently optimal for its normal function, 
interacts with the world in such a way as to give me reason to trust its deliverances.  That 
is, my visual system is sensitive to certain features of reality, and, other things being 
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equal, this sensitivity goes at least some way toward justifying beliefs made on its basis 
about those features of reality to which it is sensitive. 
 
Now, in chapter III, I explained that the psychological sentimentalist believes that 
emotion plays the same sort of role in moral judgment that perception plays in perceptual 
judgment, i.e., that our moral intuitions are formed on the basis of emotional responses in 
basically the same way that ordinary perceptual beliefs are formed on the basis of 
perceptual experiences.  I believe that Jerry Sandusky behaved wrongly because his 
behavior horrifies me emotionally, just like I believe that there is a red cup before me 
because I have the perceptual experience of a red cup.  I now want to see if I can push 
this analogy even further, by asking: Just as perception can contribute positively to the 
justification of beliefs formed on its basis, might emotion contribute positively to the 
justification of beliefs—specifically, moral intuitions—formed on its basis?  I think it 
can, as long as emotion is understood along the lines I describe it in chapter II, and as 
long as the relation that emotion bears to moral character is roughly as I characterize it in 
§1 of this chapter.   
 
Consider what I shall call the maximally virtuous person, or MVP for short.  
Along the lines sketched in §1, the MVP is someone who is as excellent as possible in his 
concern for the good.  He has all the concerns that he ought to have, in whatever way, 
and to whatever degree, he ought to have them.  And he is as appropriately sensitive as a 
person can be, in the way he sees things, to those features of his circumstances that are 
most relevant to the exercise of moral virtue.  Now, suppose that some person S performs 
some action φ, and that the MVP responds to S’s φ-ing with anger.  The details are 
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unimportant, and in fact, my point here may be better served if we know nothing of the 
nature of S and φ except that S’s φ-ing angers the MVP.   
 
I want to make two observations about this case.  First, the fact that the MVP is 
angered by S’s φ-ing is itself a good reason for thinking that S’s φ-ing was (objectively) 
morally wrong.  After all, S’s φ-ing has not angered just anyone; it has angered someone 
who is as excellent as possible in his concern for the good.  Here is an analogy.  My wife 
is a skilled musician and classically trained singer who has spent many years studying, 
composing, performing, and even teaching, all varieties of music.  She has what many 
would call a “musical ear,” being incredibly sensitive to such things as pitch, tone, 
rhythm, melody, and the like.  Now suppose she is listening to a vocal performance, and 
when the singer hits a particular note, the hairs on the back of my wife’s neck stand up 
and she cringes.  I take it that my wife’s response is as good a reason as any for her to 
think that the singer was out of tune.  After all, the note in question did not make just 
anyone cringe; it made cringe someone who is especially sensitive to breaches of melody, 
harmony, and the like.  Likewise, given the way in which I understand emotion and 
virtue, the MVP is someone who is especially emotionally sensitive to breaches of 
goodness, and so his response to S’s φ-ing is as good a reason as any for thinking that S’s 
φ-ing was wrong.   
 
In fact, if we can say that my wife not only hears the note, but even that she hears 
its flatness, then I hardly see what should keep us from saying that the MVP feels the 
wrongness of S’s φ-ing (as long as we assume, as I do here, that there are such things as 
flatness and wrongness).  After all, given the way that I understand the nature of emotion, 
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and given that the MVP’s concerns here are for the good, we can say that he is feeling the 
contrariety of S’s φ-ing to the good.  And this contrariety is not of the MVP’s making.  It 
is a fact about S’s φ-ing, independent of the MVP’s beliefs, concerns, emotions, etc.  It is 
through his emotions, though, that he is attuned to these sorts of facts.  In this way, it 
seems emotions at least can be sensitive to moral values in a manner much like 
perception, provided that the subject of the emotions is sufficiently virtuous. 
 
Can we say that a person’s emotions are sensitive to objective moral values 
precisely to the degree to which that person is virtuous?  That would be nice and simple, 
but I also think that it would be false.  Compare two people with similar lives: each has 
been through difficult times, the results of which have left each with emotions that are in 
various ways distorted.  Perhaps they have an irrational hatred of members of a particular 
race or gender, or they are just systematically more sensitive to some things, perhaps 
taking them more personally than one ought to take them.  One of the two, however, has 
come to recognize these facts about herself, and consciously corrects for them when 
forming beliefs, making decisions, etc.  As long as this conscious correction is in any way 
a manifestation of her being concerned for the good, then I’d want to say that she is the 
more virtuous of the two people—even though, as I’ve stipulated, their emotions are 
equally off the mark.  So unfortunately, it would be too simple to say that the degree to 
which a person’s emotions are sensitive to objective moral values will always match the 
degree to which she is excellent in her concern for the good. But I think we can say—as I 
do in the argument below—that, other things being equal, if a person is virtuous, her 
emotions will be sensitive to objective moral values. 
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The second observation that I want to make about the MVP’s emotional response 
to S’s φ-ing goes back to my earlier reflections upon the nature of perception and its 
contribution to the justificatory status of our ordinary perceptual beliefs.  As I observed 
above, ordinary perceptual beliefs are formed without deliberation, but still on a basis 
(perception) that is able to contribute positively to their justification.  And this ability is 
rooted in the nature of perception—specifically, in its sensitivity (under certain 
conditions) to features of reality.
14
  Applying these points to the MVP’s emotional 
response to S’s φ-ing, the thing to observe is this: If the MVP forms the intuition that S’s 
φ-ing was morally wrong on the basis of his anger response, then, other things being 
equal, the MVP’s intuition is justified, even if it is formed on the basis of the anger 
response alone (i.e., and not also on the basis of any kind of deliberation, for instance, 
about his reasons for being angry, etc.).  As we just saw, under certain conditions—
namely, conditions of virtue—a person’s emotions can be sensitive to moral values, just 
                                                 
14
 This ability of perceptual experiences to contribute positively to the justification of perceptual 
beliefs depends upon more than just a sensitivity (under certain conditions) to features of reality.  There is 
also the matter of there being some kind of relation between the conceptual contents of the perceptions and 
the subsequent contents of the beliefs.  And this is a point on which there is apparently a difference (and 
perhaps, an important one) between ordinary perceptual beliefs and moral intuitions.  In the case of the 
former, the conceptual contents of the experiences in which the beliefs are grounded presumably plays 
some role in shaping the contents of the beliefs themselves—I believe there’s a red cup because I perceive a 
red cup.  But this does not seem to be the case with respect to moral intuitions and the emotions in which 
they are grounded.  The content of my intuition that Tom’s action was morally wrong is presumably a 
proposition to the effect that Tom’s action was morally wrong.  But no part of the experience in which this 
belief is grounded—namely, my anger at Tom—has as part of its content the wrongness of Tom’s action.  
And without a story about how certain emotional experiences relate to certain moral belief-contents, there 
may be a question about how the emotions can justify those beliefs.  The good news is that I do think such 
a story can be told.  Blair, for instance, suggests that, at some early stage in our evolution, humans engaged 
in a very primitive sort of “good/bad” judgment, and that this judgment was probably causally grounded in 
our affective responses to things—i.e., everything from natural disasters, to diseases, to the actions of 
others.  Emotions with negative valences (anger, disgust, fear) gave rise to “bad”-judgments, and emotions 
with positive valences gave rise to “good”-judgments.  If one couples this suggestion with the (plausible, I 
think) assumption that, along the way, our evaluative vocabulary (and the contexts in which we employed 
it) became more and more sophisticated, I think one will have a plausible account of the relation between 
emotions and the contents of moral beliefs up and running.  The bad news, however, is that developing this 
story more fully goes beyond what I am up to in this dissertation, and so, will have to be put off until a later 
time.   
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as, under certain conditions, a person’s perceptual faculties can be sensitive to other parts 
of the world.  And if the sensitivity of perception to those parts of the world is such as to 
contribute positively to the justification of ordinary perceptual beliefs, then the sensitivity 
of emotion to moral values ought to make a similarly positive contribution to the 
justification of ordinary moral intuitions.   
  
Here, then, is an argument for the (potential) trustworthiness of moral intuitions 
grounded in emotion: 
1. Emotions are complex mental states consisting of construals, concerns, and 
feelings, related to each other in the way that I describe in chapter II.  
 
2. Psychological sentimentalism: The psychological process ordinarily 
responsible for the production of moral intuitions—i.e., moral judgment—is 
one in which emotion figures centrally.  
 
3. If (1), then (other things being equal) if I am virtuous, my emotions are 
sensitive to objective moral values.
15
 
 
This is true if concerns figure into the nature of emotion in the way that I describe in 
chapter II, and also if moral virtue is a matter of aligning one’s concerns with the good, 
as I say above in §1.  My discussion of the MVP is meant to support premise 3; but 
importantly, premise 3 does not depend upon the MVP in any way.  Rather, the MVP is 
meant only as a kind of image of how the account runs in the case of someone whose 
moral perceptual faculties are working as they should. 
4. So, (other things being equal) if I am virtuous, my emotions are sensitive to 
objective moral values. (From 1 and 3) 
 
5. If my emotions are sensitive to objective moral values, then they contribute 
positively to the justification of moral intuitions formed on their basis.  
 
6. If my emotions contribute positively to the justification of moral intuitions 
formed on their basis, then, if my moral intuitions are formed on their basis, 
                                                 
15
 I’ll have more to say later about my use of the term ‘sensitive’ here.  
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then my moral intuitions are trustworthy.  
 
7. So, (other things being equal) if I am virtuous, my moral intuitions are 
trustworthy. (From 2, 4–6) 
 
 
 Essentially, what I’m arguing is that emotions can amount to instances of what 
might be called moral perception.  This in itself is not a new idea.  In his On Emotional 
Presentation (1917), for instance, Alexius Meinong extends his broader theory of the 
intentionality of mental states to emotions in particular, arguing that (objective) moral 
and aesthetic values are presented to the mind via the emotions in essentially the same 
way that other features of reality are presented to the mind via what he calls ideas.  He 
writes, 
When I say, “The sky is blue,” and then say, “The sky is beautiful,” a 
property is attributed to the sky in either case.  In the second case a feeling 
participates in the apprehension of the property, as, in the first case, an 
idea does.
16
   
 
More recently, Lawrence Blum has argued that our perception of the morally salient 
features of one’s circumstances is largely unreflective and emotional.17  And according to 
Maggie Little,  
[I]n order to ‘see’ the moral landscape clearly, in order to discern it fully 
and properly, one must have certain desires and emotions.  Caring, being 
outraged, being motivated to act—all these are part of discerning the 
moral features clearly.  The ideal epistemic agent herself would have 
appropriate affect, for it is needed if one is to discern all that there is to 
see.
18
 
 
What has been missing from these prior discussions, however, is an adequate account of 
just how it is that our emotions might come to be sensitive to moral reality in a way 
                                                 
16
 Meinong 1972: 28-29. 
 
17 Blum 1994. 
 
18 Little 1995: 127. 
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similar to that of perception.  It is one thing to suppose that we perceive moral reality by 
means of the emotions; it is another thing to explain how this happens.  (Recall 
Wedgwood’s complaint from chapter I.)  I take this latter task to be necessary if the 
trustworthiness of our moral intuitions is to be secured; and so, this is the task that I have 
taken up here. 
 
 3. Roberts on emotion as an epistemic aid to moral judgment 
 
During his recent tenure as the Alvin Plantinga Fellow at Notre Dame’s Center for 
Philosophy of Religion, Robert Roberts spent some time extending his theory of emotion 
to a view of the role of emotion in moral judgment.  The result is a view according to 
which “an emotion may be the perceptual basis of [...] moral judgment.”19  This, of 
course, sounds very similar to what I’ve argued in this chapter, so it may be useful for me 
to take a moment to distinguish my own view from the one that he defends. 
 
For illustrative purposes, Roberts focuses on a case from Dostoevsky’s Notes 
from Underground, re-telling the story as if we know both the Underground Man and 
Liza: 
Imagine that someone tells you the following story.  A man you know 
personally has been insulted and rejected by his associates at a dinner 
party, and afterwards follows them to a brothel to start a fight, only to find 
that they have already dispersed into the rooms of the brothel.  While there 
he falls in with a prostitute, Liza, whom you also know well enough to be 
concerned about her wellbeing.  The man wants to assuage his wounded 
vanity, and has been in the habit of doing so by exercising power over 
others.  After he has slept with Liza he preaches a little sermon to her on 
the glories of family life and the degradations of prostitution.  He pours it 
on really thick, and by his rhetoric reduces her to a condition of bitter 
remorse, and of gratitude and admiration toward himself.  Overplaying his 
assumed role of judge and savior he gives her his address on departing, 
indicating that she may come to him.  When she does come to his room 
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 Roberts unpublished. 
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several days later in hopes of pursuing the relationship with her sage 
redeemer, he is humiliated by her seeing his poverty and turns on her with 
vindictive anger, telling her that he never cared for her at all, doesn’t mind 
if she degrades herself in prostitution, and was only using her to salve the 
social wounds he had received at the drinking party.  In her 
disillusionment she is devastated and leaves.
20
 
 
As Roberts recognizes, our response to the Underground Man is likely to be something in 
the neighborhood of anger or indignation.  And since our two views of the nature of 
emotion are similar in certain respects, I can agree with Roberts when he notes that these 
emotional responses are “based on a concern for Liza’s wellbeing and a more general 
concern for justice.”21  But when he turns to explain how this emotional response might 
serve as a kind of epistemic aid to our moral beliefs about the Underground Man and his 
actions, there are two points upon which Roberts and I disagree. 
 
First of all, Roberts does not distinguish—as I think he should—between our 
emotional response to the Underground Man and his actions, on the one hand, and our 
moral evaluation of him, on the other.  As Roberts puts it, “In your experience of being 
angry at the Underground Man for his treatment of Liza, he appears to you as culpable, 
bad, and deserving of hurt for what he has done.”22  To be clear, Roberts thinks that we 
construe the man as culpable, just as one might construe the duck-rabbit figure as a duck 
(see chapter II, §4).  And since Roberts and I are in agreement that construals are 
(sometimes) parts of emotion, he is apparently saying that the attribution of culpability 
here is not an effect of our anger response to the man, but rather a part of our anger 
response.   
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 Roberts unpublished.  
 
21
 Roberts unpublished; italics mine. 
 
22
 Roberts unpublished; bold in original. 
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Of course, one likely will think the man culpable, bad, and deserving of hurt; but 
whereas Roberts thinks that these are a part of our emotional response to the man and his 
actions, I would say that these thoughts are better understood as the effects of our 
emotional response—we think him culpable because of our anger with him.23  For a 
number of reasons, I think it is important to keep emotional response and moral 
evaluation separate.  For one thing, as I explained in chapter II, there seem to be clear 
cases in which one might have an emotional response without actually evaluating the 
object of the emotion in the relevant way, and vice versa.  And for another thing, if we 
fail to sufficiently distinguish between emotional response and moral evaluation, it will 
be difficult to see how the former could be an epistemic aid to the latter, as Roberts thinks 
it can.   
 
Second, apparently, Roberts only thinks that emotion can offer a kind of ex post 
facto epistemic support to moral beliefs.  He begins by discussing three ways in which 
perceptual experiences can be epistemic aids.  First, perception is an aid to 
understanding—i.e., we understand things better after we’ve perceived them.  For 
instance, I might describe a painting to you in quite vivid detail; but once you see it for 
yourself, you’ll better understand the painting that I described.  Second, perception can 
augment justification.  You may tell me that there’s a deer walking through the backyard, 
and on the basis of your testimony, I may be justified in believing this.  But when I look 
for myself, my belief is more justified than it was prior to my perceptual experience of 
                                                 
23
 One might worry that there’s a “chicken-or-the-egg” problem here: do we think him culpable 
because of our anger, or are we angry because we think him culpable?  In light of the evidence surveyed in 
chapter III, I think the causal sequence here begins with the anger response.  But I also recognize that this 
unconscious causal process often happens so quickly as to give the appearance of either co-occurrence (of 
emotion and evaluation) or even a reverse-order sequence. 
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the deer.  And finally, even if perception doesn’t augment justification, Roberts thinks 
that the personal acquaintance provided by perception is still a kind of epistemic 
upgrade.  Suppose a bird expert tells me that there’s a rare bird in the tree outside my 
office.  The combination of his expertise and my total ignorance of rare bird species may 
conspire to make it the case that my perceptual experience of the bird does nothing at all 
to the justification of my belief that there’s a rare bird in the tree.  But still, Roberts 
thinks, in virtue of becoming personally acquainted with the bird in the tree (by seeing it 
for myself), I upgrade my epistemic situation with respect to my beliefs about the bird.   
There’s nothing quite like perceiving for yourself, whether what’s 
perceived is the flavor of a fine whiskey, the nastiness of a case of racial 
injustice, the gular area of a cormorant, the necessity of a necessary 
proposition [...] The upgrade here seems to be a matter of epistemic 
proximity or intimacy with the object.
24
 
 
These are the ways in which perception can be an epistemic aid, according to Roberts.  
And it is interesting to note that they are all cases of upgrades to epistemic situations—
i.e., they are all cases in which a subject’s current epistemic situation with respect to 
some belief or set of beliefs is made better by perception.  In the same way, says Roberts, 
emotional responses can upgrade the epistemic status of our moral beliefs: We 
understand the injustice of the Underground Man’s behavior better after we’ve felt it; 
we’re more justified in believing that the behavior is unjust after we’ve felt it; and the 
sort of personal acquaintance with injustice that the emotions provide can itself be a kind 
of epistemic upgrade.   
   
While Roberts may be right about all of this, these are not the only, or even the 
main, sorts of epistemic support that perceptual experiences offer to perceptual beliefs.  
                                                 
24
 Roberts unpublished. 
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The primary sort of support that perception offers to perceptual beliefs is a causal one: 
our perceptual beliefs are prima facie justified because they were caused by perceptual 
experiences that themselves reliably track the truths of perceptual beliefs.  My belief that 
there is a deer in the backyard would be more than sufficiently justified without your 
testimony, on the basis of my perceptual experience alone, because (other things being 
equal) the perceptual experience itself arises out of a process that reliably tracks truths of 
the relevant sort.  In other words, perceptual experiences are not only good for upgrading 
epistemic situations (i.e., by augmenting a belief’s justification); they are equally capable 
of getting perceptual beliefs off on solid epistemic footing in the first place.  Likewise, 
emotion may be able to upgrade the epistemic status of certain moral beliefs, in precisely 
the ways that Roberts explains.  But on the account that I defend in this chapter, emotion, 
like perception, is able to get ordinary moral intuitions off on solid epistemic footing in 
the first place.   
 
Furthermore, Roberts never makes it clear why it should be the case that emotion 
can be any kind of epistemic aid to moral judgment.  Again, he rightly observes that our 
emotional responses to the Underground Man are rooted in concerns for such things as 
justice and Liza’s wellbeing.  But from there, he ends up just stating that our anger or 
indignation here provides some epistemic support to our beliefs about the 
blameworthiness of the man, or the injustice of his behavior.  At no point does Roberts 
acknowledge that it is because of the concerns in which our emotional responses are 
rooted—and what this indicates about the state of our moral character—that the 
emotional responses are, in this case, epistemic aids.  If we were similarly angry or 
indignant in response to the Underground Man, but the anger or indignation were rooted 
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in concerns that are totally irrelevant to moral goodness, then our emotional responses 
surely would not offer any kind of epistemic support to a belief in the injustice of the 
man’s behavior.  So while I agree with Roberts in thinking that emotions can be 
epistemic aids to moral beliefs, I think an account of the relation between emotion and 
moral virtue—of the sort that I describe in §1—is needed in order to explain why this is 
the case.    
 
 4. Reliabilism and moral reliabilism 
 
Those familiar with theories of justification and knowledge will perhaps recognize the 
view that I defend in this chapter as a form of process reliabilism about justification.  
Roughly speaking, process reliabilism is the view that, other things being equal, beliefs 
are epistemically justified if they result from a belief-forming process that is reliable, 
where reliability is typically understood in terms of conduciveness to truth.  If belief-
forming process P produces true beliefs at some sufficient (though hard to specify) 
frequency, then P is reliable; and if P is reliable, and belief b is a product of P, then b is 
justified.  According to the view that I defend here, moral judgment, sufficiently guided 
by moral virtue, is reliable; and so, the moral intuitions of the sufficiently virtuous are 
justified.  
 
Now, I’ve been reluctant (until now) to ally my view too closely with reliabilism, 
because I do not want to be responsible for defending process reliabilism in general in 
order to adequately defend my view of moral judgment.  Limitations of time and space 
simply will not allow such a thing—and besides, it has already been done much more 
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clearly and forcefully than I’d be able to do here.25  But it may nonetheless be helpful, if 
only for the purposes of clarifying my overall view, for me to say a few things about how 
my own brand of moral reliabilism might offer responses to a few objections often 
leveled against process reliabilism in general.  
 
One objection that is often made to reliabilism is that reliability is not necessary 
for a belief to be justified.  This is typically demonstrated by means of a thought 
experiment in which people in one world have perceptual beliefs that are qualitatively 
identical to those of people in the actual world, but are nonetheless brought about by a 
non-reliable process—e.g., manipulation by an evil demon.  The perceptual beliefs of 
those in the non-actual world are surely justified—after all, they’re identical to our 
perceptual beliefs, and ours are justified—but, by stipulation, they were not reliably 
formed.  So reliability is not necessary for justification.   
 
If I intended to be offering a complete analysis of moral justification, and doing 
so in terms of reliability, then this objection might be a problem for me.  But that is not 
what I’m doing in this dissertation.  I am not saying that moral intuitions (or moral 
beliefs, more generally) could only be justified by being reliably formed.  Remember, I 
am responding to skeptics who think that moral intuitions being grounded in emotion is a 
reason to think that they are not trustworthy (and so, not justified).  I reject this.  I think 
that moral intuitions can be justified because are grounded in emotion, and I explain how 
in this chapter.  This is perfectly compatible with there being a whole host of other 
ways—besides being reliably formed—for moral intuitions to be justified.  
 
                                                 
25
 See Goldman 2012. 
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More interesting, however, is another objection to reliabilism according to which 
reliability is not sufficient for justification.  Indeed, I do want to make the sufficiency 
claim, so I will have to say something more in response to this objection.  As the 
objection typically goes, we can imagine a case in which a subject has a perfectly reliable 
faculty for forming certain beliefs—where, again, ‘reliable’ is meant in the sense of being 
conducive to truth, or to the formation of true beliefs—but either has no reason to believe 
that it is reliable, or even has good reason for doubting that it is reliable.  In such cases, 
some think that the subject would not be justified in holding whatever beliefs result from 
this process, reliable though it may be.  So reliability is not sufficient for justification.  
And in the case of moral intuitions, it is indeed quite easy to imagine someone doubting 
that a psychological process in which emotion figures centrally could be reliable for the 
production of true moral beliefs.  As I have been saying from the start, this is apparently a 
very popular opinion among both philosophers and non-philosophers alike.  If I take 
myself to have good reason to doubt the reliability of my own moral judgment upon 
learning that it is a process in which emotion figures centrally—maybe I’ve noticed what 
sorts of distorting influences my emotions can have upon my thinking and deliberation 
about moral matters; or maybe I agree that emotion is often shaped by virtue, but I doubt 
that I am virtuous—how could I then be justified in holding whatever beliefs it happens 
to produce (even if it is, in fact, reliable)? 
 
I have two things to say in response to this worry.  First, I think a hardline 
reliabilist will not—and should not—be bothered by cases like this.  The fact of the 
matter is that we are often wrong about the justificatory status of our own beliefs.  Of 
course, it is probably more common for us to err on the side of overestimating how 
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justified a particular belief really is, but it should come as no surprise that we sometimes 
underestimate our own justifiedness as well.  If a moral intuition of mine was reliably 
formed, then any doubts about its justification are false, even if they are had for good 
reason.  I may not know that I am justified until I am able to remove these doubts; and I 
may struggle to justify the intuition to others; but for all that, the intuition itself is 
justified, in virtue of being reliably formed.  So the first thing to say in response to the 
worry about reliability not being sufficient for justification is just that I endorse this 
hardline reliabilist response. 
 
The second thing to say is aimed more specifically at the worry as it applies to 
emotions and moral intuitions.  There may indeed be good reasons for one to doubt the 
extent to which one’s emotional responses track moral values, or the degree to which one 
is morally virtuous.  But my suspicion is that there is only very little overlap between the 
set of people who have serious doubts about these things and the set of people who ought 
to have serious doubts about these things; and I think the latter set is much, much smaller 
than one might suspect.  Now, it would be hard for me to substantiate these suspicions 
empirically, because, as far as I can tell, there just is not a satisfactory method for 
measuring such things as the degree to which a person is morally virtuous.  But I 
nonetheless take myself to have given reasons in this chapter for thinking that worries 
about our emotions and their ability to generate trustworthy moral intuitions are often 
overblown.  We may not be maximally virtuous, but maximal virtue is not necessary for 
moral intuitions to be justified—just as a perceptual faculty would not have to function 
perfectly in order for perceptual beliefs to be justified.  I’ll have more to say about this in 
the next section, and still more in the next chapter.   
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There is another problem that may confront versions of moral reliabilism in 
particular, and it has to do with the causal relationship (or lack thereof) between moral 
beliefs and moral values.  In defending the trustworthiness of moral intuitions, I drew 
upon an analogy to the trustworthiness of ordinary perceptual beliefs.  But, some might 
argue, there is an important difference between these two types of beliefs.  In the case of 
perceptual beliefs, it is common to think that they are reliably formed because of the 
causal relationship that exists between perceptual experiences and the things perceived.  
The sweet sensation is caused by the tea, for instance, so of course a belief that the tea is 
sweet is reliably formed if it is formed on the basis of the sweet sensation.  But if this is 
what it takes for our fast and unreflective practice of forming perceptual beliefs to count 
as reliable, then if one wants to say of our ordinary moral intuitions that they, too, are 
reliably formed, it would seem one will have to adopt a rather hearty—not to mention 
extremely controversial—metaphysics of morals according to which moral facts or 
properties are able to somehow cause our emotional responses.  I’m trying to give an 
account of moral judgment according to which its products are (or can be) justified 
beliefs about objective moral values, but I also want to remain as neutral as possible 
about the metaphysics of those values.   
 
Thankfully, as has been pointed out by Russ Shafer-Landau—himself a defender 
of moral reliabilism—causation is not necessary for reliability.26  That is, beliefs about x 
can be reliably formed even if x itself does not enter causally into the production of those 
                                                 
26 Shafer-Landau 2003: 275.  Another problem that often confronts versions of process reliabilism 
is the so-called Generality Problem.  I ignore the Generality Problem here; but for a helpful discussion of 
the problem, and one that confronts the problem in the context of moral belief and justification, see Shafer-
Landau 2003: 280-285. 
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beliefs.  One way to establish that this is the case would be to tell a story about how 
beliefs about x (or the process by which these beliefs are formed) track the relevant x-
facts.  If there is a tracking relation of some sort, then the beliefs might be reliably 
formed even if they are not caused by x.  So if our moral intuitions are formed on the 
basis of our emotional responses to things, they may yet be justified even if moral values 
do not themselves play a role in causing the emotions—for it might nonetheless be the 
case that our emotions track moral facts or properties to a sufficient (though hard to 
specify) degree.  Of course, we should want for it not to be an accident that our emotional 
responses track moral values in this way.  But the account I’ve given of the nature of 
emotion and its relation to moral virtue is meant to ensure that this is not the case.
27
 
 
 5. Three lingering worries 
 
Let me briefly address a few lingering worries about my view before returning in the 
next, and final, chapter to the skeptical arguments of Greene, Street, Nichols, and Sinnott-
Armstrong.  The first of these worries has to do with the objectivity of moral judgment.  
I’ve attempted in this chapter to give an account of moral judgment according to which 
the products of moral judgment are (or can be) justified beliefs about objective moral 
values.  But, it is natural to wonder, if moral judgment ordinarily goes the way of the 
emotions, and my emotions are to a significant degree determined by my concerns, then 
how could the products of moral judgment be anything but subjective?  And, one might 
add, it is not enough for me to say that our emotions are sensitive to an objective moral 
reality as long as they are rooted in a concern for the good, for conceptions of the good 
                                                 
27
 Looking back at the argument in §2, we might understand the term ‘sensitive’ in premises 3-5 in 
terms of kind of tracking relation of the sort described here—i.e., the effect of virtue upon moral judgment 
is that of ensuring that emotional responses track moral values, even if they are not caused, in any sense, by 
moral values.  It is in this way that our emotions can be sensitive to moral values.  
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are likely every bit as varied and subjective as anything else.   
 
As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, one way to avoid this worry 
might be to conceive objective moral values as secondary, or response-dependent, 
qualities.  If being able to cause negative emotions (under certain circumstances) is all it 
is for φ-ing to be morally wrong, for instance, then it should be pretty easy for my moral 
intuitions about the wrongness (or not) of φ-ing to count as beliefs about objective moral 
values, even if they are grounded in nothing but emotion.  But as I noted earlier, there 
may be reasons for preferring an account that does not depend upon a secondary quality 
view of moral values. 
 
In response to this worry about objectivity, then, I’ll say this: when I claim that 
moral virtue consists in being excellently concerned for the good, what I mean to say is 
that virtue consists not in being concerned for what one takes to be the good (or even 
what one would take to be the good under ideal conditions), but rather in being concerned 
for what is in reality the good.  So for instance, if a utilitarian exhibits excellence in his 
concern for maximizing happiness, he will only count as virtuous on this view if it turns 
out that goodness and the maximization of happiness are one and the same.  On the 
assumption that there are objective moral values in the world, moral virtue consists in 
being excellently concerned for what is objectively the good.  And to the extent that 
someone’s concerns are aligned with it (regardless of whether or not she is aware of this 
alignment), I contend, she will be disposed to respond emotionally to objective moral 
values. 
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A second worry stems from the obvious and unfortunate fact that we are not 
maximally virtuous.  It might be easy to concede that someone like the MVP is attuned to 
morality in the way that I describe, but what about the rest of us?  Should the disparity 
between the MVP and ordinary people like us not inspire some doubt as to the 
trustworthiness of our moral intuitions? 
 
Now, in one sense, it simply does not matter that we are not maximally virtuous.  
Skeptics like Nichols and Sinnott-Armstrong argue that moral intuitions are probably not 
trustworthy if they are grounded in emotion—that is, there is supposed to be something 
about emotion that is incompatible with the production of trustworthy moral intuitions.  
The MVP is a counter-example to their arguments: his moral intuitions are trustworthy 
because they are grounded in emotion.  What these skeptics will have to add to their 
arguments, then, is a further argument to the effect that the disparity between the MVP 
and the rest of us is large enough to render our moral intuitions untrustworthy.  But I 
should say that it is hard to even imagine what such an argument would require.  These 
skeptics would presumably need to support their disparity claim with empirical evidence, 
but as far as I can tell, none of the evidence currently on offer is adequate to the task.  
There is, of course, plenty of evidence—empirical and anecdotal—for thinking that our 
emotions sometimes cloud moral judgment.  But then, there is also plenty of evidence for 
thinking that our perceptions sometimes cloud perceptual judgment—think, for instance, 
of cases of illusion, hallucination, and the like.  If our ordinary perceptual beliefs are no 
less trustworthy because of this, why think any differently of our moral intuitions?  (In 
the next chapter, I discuss cases of so-called ‘moral illusion’.) 
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Recall the analogy that I drew between the MVP and someone with a “musical 
ear.”  It is surely true that my wife exhibits a greater sensitivity to features of music and 
musical performances than those of us who are not as highly trained.  But if you were 
simply to hammer away at any adjacent keys on a tuned piano, probably everyone within 
earshot would cringe.  With respect to a great many breaches of melody, harmony, etc., it 
doesn’t take an expert musician to hear them.  Likewise, with respect to many moral 
matters, it doesn’t take a maximally virtuous person to feel them.  We all react with 
horror to stories of such things as child abuse, torture for pleasure, genocide, and other 
obvious moral wrongdoings.  And apparently, in light of the evidence from chapter III, 
these emotional reactions play an important role in causing us to believe the things we do 
about such actions.  We know the answers to a lot of moral questions, and, I’d argue, we 
have our emotions to thank for this.  
 
If there is a lesson to be learned from the fact that we are not maximally virtuous, 
I think it is primarily a practical one.  Rather than systematically doubting the 
deliverances of our moral sense, we should simply proceed with caution, and do what we 
can to sharpen our sense of the good.
28
  It may be perfectly reasonable to recognize in 
oneself tendencies for specific concerns to be otherwise than they should—e.g., perhaps 
it’s been brought to your attention that you have an insufficient degree of self-respect.  
And consequently, one may reasonably doubt the moral intuitions that one has related to 
these misplaced or misguided concerns—e.g., you begin to doubt intuitions to the effect 
that it is morally okay for your boss to treat you in this or that way.  But this doubt will, 
                                                 
28
 Of course, selecting a strategy for doing so will likely require us to regard some moral 
intuitions as incorrigible.  As far as I can tell, this is not a problem for the point that I am making 
here. 
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or should, always be localized to the area of concern, and should not be cast over all of 
our moral intuitions—unless one somehow recognizes in oneself serious and widespread 
defects in either emotion or moral character. 
 
Finally, rather than worrying that we are not virtuous enough for our moral 
intuitions to be trustworthy, one might wonder if anyone is virtuous at all.  Here I have in 
mind another area of research in empirical moral psychology—i.e., research into the 
psychological reality of traits (e.g., traits of virtue and vice).  According to some so-
called situationists, there really is no such thing as moral virtue, if by ‘virtue’ we mean to 
denote a particular class of traits.  And this is because, they argue, there is insufficient 
empirical evidence to support our ordinary, everyday attribution of traits to people.  As 
Gilbert Harman puts it, “Empirical studies designed to test whether people behave 
differently in ways that might reflect their having different character traits have failed to 
find relevant differences.”29  What do seem to make noteworthy differences to a person’s 
behavior are features of his situation that often seem to have little or nothing to do with 
virtue—e.g., people are apparently significantly more likely to engage in helping 
behavior if they’ve just found a dime in the coin-return slot of a pay phone.30  Thus, 
Harman continues, “ordinary attributions of character-traits to people may be deeply 
misguided, and it may even be the case that there is no such thing as character.”31  And of 
course, if there is no such thing as character, then the view of moral judgment that I 
defend in this chapter will fall flat on its face, since there will be nothing to ensure that 
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 Harman 1999: 316.  See also Doris 2002. 
 
30
 Isen and Levin 1972. 
 
31
 Harman 1999: 316. 
 140 
our emotional responses are tracking moral truths in the sort of justification-conferring 
way that I describe.  
 
As interesting as I find the literature on the psychology of moral character, a full 
response to the situationist would take me too far away from the focus of this chapter, 
which is the trustworthiness of moral intuitions.  Suffice it to say, for now: situationists 
typically conceive of traits of virtue as direct dispositions to particular behaviors, and I 
agree with those who argue that this is a very problematic conception of virtue and moral 
character.
32
  (Notice that the view of moral virtue that I take up in §1 does not obviously 
commit me to anything whatsoever with respect to the connection between virtue and 
behavior.  To say that a morally virtuous person is someone who is excellent in her 
concern for the good is to say nothing at all about how she’ll behave in a given situation.)  
If something like this response is on point, then we may be be free to grant that 
situationists have established the non-existence of something, just not moral virtue.   
 
 6. Concluding remarks 
 
I began this dissertation by noting just how important moral intuitions are to us, both 
within and outside of philosophy.  Then I explained how recent work in empirical moral 
psychology has raised what many think is a serious worry about the trustworthiness of 
our moral intuitions: the evidence suggests that these intuitions are ordinarily the effects 
of emotion, and emotion is typically thought to be something that could only get in the 
way of the production of trustworthy moral beliefs.  The main goal of this dissertation, 
then, as I described it there, has been to defend the epistemic status of moral intuitions by 
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 See, e.g., Kamtekar 2004 and Adams 2006 (especially ch. 8). 
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showing how it can be that they are trustworthy when, and because, they are grounded in 
emotion.  That is what I have done in this chapter.   
 
As readers can now clearly see, my case very much depends upon the nature of 
emotion being as I describe it in chapter II.  For that account of the nature of emotion 
allows me to develop the account of the relationship between emotion and moral virtue 
that I do here in chapter IV.  And as long as these two accounts are on point, it turns out 
that our ordinary moral intuitions can sometimes be trustworthy because they are 
grounded in emotion, and not despite this fact.  And if that’s correct, then apparently, we 
have good reason to go on as if our moral intuitions are trustworthy—even if we are 
unaware of this.   
 
In the next and final chapter, I’ll look back at the four skeptical arguments that I 
mentioned at the end of chapter III, and I’ll show how the view that I’ve defended in this 
chapter provides me with decisive responses to these arguments.  I’ll also look at another 
skeptical argument, also from Sinnott-Armstrong, and explain why I think this argument 
actually provides further support for my views.   
  
 
 
 
V 
EMOTION AND MORAL JUDGMENT SKEPTICISM 
 
 
In chapters II-IV, I developed an account of moral judgment according to which, first, 
emotion figures centrally as a cause in the production of moral intuitions, and second, 
moral intuitions are (or at least, they can be) trustworthy because they are grounded in 
emotion, and not despite this fact.  The time has come for me to put the view to the test, 
and to show that it can deliver on its promise to rebut a certain strain of moral skepticism.  
For the purposes of this chapter, I will call anyone who thinks that moral intuitions 
cannot be trustworthy if they are grounded in emotion—or at least, that their being 
grounded in emotion is a reason to think that moral intuitions are not trustworthy—a 
moral judgment skeptic.  (As a reminder: as I am using the term, moral intuitions are 
trustworthy if they really are justified beliefs about objective moral values.)  So the 
questions left for me to address are these: What reasons are there for moral judgment 
skepticism?  And are they reasons that my view can overcome?   
 
In §§1-3, I examine four arguments for moral judgment skepticism, showing how 
my view can respond in each case.  In §1, I look at an argument from Joshua Greene, and 
then a similar, but much stronger, argument from Sharon Street.  Both arguments focus 
on the evolution of emotions, and how this might tell against thinking that emotions can 
reliably track objective moral values, as I argue they can.  In §2, I turn to an argument 
from Shaun Nichols.  Of concern to Nichols is the apparent arationality of emotion.  
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Since emotions are “rationally arbitrary,” he thinks—and since emotion figures centrally 
in moral judgment (he, too, is a psychological sentimentalist)—moral judgment cannot be 
objective.  And in §3, I discuss an argument from Walter Sinnott-Armstrong.  Whereas 
Greene, Street, and Nichols are chiefly concerned with the objectivity of moral 
judgment—i.e., whether or not moral judgment is the sort of process that can be counted 
on to produce beliefs about objective moral values—Sinnott-Armstrong is concerned 
more with the justification of moral intuitions.  Since emotions are in the business of 
clouding moral judgment, he thinks, we’ll need some sort of further inferential 
confirmation in order to justify our moral intuitions.   
 
Then, in §4, I’ll briefly consider another sort of argument for thinking that moral 
intuitions are untrustworthy.  This argument also comes from Sinnott-Armstrong, and it 
has to do with the apparent susceptibility of moral judgment to what might be called 
“moral illusions.”  Rather than denying that moral judgment is susceptible in this way, 
though—in fact, I agree that it is—I’ll instead explain why (a) the susceptibility of moral 
judgment to such illusions might be seen as further confirmation of the view that I 
developed in chapters II-IV, and also (b) why this susceptibility is really not the problem 
that Sinnott-Armstrong thinks it is.  And finally, in §5, I’ll conclude the dissertation by 
summarizing my overall view, and then speculating about some further implications that 
the view may have upon other issues in ethics and moral psychology.   
  
 1. Greene, Street, and the evolution of emotions 
 
One argument for moral judgment skepticism comes from psychologist Joshua Greene.  
He sets the argument up by briefly describing the difference between realists and anti-
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realists in metaethics, and then suggesting, optimistically, “I believe that neuroscience 
and related disciplines have the potential to shed light on these matters by helping us to 
understand our common-sense conceptions of morality.” 1   According to Greene, 
metaethicists are primarily concerned with the (metaphysical) nature of moral values, and 
there are basically just two sides that one might take on this issue: either one affirms that 
truths about the moral values of things are “full-blown truths, mind-independent facts 
about the nature of moral reality,” or one affirms that moral values are, “like sexiness, in 
the mind of the beholder.”2  And he proposes that we attempt to resolve this issue by 
“examin[ing] what is in the minds of the relevant beholders,” i.e., by determining just 
what is going on in a person’s mind when she judges a thing to have this or that moral 
value.  Understanding how moral intuitions are formed, he suggests, may help us to 
determine if they are best understood as beliefs about objective moral values or, instead, 
as “projections of internal attitudes.”3 
 
At this point, Greene makes three observations about moral judgment.  His first 
observation is that moral judgment ordinarily operates very quickly—even 
automatically—and effortlessly (see §3 of chapter I), and that this gives to moral 
judgment its distinctly perceptual phenomenology. 
An interesting feature of many intuitive, effortless cognitive processes is 
that they are accompanied by a perceptual phenomenology.  For example, 
humans can effortlessly determine whether a given face is male or 
female.
4
 
 
                                                 
1
 Greene 2003: 849.   
 
2
 Greene 2003: 849. 
 
3
 Greene 2003: 849. 
 
4
 Greene 2003: 849. 
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His second observation is that it is because of its perceptual phenomenology that moral 
judgment seems to us like a process by which we form beliefs about mind-independent, 
objective moral values.  After all, in ordinary cases, perception is a matter of being 
impressed upon by things that are out there in the world to be perceived.  And finally, his 
third observation is that emotion is what underlies the perceptual phenomenology of 
moral judgment.  Citing research in empirical moral psychology—like that discussed in 
chapter III—Greene explains that moral judgment is able to operate with such speed and 
effortlessness because it is primarily a matter of automatic emotional responses.  In other 
words, psychological sentimentalism is true, and this explains why moral judgment has 
the perceptual phenomenology that it has.   
 
So far, Greene has said nothing that I find particularly bothersome.  I might argue 
that it is more than just the perceptual phenomenology of moral judgment that inclines us 
to believe that it is a process by which we form beliefs about objective moral values.  But 
he is probably right that this phenomenology contributes to our going on as if moral 
judgment is objective.  It is when he goes on to draw out a supposed implication of these 
three observations about moral judgment, however, that Greene and I disagree.   
 
Essentially, Greene argues that, if it is indeed emotion that gives moral judgment 
its perceptual phenomenology, then it must be the case that its perceptual phenomenology 
is a sham.  For this would imply that moral judgment is like aesthetic judgment, in that 
our beliefs about the moral values of things—like our beliefs about a thing’s 
“sexiness”—are grounded (causally) in emotion (or some other affective state).  And, 
Greene simply assumes, everyone will agree that the perceptual phenomenology of 
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aesthetic judgment is a sham, since there are no “full-fledged truths” about such matters 
as beauty and sexiness.   
We have here the beginnings of a debunking explanation of moral realism: 
we believe in moral realism because moral experience has a perceptual 
phenom-enology, and moral experience has a perceptual phenomenology 
because natural selection has outfitted us with mechanisms for making 
intuitive, emotion-based moral judgments, much as it has outfitted us with 
mechanisms for making intuitive, emotion-based judgments about who 
among us are the most suitable mates. […] According to this view, moral 
realism is akin to naïve realism about sexiness, like making the 
understandable mistake of thinking that Tom Cruise is objectively sexier 
than his baboon counterparts.
5
 
 
In other words, moral judgment is relevantly similar to aesthetic judgment, and aesthetic 
judgment is clearly not objective.  So moral judgment must not be objective either, 
despite its perceptual feel. 
 
As Greene presents it here, this is a pretty weak argument.  For one thing, I think 
there are many who will find his remarks about aesthetic judgment rather controversial.  
Certainly, to some degree, we think that things like sexiness are “in the mind of the 
beholder.”  But Greene assumes that we’ll agree that all aesthetic matters are like this.  I 
suspect he is wrong about this—would people really agree that the superiority of a 
renowned artist’s work to an average person’s doodles is entirely in the mind of the 
beholder?—but I’ll not pursue the matter any further here.  A question I would like to 
pursue, however, is this: Why not think that moral judgment is like gender perception?  
By Greene’s own lights, gender perception is another fast and effortless psychological 
process for which we have evolution to thank; and yet, surely he’d not say that the 
perceptual phenomenology of gender perception is a sham.  After all, there certainly are 
mind-independent facts of the matter about whether a particular face is that of a male or 
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female.  Here is Greene’s explanation of the difference, which he adds immediately after 
the above quotation: 
Note that according to this view moral judgment is importantly different 
from gender perception.  Both involve processes that give rise to a 
perceptual phenom-enology, but in the case of gender perception the 
phenomenology is veridical: there really are mind-independent facts about 
who is male or female.
6
 
 
But of course, no moral realist will accept this explanation, for it only begs the very 
question at hand.  Greene raised a psychological question about what is going on in the 
minds of moral believers, in the hope that it would point us in the direction of an answer 
to a metaethical question about the nature of moral values.  But in the end, it looks like he 
moves in precisely the opposite direction: he assumes an answer to the metaethical 
question—i.e., he assumes that there aren’t any mind-independent moral values—and 
then, on the basis of this assumption, he gives us an answer to the psychological question: 
since there are no objective moral values for us to perceive, it cannot be the case that 
genuine (moral) perception is going on in the minds of moral believers.   
 
Greene will likely respond that I am failing to appreciate what its emotional 
nature implies about the objectivity of moral judgment: moral intuitions, unlike beliefs 
about gender (presumably), are grounded in emotion.  And that’s why it cannot be the 
case that moral intuitions are beliefs about objective moral values.  But then Greene 
would only be begging the question against those, like myself, who argue that emotions 
can be instances of moral perception.  As I explained at the end of chapter III, Greene 
apparently shares the assumption that there is something about emotion that makes it the 
case that moral judgment cannot be objective if emotion plays a significant role in the 
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production of moral intuitions.  But he does not offer us any reason to share this 
assumption with him—he just assumes we will—and in chapter IV, I provide grounds for 
rejecting it. 
 
A more interesting argument—and one similar to Greene’s—comes from Sharon 
Street.
7
  At the core of Greene’s argument is the suspicion, as he puts it, that  
[u]nderstanding where our moral instincts come from and how they work 
[...] can lead us to doubt that our moral convictions stem from perceptions 
of moral truth rather than projections of internal attitudes.
8
 
 
Street shares this suspicion.  Reflecting upon the evolutionary origins of human moral 
judgment, she thinks, will lead us to doubt that our minds are ever in the business of 
apprehending objective moral values.   
 
Street’s argument begins with the observation that the forces of natural selection 
likely had a tremendous influence upon the shaping of human attitudes and emotions, and 
consequently, upon the shaping of what she calls our “evaluative tendencies.”  Surely, for 
instance, evolution is at least largely responsible for shaping our emotional responses to 
such things as death, suffering, and survival.  Consequently, humans in general treat the 
fact that something would promote one’s survival as a reason in favor of it—and, here 
again, we have evolution to thank for this.  I imagine few would disagree with Street on 
this point.  However, on the basis of this observation about the tremendous influence of 
natural selection upon human emotions, Street goes on to raise a dilemma for anyone, 
                                                 
7
 It may be worth noting that, despite the similarities between their two arguments, Greene and 
Street are up to significantly different things.  For one thing, while Greene is engaged only in a discussion 
of psychological sentimentalism, Street takes herself to be engaged in a project that is much broader than 
this—namely, that of using Darwinian evolutionary considerations to argue against realism in metaethics.  
So when I ask, in a few paragraphs, how a psychological sentimentalist might respond to Street’s argument, 
I do not mean to imply that Street’s argument is aimed at psychological sentimentalists in particular.    
 
8
 Greene 2003: 850. 
149 
 
like myself, who thinks that there are objective moral values for our minds to apprehend 
when engaging in moral judgment.   
 
Briefly, the dilemma is this.  We must either affirm or deny that there is a relation 
of some sort between objective moral values and the forces of natural selection.  If we 
affirm that there is a relation, Street thinks, it could only be a tracking relation: evolution 
outfitted us with emotions and attitudes that reliably track the moral status of things.
9
  
The problem with this, however, is simply that there are better explanations (understood 
in terms of scientific adequacy) of the evaluative tendencies of human beings than the 
one suggested by the tracking account.  Take, for instance, Street’s own adaptive link 
account, according to which  
tendencies to make certain kinds of evaluative judgments rather than 
others contributed to our ancestors’ reproductive success not because they 
constituted perceptions of independent evaluative truths, but rather 
because they forged adaptive links between our ancestors’ circumstances 
and their responses to those circumstances, getting them to act, feel, and 
believe in ways that turned out to be reproductively advantageous.
10
 
                                                 
9
 Why think that it could only be a tracking relation?  As Street explains, it is because of the very 
nature of moral realism.  “[B]ecause it views these evaluative truths as ultimately independent of our 
evaluative attitudes, the only way for realism both to accept that those attitudes have been deeply 
influenced by evolutionary causes and to avoid seeing these causes as distorting is for it to claim that these 
causes actually in some way tracked the alleged independent truths.  There is no other way to go” (Street 
2006: 134-135). 
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 Street 2006: 127.  Street apparently uses the term ‘judgment’ to refer either to a propositional 
attitude of some sort (e.g., a belief), or to the act of forming such an attitude (see §3 of chapter 1).  One 
reason that I try not to use ‘judgment’ in this sense, however, is that there may be different types of moral, 
or evaluative, beliefs, and these different types of beliefs may be the products of different types of belief-
forming acts.  Following Sidgwick, for instance, Shafer-Landau distinguishes between three different types 
of moral beliefs: (i) beliefs expressing general moral principles (e.g., the belief that one should act only on 
maxims that one could will to be universal laws, etc.), (ii) beliefs expressing moral appraisals of act-types 
(e.g., the belief that lying is wrong), and (iii) beliefs expressing moral appraisals of act-tokens (e.g., the 
belief that it was not wrong for Suzy to tell lie L in circumstance C).  These strike me as importantly 
different kinds of beliefs, and it would not be surprising if they resulted from very different kinds of belief-
forming acts, or psychological processes.  Consequently, to use ‘moral (or evaluative) judgment’ to refer to 
any evaluative belief, or to any act by which we form such beliefs, as Street apparently does, one risks 
saying things that are true only in some cases, but false in others.  For instance, while it may seem quite 
plausible that we have evolution to thank for the mechanisms by which we form beliefs about act-tokens, is 
it equally plausible that beliefs expressing general moral principles were influenced in the same way, to the 
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As Street goes on to argue (I won’t recall the details here), the adaptive link account is 
clearer, more parsimonious, and explanatorily more powerful than the tracking account.  
So, even though Street thinks it more promising for the realist to affirm, rather than deny, 
a relation between the forces of natural selection and objective moral values, this 
nonetheless turns out to be quite a tough row to hoe. 
 
Why not deny a relation between evolutionary forces and objective moral values?  
According to Street, the problem here is that there is no way for the realist to avoid the 
conclusion that it would then be an unbelievable—literally, unbelievable—coincidence if 
any of our ordinary moral intuitions were actually true.  
On this view, allowing our evaluative judgments to be shaped by 
evolutionary influences is analogous to setting out for Bermuda and letting 
the course of your boat be determined by the wind and tides: just as the 
push of the wind and tides on your boat has nothing to do with where you 
want to go, so the historical push of natural selection on the content of our 
evaluative judgments has nothing to do with evaluative truth.
11
 
 
And it is no help to insist that, at some point in our evolutionary past, we developed the 
capacity to use rational reflection as a means to “right the ship,” as it were—i.e., as a 
means to counter the distorting influences of evolution, and steer moral judgment in the 
direction of objective moral values.  For when we engage in rational reflection, Street 
explains, it is not as if we step outside of our own evaluative standpoint, detached entirely 
from our own evaluative beliefs.  Rather, the person engaged in rational reflection “uses 
them [evaluative beliefs], reasons in terms of them, [and] holds some if them up for 
                                                                                                                                                 
same degree, etc., by the forces of natural selection?  I think probably not, though I’ll not pursue the matter 
any further. 
So that it fits more neatly into the discussion that I’ve been carrying on in this dissertation, I might 
recast Street’s argument as one that concerns the influence of evolutionary forces upon moral judgment, 
i.e., upon our tendency to form certain moral intuitions, and not others.   
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examination in light of others.”12  And of course, these are the same beliefs that are 
supposed to have been shaped to a significant degree by the distorting forces of natural 
selection.   
So long as we assume that there is no relation between evolutionary 
influences and evaluative truth, the appeal to rational reflection offers no 
escape from the conclusion that, in the absence of an incredible 
coincidence, most of our evaluative judgments are likely to be false.
13
 
 
So if we deny a relation between the forces of natural selection and objective moral 
values, then it seems we’re quickly led to the unfortunate conclusion that most of our 
ordinary intuitions about the moral status of things are probably false, since they are 
grounded causally in emotions that have been shaped by evolution in ways that have 
nothing whatsoever to do with objective moral values.   
 
How might a psychological sentimentalist who also wants to affirm the existence 
of objective moral values escape Street’s “Darwinian dilemma”?  Well, as I’ve 
mentioned before, one could adopt a secondary quality view of moral values, like the one 
that McDowell endorses.  If being such as to elicit certain emotional responses is all it is 
for x to be morally wrong, and this fact about x obtains sufficiently independently of our 
thoughts about its capacity to elicit those responses, etc., then one could apparently claim, 
perfectly consistently, that (a) x is objectively morally wrong, (b) our intuitions about the 
wrongness of x are (sometimes) causally grounded in our emotional response to x, and (c) 
evolutionary forces have had a tremendous influence upon our emotional responses to 
things.  But what if one would rather not adopt a secondary quality view of moral values? 
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Think back to my account of the nature of emotion, and ask: How is it that 
evolution has had the sort of influence that it has apparently had upon our emotions?  I’d 
answer that this influence is a result of the ways in which evolution shaped our concerns 
and construals.  For instance, a concern for our own survival is among the deepest and 
most universal of human concerns, and there is no doubt that the forces of natural 
selection had something to do with this.  Evolution is also (partly) responsible for shaping 
our construals of ferocious animals as threats, of some other people as physically 
attractive, of children as vulnerable, and so forth.  (Indeed, this may be a consequence of 
evolution’s prior effects upon our concerns.)  In these ways, my account of the nature of 
emotion helps to explain how it is that evolution could have shaped our emotional 
responses to things.  
 
My account of emotion can also help to explain how it is that moral intuitions 
grounded in emotion can be trustworthy despite the “purely distorting” influences of 
evolution, especially when it is coupled with the account of moral virtue described in the 
last chapter.  Notice that nothing Street says is incompatible with it now being the case 
that many of us are morally virtuous in this way—i.e., concerned for things that are 
objectively morally good, in the right ways, to the right degrees, etc.  Especially when it 
is pointed out that one’s being morally virtuous in this sense does not depend in any way 
upon one’s ability to recognize goods as good.  One can be excellently concerned for 
things that are good—and so, other things equal, morally virtuous—even if one neither 
recognizes them as good nor even realizes that she is concerned for them.  And as long as 
this is the case, then, per the argument in the last chapter, some will have moral intuitions 
that are trustworthy because they are grounded in emotion, and not despite this fact. 
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At one point, Street considers a response like this one, according to which our 
capacity to perceive objective moral values arose as a kind of byproduct of some other 
capacity that was selected for its evolutionary benefits.  She calls this the “byproduct 
hypothesis”: 
Many human capacities, after all, are like this: our ability to do 
astrophysics, for instance, was surely not itself directly selected for, but is 
instead the byproduct or outgrowth of other capacities which likely do 
have an explanation in terms of natural selection.  Perhaps in some similar 
fashion our ability to grasp independent evaluative truths has emerged as a 
byproduct or outgrowth of some other capacity—call it capacity C.14 
 
What I’m suggesting is that our ability to perceive objective moral values may very well 
have developed as a byproduct of our more basic capacities to have concerns and to 
respond to things emotionally.   
 
Street objects to this sort of response by insisting that the same Darwinian 
dilemma arises once again: we must either affirm or deny a relationship between the 
evolution of capacity C and objective moral values.  We should only affirm such a 
relation, though, if the resulting account of the evolution of C would be more acceptable 
scientifically than an account that does not affirm the relation.  And Street doubts that this 
would be the case.  On the other hand, if we deny a relation, Street thinks the coincidence 
worry arises again: if objective moral values had nothing whatsoever to do with the 
evolution of capacity C, then it would be too coincidental to believe that C could have 
given rise to a capacity to perceive objective moral values.  However, as I hope is clear 
by now, this just isn’t the case.  If moral virtue is roughly as I conceive it in the last 
chapter, then it is hardly a “complete fluke” that our capacity for emotion could give rise 
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to a capacity to perceive objective moral values, as Street claims it would have to be.  As 
I said, all I need is for it to have been possible for us to develop concerns for things other 
than the satisfaction of our most basic evolutionary needs.  And surely this has been the 
case, probably for as long as we’ve been able to have concerns at all. 
 
Now, to be sure, Street would likely not let the discussion stop here.  Presumably, 
the next step would be for her to ask: Assuming that many of us have concerns for things 
that are objectively morally good, what is the best explanation for this fact?  And it seems 
the dilemma—or something like it—is up and running yet again.  Unless moral values 
figure into our best explanation of how people have come to be sufficiently virtuous (as I 
am thinking of virtue), then it could only have been by a “complete fluke” that this has 
happened.  But surely, there will be better explanations, by scientific standards, of the 
causal origins of our concerns than any involving reference to objective moral values.   
 
I wonder, though, if this has now become a false dilemma.  For it is just not clear 
to me that moral values would have to figure into our best explanation of why we have 
the concerns that we have—or else it is a “complete fluke”—as long as there’s a plausible 
story according to which we did in fact develop concerns for things that are objectively 
morally good.  What one needs are mechanisms whose existence and influence are 
affirmed by our best evolutionary sciences, but that can also figure into a plausible 
explanation of how it is that human beings could universally and systematically come to 
be concerned about things that are morally good.  This way, the convergence of human 
concerns upon things that are good would not be a “complete fluke,” but nor would it be 
the case that the goodness of these things is necessary to explain how, or why, we came 
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to be concerned about them.  And as far as I can tell, there are such mechanisms, well 
established by the relevant sciences.  For instance, it is deeply ingrained in our evolved 
psychologies to be greatly concerned for our own well being, and for the well being of 
those close to us.  And these are things that are among the goods for which a morally 
virtuous person is concerned.  Furthermore, humans are well known to have a capacity to 
share, psychologically, in the suffering and enjoyment of others—a capacity known to 
most as empathy.  This is something for which we have evolution to thank; and it is not 
difficult to imagine how this capacity could have greatly influenced our concerns for the 
avoidance of suffering and promotion of enjoyment (again, in ourselves and others).  
Now, to be sure, these are cases in which evolution is equipping us with concerns for 
things that are good, but not because they are good.  But as I’ve explained, this is no 
matter to me.  All that matters is that there is a plausible story to tell according to which 
human beings, evolved as we are, are concerned about things that are morally good (in a 
de re sense).  Admittedly, much more than I’ve said here will be required for a full 
response to the sort of skepticism that Street encourages.  But I do think I’ve said enough 
to give some indication of the avenue that I think one should take in order to do so.
15
   
 
Both Greene and Street think that there is something about the evolution of 
emotions that tells against their being able to reliably track objective moral values.  
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 On one reading of Street’s argument, it is essentially just a restatement—perhaps with a few 
new evolutionary bells and whistles—of Gilbert Harman’s famous argument against realist theories in 
ethics.  Roughly, according to Harman, there is no phenomenon—emotional experiences, or otherwise—
the best explanation of which includes reference to moral values (see Harman 1977 and 1986).  In response, 
Nicholas Sturgeon rejected the supposed explanatory impotence of moral values, citing examples in which 
such values do seem to be making an explanatory difference that Harman apparently denies (see Sturgeon 
1985 and 1986).  As I say above, a full response to Street would require much more than I offer here, and 
likely take me too far away from my focus in this dissertation.  But I mention the Harman/Sturgeon debate 
if for no other reason than to suggest it as a resource for those sentimentalist-realists like myself who find 
themselves troubled by Street-style skepticism.    
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Greene, however, appears only to beg certain very important questions.  And Street’s 
Darwinian dilemma, I think, turns out to be a false dilemma.  According to her, the realist 
must either affirm or deny a relation between the forces of natural selection and objective 
moral values; and if he denies a relation (as I’m inclined to do), there is no way to avoid 
the conclusion that our moral intuitions are not trustworthy—since, if any of our moral 
intuitions are true, this could only be a matter of dumb luck, and not a reliable belief-
forming process.  But my accounts of emotion and moral judgment open up a third 
option.  Regardless of how and why the emotions evolved, they can serve as a kind of 
perceptual basis for moral judgment, provided that they are shaped to a sufficient degree 
by moral virtue. 
 
 2. Nichols and the arationality of emotions 
 
Shaun Nichols is another moral judgment skeptic.  In his book Sentimental Rules (2004), 
Nichols develops a theory of moral judgment according to which moral judgment 
involves two dissociable mechanisms.  The first of these mechanisms is an internally 
represented set of rules prohibiting certain behaviors—a “normative theory,” as he calls 
it.  And the second is emotion.  Psychopaths, he thinks, possess only the first of these.  
This is why they are often able to produce all of the “right” claims about what things are 
morally right and wrong, but nonetheless unable to recognize a difference between moral 
and conventional wrongs.  In psychologically normal people, these internally represented 
sets of rules come to be “backed” by emotions like anger and disgust—hence, 
“sentimental rules”—and this is how we judge the moral wrongness of things.  The 
details of his account are not important for my purposes here.  What matters is only that 
Nichols, too, is a psychological sentimentalist.   
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After spending several chapters developing and defending his view, Nichols 
devotes the final chapter of his book to arguing that, because it is a version of 
psychological sentimentalism, his theory of moral judgment is incompatible with 
“commonsense [moral] objectivism.”  As Nichols himself puts the argument: 
Morality is not objective because: 
1.  Rational creatures who lack certain emotions would not make the 
moral judgments that we do. 
2.  There is no principled basis for maintaining that these certain 
emotions (on which our moral [intuitions] depend) are the right 
emotions.  That is, there is no externally privileged basis for 
maintaining that all rational creatures should have the emotions. 
In brief, moral judgment depends on certain emotions, and these emotions 
them-selves are rationally arbitrary, so moral judgment, as we know it, is 
not objective.
16
 
 
Premise 1 is supposed to be an implication of psychological sentimentalism.  And 
premise 2 is an assumption that Nichols makes about the nature of emotion, which I’ll 
address in a moment.  I should also note that it is not entirely clear how Nichols is using 
the term ‘objective’ in this argument, since he applies the term to morality at the 
beginning, and then to moral judgment in the conclusion.  This is unfortunate, since it is 
surely possible for one of these things to be objective, and not the other.  Even if ordinary 
moral judgment in humans turns out not to be a process that can be counted upon to 
produce beliefs about objective moral values, it could of course still be the case that there 
are objective moral values.  Maybe objective moral values are just inaccessible.  
Regardless, because of his focus upon the role of emotion in moral judgment (and also 
because of his rejection of philosophical versions of sentimentalism), I’ll henceforth 
assume that Nichols means to be making a claim just about the objectivity of moral 
judgment, and not about the objectivity of morality more generally. And that claim is this: 
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since emotion figures centrally in moral judgment, and the emotions are rationally 
arbitrary, moral judgment cannot be counted upon to produce beliefs about objective 
moral values. 
  
In an attempt to explain how his argument is supposed to work, Nichols offers the 
following analogy.  We believe that torturing puppies is wrong, but Martians who lack 
anything like human emotions might not believe this.   
Furthermore, the argument continues, this need not be because the 
Martians are ignorant of any facts or because they are obtuse or too busy 
to do the calculations.  Rather, the Martians might be as smart, well-
informed, and have as much intellectual leisure as you please.  The 
Martians might be exceptional (if solitary and back-stabbing) 
mathematicians and scientists.  They fail to condemn puppy torture 
because they lack analogues of the human sentiments.
17
 
 
So far, this is just supposed to be a case if Nichols’ first premise.  Here is where his 
second premise enters the analogy: 
The next step in the broad argument is to maintain that there is no 
externally privileged basis for saying that we have the right emotions and 
the Martians are emotionally defective.  That is, there is no independent 
basis for saying that our emotional repertoire is the right one to have.
18
 
 
And from this it is supposed to follow that moral judgment is not objective. 
 
I have two things to say in response to Nichols’ argument.  First, if the 
Aristotelian account of the relation between emotion and virtue described in the last 
chapter is on point, then Nichols is surely wrong to think that there is no basis upon 
which we might judge the rightness or wrongness of different emotional responses.  Even 
if virtue is relative to kind—so that what makes for a virtuous human is something 
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entirely different from what makes for a virtuous Martian—it will still be false that “there 
is no principled basis for maintaining that these certain emotions … are the right 
emotions.”  That is, as long as we’re talking about human emotions.  As I explained in 
chapter II, emotions are often susceptible to both rational and moral evaluation.  Fear is 
the right response to a ferocious bear, and the wrong response to Yogi bear.  Again, as I 
explained before, even neo-Jamesians like Prinz are careful to secure some sense in 
which emotions are susceptible to evaluation of this kind.  So for Nichols to simply state, 
without any argument, that emotions are rationally arbitrary is surprising.  And this is to 
say nothing of the moral evaluability of emotions, which is surely implied by our 
ordinary thought and talk about our own emotions and the emotions of others.  If shame 
is not a morally appropriate response to serious wrongdoing, then apparently, we are all 
massively deceived about the nature of emotion. 
 
Second, even if there were no basis for judging the rightness or wrongness of 
different emotional responses, it would not follow from this that the centrality of emotion 
in moral judgment is a reason to doubt that moral judgment is objective.  Once again, it is 
useful to think of perception.  Suppose I’m seated in a room with decent lighting, I’m 
wearing my glasses, my eyes are open, etc., and I have the perceptual experience of a 
coffee cup.  On the basis of this experience, I come to believe that there is a coffee cup 
before me.  My Martian friend, however, has perceptual faculties that are radically 
different from mine (he may also lack the relevant concepts), and consequentially has a 
different perceptual experience from the one that I have.  Presumably, there is no 
privileged basis external to both of us upon which I could claim that my perceptual 
experience, and not his, is the right one to have.  After all, his Martian faculties are 
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working exactly as Martian faculties should.  But does it somehow follow from this that 
my perceptual belief does not result from a process that gives me access to objective 
features of reality (e.g., the fact that there is a coffee cup before me)?  Of course not.  So 
why think any differently about our moral intuitions and the emotions in which they are 
grounded?  
 
Some may want to spin Nichols’ argument into a more straightforwardly 
epistemological problem.  One might think, for instance, that my inability to provide 
grounds for thinking that my perceptual experience, and not the experience had by my 
Martian friend, is the right one to have may nonetheless jeopardize the justification of my 
subsequent belief that there is a coffee cup before me.  And if this is right, then the same 
sort of worry will apply to moral intuitions grounded in emotion.  Unless we can access 
some privileged basis, external to both humans and Martians, upon which we might 
confirm the appropriateness of our emotional horror at puppy torture, then we are not 
justified in believing that it is wrong to torture puppies.  At this point, my endorsement of 
process reliabilism (see §4 of chapter IV) is important.  As long as our beliefs about the 
wrongness of puppy torture are reliably formed, then they are justified.  The lack of an 
“externally privileged basis” in this case may certainly jeopardize our ability to justify 
our moral beliefs to our Martian friends.  But being justified in believing b and being able 
to justify b to others are two importantly different things, especially as far as the 
reliabilist is concerned.  I might be perfectly justified in believing b, even if I am wholly 
unable to explain my reasons for believing, or to articulate reasons for thinking the belief 
justified, or to persuade others of the belief.   
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 3. Sinnott-Armstrong and the clouding effect of emotions 
 
The final argument for moral judgment skepticism comes from Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong.  To set the argument up, Sinnott-Armstrong considers a variety of cases in 
which some inferential confirmation is needed in order for a non-moral belief to count as 
justified.  And from these cases, he tries to draw out five general epistemological 
principles that he can then extend to moral intuitions.  So for instance, he writes, “If you 
believe that George Washington never told a lie, and if this belief comes from a legend 
spread by Washington’s allies to gain power, then you are not justified in believing the 
legend, though it still might be true.”19   From this case, and others like it, Sinnott-
Armstrong draws out the following principle: “confirmation is needed for a believer to be 
justified when the belief arises from an unreliable or disreputable source.”20  Fair enough.  
His third principle, however, has to do with the impact of emotion upon the justification 
of beliefs.  He writes, 
When people get very angry, for example, they tend to overlook relevant 
facts.  They often do not notice excuses or apologies by the person who 
made them angry.  We should not generalize to all emotions, but we can 
still endorse some-thing like this: 
Principle 3: confirmation is needed for a believer to be justified 
when the believer is emotional in a way that clouds judgment.
21
 
 
So far, Sinnott-Armstrong hasn’t said anything that anyone should find objectionable.  
After all, there is no doubt that our emotions do sometimes cloud judgment.  And he is 
even careful here to note that we should not generalize to all emotions.  But later, when 
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20
 Sinnott-Armstrong 2006: 345. 
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he extends Principle 3 to apply to our ordinary moral intuitions, it becomes unclear 
whether he thinks that believers are ever not “emotional in a way that clouds judgment.” 
 
Sinnott-Armstrong’s discussion of moral judgment focuses upon the following 
two questions.  First, are moral intuitions primarily the products of reason or emotion?  
And second, which emotions, if any, cloud judgment?  His answer to the first question is 
that moral intuitions are primarily the products of emotion, an endorsement of 
psychological sentimentalism.  In fact, he briefly makes reference to many of the same 
studies that I discuss in chapter III.  But what of the second question: Which emotions, if 
any, cloud moral judgment?  Unfortunately, he never really clarifies what the difference 
is supposed to be between emotions that do cloud moral judgment and those that do not; 
and in fact, one gets the impression that he thinks emotions always cloud moral 
judgment.  For instance, at one point, after referencing Greene’s fMRI study, in which 
subjects’ brains were scanned while they respond to the TROLLEY and FOOTBRIDGE 
scenarios, Sinnott-Armstrong writes,  
It is not obvious what to make of these results.  [...]  Nonetheless, one 
natural speculation is this: When asked about pushing the fat man, subjects 
react, ‘That’s so horrible that I can’t even think about it.’  Emotions stop 
subjects from considering the many factors in these examples.  If this 
interpretation is correct, then many pervasive and fundamental moral 
beliefs result from emotions that cloud moral judgment.
22
   
 
And a little later, he adds, “[S]uch brain studies seem to provide some evidence that 
many moral [intuitions] result from emotions that cloud judgment.”23  Strictly speaking, 
though, neither Greene’s study nor any of the other studies that Sinnott-Armstrong cites 
makes any assumptions at all about the effects of emotion upon the quality of a person’s 
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moral judgment—that is, none of these studies assumes that emotions are in the business 
of clouding moral judgment.  All they purport to show is that many of our moral 
intuitions are causally grounded in emotion.  So why would Sinnott-Armstrong think that 
these studies show that moral judgment is often clouded by emotion?  Presumably, he 
draws this conclusion because he assumes that emotions always have a clouding effect—
so that, to whatever extent moral judgment is based upon emotion, it is to that extent 
clouded. 
 
Later still, Sinnott-Armstrong responds to the objection that, even if his five 
principles apply to some moral beliefs, they do not apply to all moral beliefs; and so there 
may still be moral beliefs that do not need inferential confirmation in order to be justified.  
In response, he writes,  
As I admitted, some moral beliefs are not controversial.  For example 
[referring to a variant of the FOOTBRIDGE case, described in chapter 3], 
almost everyone (except moral nihilists) agrees that it is morally wrong to 
push the fat man in front of the trolley just because you are angry with him 
for beating you in a game.  Such cases also do not seem due to context, 
heuristics, overgeneralization, or framing effects.  Still, such moral 
believers are […] emotional (as Greene’s experiments suggested).  So 
[Principle 3 does] seem to create a need for confirmation even in such 
clear cases.
24
   
 
Once again, Sinnott-Armstrong seems simply to assume that emotions are always in the 
business of clouding moral judgment.  As long as “moral believers are emotional”—by 
which he seems to mean just that their beliefs are grounded in emotion—there is a “need 
for confirmation,” even if the belief itself is one to which almost everyone would agree. 
 
Here, too, I have two things to say in response.  First, while it surely must be 
conceded that emotions do sometimes cloud moral judgment, it also seems as if a lack of 
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emotion can have similarly negative effects upon a person’s judgment.  As I discussed in 
chapter III, there are a number of psychological conditions characterized by, among other 
things, some sort of emotional deficit—i.e., a systematic absence or blunting of normal 
emotions.  Psychopathy and autism are probably the two that receive the most attention in 
moral psychological literature.  And as I explained in the earlier chapter, people with 
these conditions are well known for having serious difficulties with moral judgment.  
Psychopaths, for instance, are apparently unable to “see” a difference between moral and 
conventional wrongdoing, and most attribute this defect in their moral judgment to their 
characteristic emotional deficits.  So while Sinnott-Armstrong is right to note, for 
instance, that our emotions sometimes keep us from considering features of our 
circumstances that may be relevant to moral judgment, there is also evidence for thinking 
that our emotions are sometimes necessary if those features are to ever be apparent to us 
in the first place.
25
  
 
And of course, the second thing to say in response to Sinnott-Armstrong is just 
that there are ways of conceiving the nature of emotion and its connection to morality—
given, for instance, the relation that emotion bears to moral virtue—according to which it 
would be as mistaken to say that emotion clouds moral judgment as it would be to say 
that our perceptual experiences cloud our judgment of the perceptible features of things.  
It is hard to resist thinking that Sinnott-Armstrong (and perhaps other moral judgment 
skeptics) must be assuming some sort of feeling theory of emotion.  Indeed, it would be 
easy to think that emotions could only be in the business of clouding moral judgment if 
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 People with autism, for instance, commonly struggle to recognize what is going on in the minds 
of other people, and many think that this struggle is an effect of “a failure to become emotionally engaged,” 
early in life, with the subjective states of others (Hobson 2005: 189).  For more, see Hobson 2002. 
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one thought that emotions were nothing more than feelings of changes in the body.  After 
all, when other such feelings are at the forefront of our minds, it seems likely that our 
judgment of things will consequently be less than ideal.  Bouts of dizziness and 
heartburn, for instance, can be distracting in much the same way that Sinnott-Armstrong 
says emotions can be distracting.   
 
However, for reasons that I lay out in chapter II, we should not think this way 
about the nature of emotion.  There is more to emotions than just feelings.  Emotions are 
complex states consisting of construals, concerns, and feelings, all bearing particular 
relations to each other.  If I am right about this, and if the relation between emotion and 
moral virtue is roughly as I describe it in the last chapter, then the effect that virtue has in 
shaping our emotions is such as to make the virtuous person emotionally sensitive to 
objective moral values in a manner reminiscent of perception.  And just as our fast and 
unreflective perceptual beliefs are (or can be) justified in virtue of their being grounded in 
perceptual experiences, our moral intuitions are (or can be) justified in virtue of, and not 
despite, their being grounded in emotional experiences.  If my argument from chapter IV 
is successful, then, it turns out that Sinnott-Armstrong’s assumption about the effects of 
emotion upon moral judgment is false—rather than only clouding moral judgment, it is 
through our emotions that we can become attuned to the moral values of things.   
 
 4. Sinnott-Armstrong on ‘moral illusion’ 
  
In the same article, Sinnott-Armstrong offers another argument for doubting the 
trustworthiness of moral intuitions.  This argument does not directly concern the nature or 
implications of the role of emotion in moral judgment, but I nonetheless think it will be 
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worth addressing here, for reasons that will become clear soon enough.  Essentially, 
Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral intuitions are often subject to what might be called 
“moral illusions,” and this is especially interesting since my case for the trustworthiness 
of moral intuitions in the last chapter involved an analogy to perception.   
 
Here, too, his method is to begin with cases of non-moral beliefs that have been 
influenced in various ways by illusion, and then to work his way back to cases of moral 
beliefs.  One of the non-moral examples is a case of visual illusion: objects look smaller 
when they are next to large objects, and larger when they are next to small objects.  In 
such cases, then, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, “we are not justified in trusting our estimates 
until we check their sizes in other circumstances or by other methods.”26   
 
Another sort of illusion that he considers has to do with heuristics, i.e., quick-and-
ready rules of thumb that unconsciously guide our thoughts in certain circumstances.  For 
instance, if you ask people to guess how many times a 7-letter word with ‘n’ as the sixth 
letter appears in a particular book, they’ll typically give you a number many times lower 
than if you had asked them how many times a 7-letter word ending with ‘-ing’ appears in 
the book.  But of course, any word of the latter type is also a word of the former type; so 
in reality, there must be at least as many words of the former type as there are of the latter 
type, if not more.  Many attribute people’s responses here to an availability heuristic, 
according to which we judge the frequency of a thing based upon how easily examples of 
that thing come to mind: examples of 7-letter words ending in ‘-ing’ come to mind much 
more easily than examples of 7-letter words with ‘n’ as the sixth letter.  But in this case, 
the heuristic has a kind of illusory effect—it makes 7-letter words with ‘n’ as the sixth 
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letter appear less common than they really are.  As a result, Sinnott-Armstrong explains, 
people “do not seem adequately epistemically justified in trusting beliefs based on such 
heuristics.”27  
 
On the basis of cases like the two I’ve just mentioned, Sinnott-Armstrong 
suggests the following general principle: “confirmation is needed for a believer to be 
justified when the circumstances are conducive to illusion.”28  And now we must ask: Are 
the circumstances of moral judgment ever conducive to illusion?  Sinnott-Armstrong 
thinks they are.   
 
One case of moral illusion comes from Peter Unger.  As Sinnott-Armstrong 
recounts the case:  
[Unger] found that the order in which options are presented affects beliefs 
about whether a given option is morally wrong.  He also claims that 
people’s moral beliefs about a certain option depend on whether that 
option is presented as part of a pair or, instead, as part of a series that 
includes additional options intermediate between the original pair.
29
 
 
Another case of moral illusion comes from psychologists Kahneman and Tversky.
30
  In 
one study, they divided subjects into two groups, asking members of each group to 
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 Sinnott-Armstrong 2006: 352 (citing Unger 1996: 88-94).  As Sinnott-Armstrong explains in a 
footnote, Unger is here describing the results of an informal survey, but unfortunately, Unger does not 
describe the methods that he used for the survey.  He also does not describe the exact results of the survey.  
   
30
 I should say: It is not obvious that this should be counted as a case of moral illusion.  Sinnott-
Armstrong defends its inclusion in this discussion by arguing that, since subjects were not told how, if at 
all, the hypothetical programs would affect them personally, “their choices seem to result from beliefs 
about which program is morally right or wrong” (2006: 354). 
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choose between two hypothetical programs for fighting a particular disease that afflicts 
600 people.
31
  Here is how the two programs were described to the first group:  
If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.  If program B is 
adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and a 2/3 
probability that no people will be saved. 
 
And here is how the two programs were described to subjects in the second group: 
If program C is adopted, 400 people will die.  If program D is adopted, 
there is a 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3 probability that 
600 will die. 
 
Clearly, programs A and C are equivalent, and programs B and D are equivalent.  But 
subjects’ preferences did not reflect these equivalencies.  When asked to choose between 
A and B, most subjects preferred A; and when asked to choose between C and D, most 
subjects preferred D.  As Sinnott-Armstrong explains, despite the technical equivalence 
between A and C, for instance, the different terms of their descriptions create a kind of 
moral illusion: describing C in terms of how many people will die, as opposed to how 
many people will be saved, leads subjects to see it as (morally) worse than its equivalent.  
Illusions such as this one are sometimes classified as cases of framing effects, and 
Sinnott-Armstrong apparently believes they are quite common in moral judgment: 
“Framing effects distort moral beliefs in so many cases that moral believers need 
confirmation for any particular moral belief.”32 
 
I have no intention to disagree with Sinnott-Armstrong’s suggestion that moral 
judgment is sometimes subject to framing effects and other types of moral illusion.  But I 
do wish to say two things in response.  First, it seems odd to me that he characterizes the 
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possibility of moral illusion as a separate reason for doubting the trustworthiness of 
moral intuitions—i.e., separate from their being grounded in emotion.  Does he think that 
moral intuitions are grounded in emotion, or does he think that moral intuitions are 
grounded in something like an unconscious analysis of information and context that can 
sometimes be misled by things like framing effects?  On the one hand, if he thinks that 
the evidence supports psychological sentimentalism, then shouldn’t he want to interpret 
these latter studies in light of that fact?  On the other hand, if he thinks most intuitions are 
subject to framing effects and other illusions, what does that have to do with emotion?   
 
I raise these questions not because I think that Sinnott-Armstrong owes us 
answers to them, but rather as an opportunity to point out that my account of the nature of 
emotion and its role in moral judgment provides me with answers to them.  Briefly: moral 
intuitions are grounded in emotion and they are sometimes subject to illusion, because 
what is happening in cases of moral illusion is that our construals of things are being 
manipulated, sometimes by factors that are not especially relevant to moral judgment.  
Subjects in the Kahneman and Tversky study are led to construe programs A and C 
differently; and this affects their subsequent (moral) beliefs about the two programs, 
because we respond differently emotionally to the thought of 400 people dying than we 
do to the thought of 200 people being saved.  Similarly, in the case from Unger, it is 
likely that the order in which we are given options can affect our construals of—and 
subsequent moral beliefs about—the relevant options.  So my account of emotion and its 
role in moral judgment provides me with a unifying explanation of what Sinnott-
Armstrong treats as two disparate phenomena in moral psychology.  If nothing else, I 
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take this to be further confirmation that I’ve got the anatomy of emotion and moral 
judgment basically right.   
 
What can I say about the trustworthiness of moral intuitions, though, in light of 
the possibility of moral illusion?  Essentially, I’ll repeat what I said in chapter IV, in 
response to the worry that ordinary people are not nearly as virtuous as the MVP.  
Whereas the worry there was that our concerns are not always as they ought to be, here 
the worry seems to be that our construals of things are not always accurate.  But the 
lessons are the same as they were before.  First, as I said then, much more research needs 
to be done before anyone should join Sinnott-Armstrong in concluding that moral 
intuitions are not to be trusted.  It simply does not follow from the cases that Sinnott-
Armstrong cites that all, or even most, of our moral intuitions are influenced in this way.  
And even if it can be shown that moral judgment is often subject to illusion, skeptics will 
also have to show that the effects of these illusions are great enough to warrant 
skepticism.  It will not be enough to simply point out that moral illusion causes our 
construals of things to be less than perfectly accurate.  After all, even if my perceptions 
are never perfectly accurate, it may nonetheless be the case that my perceptual beliefs are 
reliably formed.  With respect to ordinary perception, reliability does not entail perfect 
accuracy.  Presumably, the same could be said of the construals that underlie our 
emotional responses to things.   
 
Second, as before, there is a useful practical lesson to be taken from cases of 
moral illusion.  Just as we need to take care with our concerns, being sensitive to cases in 
which our concerns may be otherwise than they ought to be, we need to take care with 
171 
 
our construals of things.  This can be especially difficult, since, as I explained in chapter 
II, construals are sometimes unconscious, and sometimes out of our control.  But 
nonetheless, we have a responsibility to do everything in our power to ensure that we see 
things as they are, morally.  Take poverty, for instance.  Most will agree that the suffering 
of those in conditions of poverty is a terrible thing.  But it seems likely that those who 
have either experienced poverty for themselves, or have at least spent significant amounts 
of time with the poor, will construe this suffering differently—and arguably, more 
accurately—than those who have not.  Similarly, those who spend time reflecting upon 
discrimination and its socio-psychological effects are likely to construe the circumstances 
of victims of discrimination more accurately than people who have never reflected upon 
such things.  And so on and so forth.  Developing habits like these may help to protect 
against the influence of moral illusions, by helping to ensure that we see things, morally, 
as they really are.   
 
 5. Conclusion 
 
As I explained in the first chapter, moral intuitions are very important things, to 
philosophers and non-philosophers alike.  And philosophers in particular have long 
debated whether or not these intuitions are truly deserving of the sort of trust that we 
apparently give to them, both in our ordinary lives and in moral philosophy.  But until 
relatively recently, these debates involved very little attention to empirical research into 
the psychological underpinnings of moral judgment.  This is unfortunate because, as 
Sinnott-Armstrong and others recognize, “it is hard to see how to determine whether 
certain moral intuitions are justified without any understanding of the processes that 
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produce those intuitions.”33   Thankfully, interdisciplinary research into the nature of 
moral judgment and status of moral intuitions is now in full bloom, as moral 
philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and others are jointly engaged in an effort to 
finally answer long-time philosophical questions in empirically adequate ways. 
 
Unfortunately, the growing consensus seems to be that this research ought to 
undermine our trust in our own moral intuitions.  This is unfortunate, for a number of 
reasons.  For one thing, it would seem to imply that ethics ought to be done radically 
differently than philosophers have been doing it for the past two thousand years or so.  
For any and all references (direct or indirect) to moral intuitions—which are ubiquitous—
would have to be completely disregarded, and avoided in the future.  And for another 
thing, such sweeping skepticism of our moral intuitions would apparently have serious 
and disturbing implications upon the ways in which we conduct our everyday lives.  As I 
explained in the first chapter, we not only regularly form moral beliefs about others and 
their actions in this fast and unreflective manner, but also, we organize our lives around, 
making decisions and plans on the basis of, these intuitive moral beliefs.   
 
Underlying this growing consensus is the very popular assumption that moral 
intuitions are probably not trustworthy if they are grounded in emotion.  Apparently, 
there is supposed to be something about the nature of emotion that somehow makes it 
unlikely, if not impossible, for beliefs grounded in emotion to ever be justified beliefs 
about objective moral values.   
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In this dissertation, I’ve attempted to resist this trend by arguing that the popular 
assumption is false: moral intuitions can be trustworthy even if they are grounded in 
emotion.  In fact, given the right conditions, moral intuitions can be trustworthy because 
they are grounded in emotion.  As is sometimes said in other contexts, “the best defense 
is a good offense.”  So, in defense of the epistemic status of moral intuitions, I’ve gone 
on the offense, developing positive accounts not only of the nature of emotion, but also of 
the relation between emotion and moral virtue.  If the nature of emotion is roughly as I 
argue in chapter II, and the relation between emotion and virtue is as I describe it in 
chapter IV, then it turns out that people’s ordinary moral intuitions can be trustworthy 
because they are grounded in emotion, provided that these people are sufficiently morally 
virtuous.   
 
Now, as I have been careful to recognize along the way, my overall account of 
moral judgment raises at least as many questions as it attempts to answer: Are there any 
empirical grounds for thinking that the nature of emotion is as I argue in chapter II?  
Might further research tell against psychological sentimentalism?  How might we test for 
things like moral virtue, as I conceive them here?  Is there any empirical basis for 
thinking that emotion relates to virtue in the way that I describe?  And this is to say 
nothing of questions about any further philosophical implications that my views might 
have: What, if anything, might my view imply about the relation between sincere moral 
judgment and motivation?  Does the fact that intuitions are grounded in emotion provide 
support for cognitivism, noncognitivism, or perhaps hybrid accounts of the function and 
meaning of moral utterances?  Does my view imply that moral rules or principles play no 
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role at all in the production of moral intuitions?  And if so, have I thereby committed 
myself to a form of moral particularism?   
 
Unfortunately, all of these questions will have to be put off for a later time.  My 
main concern in this dissertation has just been to construct an account of moral judgment 
that allows me to defend moral intuitions from the sorts of skeptical attacks that I 
describe here in chapter V.  More work surely needs to be done, but I nonetheless think 
that the basic parts of a successful defense are all here.   
 175 
REFERENCES 
 
 
ADAMS, R. M. (2006). A Theory of Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
ALLADIN, A. (2008). Cognitive Hypnotherapy: An Integrated Approach to the Treatment 
of Emotional Disorders. West Sussex: Wiley and Sons.  
 
ARISTOTLE. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by W. D. Ross. In R. McKeon (ed.), The Basic 
Works of Aristotle. New York: Random House.  
 
ARPALY, N. (2003). Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
BLAIR, R. J. (1993). “The Development of Morality.” Ph.D. diss., University of London. 
 
——— (1995). “A Cognitive Developmental Approach to Morality: Investigating the 
Psychopath,” Cognition 57: 1-29. 
 
——— (1996). “Brief Report: Morality in the Autistic Child,” Journal of Autism and 
Developmental Disorders 26(5): 571-579. 
 
——— (2007). “The Amygdala and Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex in Morality and 
Psychopathy,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11: 387–392. 
 
BLAIR, R. J., ET AL. (1996). “Theory of Mind in the Psychopath,” Journal of Forensic 
Psychiatry 7: 15–25. 
 
BLUM, L. A. (1994). Moral Perception and Particularity. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
COLBY, A., KOHLBERG, L., GIBBS, J., AND LIEBERMAN, M. (1983). “A Longitudinal Study 
of Moral Judgment,” Monographs of the Society for Research in Child 
Development 48. 
 
CUSHMAN, F., YOUNG, L., AND GREENE, J. D. (2010). “Multi-system Moral Psychology,” 
in John M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (eds.), The Moral 
Psychology Handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 47-71. 
 
CUSHMAN, F., YOUNG, L., AND HAUSER, M. (2006). “The Role of Conscious Reasoning 
and Intuition in Moral Judgment: Testing Three Principles of Harm,” 
Psychological Science 17(12): 1082-1089. 
 
DAMASIO, A. (1994). Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New 
York, NY: Gossett/Putnam. 
 
 176 
DARBY, B. W. AND JEFFERS, D. (1988). “The Effects of Defendant and Juror 
Attractiveness on Simulated Courtroom Trial Decisions,” Social Behavior and 
Personality 16: 39-50. 
 
D’ARMS, J. (2005). “Two Arguments for Sentimentalism,” Philosophical Issues 15: 1-21. 
 
D’ARMS, J. AND JACOBSON, D. (2006). “Sensibility Theory and Projectivism,” in D. Copp 
(ed.), Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
DION, K., BERSCHEID, E., AND WALSTER, E. (1972). “What is Beautiful is Good,” Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 24: 285-290. 
 
DORIS, J. (2002). Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
DORIS, J. AND STICH, S. (2005). “As a Matter of Fact: Empirical Perspectives on Ethics,” 
in Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
DRETSKE, F. (1981). Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
——— (1986). “Misrepresentation,” in R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and 
Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 17-36.  
 
DWYER, S. (2009). “Moral Dumbfounding and the Linguistic Analogy: Methodological 
Implications for the Study of Moral Judgment,” Mind & Language 24(3): 274-
296. 
 
DWYER, S., HUEBNER, B., AND HAUSER, M. (2010). “The Linguistic Analogy: 
Motivations, Results, and Speculations,” Topics in Cognitive Science 2: 486-510. 
 
FOGAS, J. P. AND BOWER, G. H. (1987). “Mood Effects on Personal Perception 
Judgments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51: 53-60. 
 
GIBBARD, A. (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
GOLDMAN, A. (2012). Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
GRANT, C. M., BOUCHER, J., RIGGS, K. J., AND GRAYSON, A. (2005).  “Moral 
Understanding in Children with Autism,” Autism 9(3): 317-331. 
 
GREENE, J. D. (2003). “From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral ‘Ought’: What Are the Moral 
Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?” Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience 4: 847-850. 
 177 
 
——— (2008). “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,” in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), 
Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain 
Disorders, and Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 35-79. 
 
GREENE, J. D., AND HAIDT, J. (2002). “How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?” 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6: 517-523. 
 
GREENE, J. D., SOMMERVILLE, R. B., NYSTROM, L. E., DARLEY, J. M., AND COHEN, J. D. 
(2001). “An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment,” 
Science 293: 2105-2108. 
 
GRIFFITHS, P. E. (2004). “Is Emotion a Natural Kind?” in R. Solomon (ed.), Philosophers 
on Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 233-249. 
 
HAIDT, J. (2001). “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist 
Approach to Moral Judgment,” Psychological Review 108(4): 814-834. 
 
HAIDT, J., KOLLER, S. H., AND DIAS, M. G. (1993). “Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It 
Wrong to Eat Your Dog?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65(4): 
613-628. 
 
HAIDT. J., BJORKLUND, F., AND MURPHY, S. (unpublished). “Moral Dumbfounding: When 
Intuition Finds No Reason.” University of Virginia. 
 
HARMAN, G. (1977). The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
——— (1986). “Moral Explanations of Natural Facts: Can Moral Claims Be Tested 
Against Moral Reality?” in N. Gillespie (ed.), Spindel Conference: Moral 
Realism. (The Southern Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 24): 57-68. 
 
——— (1999). “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the 
Fundamental Attribution Error,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99: 315-
331. 
 
HAUSER, M. (2006). Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right 
and Wrong. New York: HarperCollins. 
 
HOBSON, R. P. (2002). The Cradle of Thought: Exploring the Origins of Thinking. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
——— (2005). “What Puts the Jointness in Joint Attention?” in N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. 
McCormack, and J. Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other 
Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 178 
HUME, D. (1983 [1751]). An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. J. B. 
Schneewind (ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett. 
 
——— (2000 [1739/1740). A Treatise of Human Nature. D. F Norton and M. J. Norton 
(eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
ISEN, A. M. AND LEVIN, P. F. (1972). “The Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies 
and Kindness,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21: 384-388. 
 
JAGGAR, A. (2008). “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology,” in 
Alison Jaggar (ed.), Just Methods: An Interdisciplinary Feminist Reader. Boulder: 
Paradigm Press, pp. 378-391. 
 
JAMES, W. (1950). The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2. New York: Dover. 
 
KAHNEMAN, D. AND TVERSKY, A. (1979). “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
under Risk,” Econometrica 47(2): 263-292. 
 
KAMTEKAR, R. (2004). “Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our 
Character,” Ethics 114: 458-491. 
 
KENNY, A. (1963). Action, Emotion, and Will. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
KOHLBERG, L., LEVINE, C., AND HEWER, A. (1983). Moral Stages: A Current 
Formulation and a Response to Critics. In J. A. Meachem (Ed.), Contributions to 
Human Development, Vol. 10. Basel: Karger. 
 
LANGE, C. G. (1967 [1885]). “The Emotions: A Physiological Study,” in C. Lange and 
W. James (eds.), The Emotions. New York: Hafner. 
 
LAZARUS, R. S. (1991). Emotion and Adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
LERNER, J., GOLDBERG, J., AND TETLOCK, P. E. (1998). “Sober Second Thought: The 
Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of 
Responsibility,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 24: 563-574. 
 
LITTLE, M. O. (1995). “Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral 
Epistemology,” Hypatia 10: 117-137. 
 
MACKIE, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. London: Penguin. 
 
MCDOWELL, J. (1998a). “Virtue and Reason,” in J. McDowell (ed.), Mind, Value, & 
Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 50-73. 
 
——— (1998b). “Values and Secondary Qualities,” in J. McDowell (ed.), Mind, Value, 
& Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 131-150. 
 179 
 
MEINONG, A. (1972). On Emotional Presentation. Trans. with Introduction by M. L. 
Schubert Kalsi. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 
 
MICHAUD, S., AND AYNESWORTH, H. (1989). Ted Bundy: Conversations with a Killer. 
New York: New American Library. 
 
MOORS, A. (2010). “Theories of Emotion Causation: A Review,” in J. De Houwer and D. 
Hermans (eds.), Cognition & Emotion: Reviews of Current Research and 
Theories. New York: Psychology Press. 
 
NICHOLS, SHAUN (2004). Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral 
Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
NISBETT, R. AND WILSON, T. (1977). “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports 
on Mental Processes,” Psychological Review 84(3): 231-259. 
 
OAKLEY, J. (1992). Morality and the Emotions. London: Routledge. 
 
PIAGET, J. (1997). The Moral Judgment of the Child. New York: Free Press. 
 
PRINZ, J. (2000). “The Duality of Content,” Philosophical Studies 100: 1-34. 
 
——— (2002). Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
 
——— (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
——— (2006). “The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments,” Philosophical Explorations 
9(1): 29-43. 
 
——— (2007). The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
ROBERTS, R. C. (1988). “What An Emotion Is: A Sketch,” Philosophical Review 97(2): 
183-209. 
 
——— (1989). “Aristotle on Virtues and Emotions,” Philosophical Studies 56(3): 293-
306 
 
——— (2003). Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
——— (unpublished). “Emotions, Perceptions, and Moral Judgments.” 
 
 180 
RORTY, A. (1980). “Explaining Emotions,” in A. Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 103-126. 
 
SCHNALL, S., HAIDT, J., CLORE, G. L., AND JORDAN, A. (2008). “Disgust as Embodied 
Moral Judgment,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34: 1096-1109. 
 
SHAFER-LANDAU, R. (2003). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
——— (2004). Whatever Happened to Good and Evil? Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
SINGER, P. (1972). “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 1: 
229-243. 
 
——— (1981). The Expanding Circle: Ethics and Sociobiology. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
——— (2007). “Should We Trust Our Moral Intuitions?” Project Syndicate: A World of 
Ideas, March 14, 2007. Accessed February 17, 2013. http://www.project-
syndicate.org/ commentary/should-we-trust-our-moral-intuitions. 
 
SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, W. (2006). “Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology,” in 
T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, pp. 339-366. 
 
SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, W., YOUNG, L., AND CUSHMAN, F. (2010). “Moral Intuitions,” in 
John M. Doris and the Moral Psychology Research Group (eds.), The Moral 
Psychology Handbook, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 246-272. 
 
SMETANA, J. (1993). “Understanding of Social Rules,” in M. Bennett (ed.), The 
Development of Social Cognition: The Child as Psychologist. New York: 
Guilford Press. 
 
SMETANA, J. AND BRAEGES, J. (1990). “The Development of Toddlers’ Moral and 
Conventional Judgments,” Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 36: 329-346. 
 
SOLOMON, R. (1980). “Emotions and Choice,” in Amélie Rorty (ed.), Explaining 
Emotions. Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 251-282. 
 
SOMMERS, T. (2009). A Very Bad Wizard: Morality Behind the Curtain: Nine 
Conversations. McSweeney’s Press. 
 
STRACK, F., MARTIN, L. L. AND STEPPER, S. (1988). “Inhibiting and Facilitating 
Conditions of Facial Expressions: A Nonobtrusive Test of the Facial Feedback 
Hypothesis,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54: 768-777. 
 
 181 
STRATTON-LAKE, P. (2002). “Introduction,” in P. Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical 
Intuitionism: Re-evaluations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 1-28. 
 
STREET, S. (2006). “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Philosophical 
Studies 127(1): 109-166. 
 
STURGEON, N. (1985). “Moral Explanations,” in D. Copp and D. Zimmerman (eds.), 
Morality, Reason and Truth. Totowa NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, pp. 49-78. 
 
——— (1986). “Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts,” in N. Gillespie (ed.), 
Spindel Conference: Moral Realism. (The Southern Journal of Philosophy, suppl. 
vol. 24): 69-78. 
 
TAKEDA, T., KASAI, K., AND KATO, N. (2007). “Moral Judgment in High-Functioning 
Pervasive Developmental Disorders,” Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences 61: 
407-414. 
 
UNGER, P. (1996). Living High and Letting Die. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
VALDESOLO, P., AND DESTENO, D. (2006). “Manipulations of Emotional Context Shape 
Moral Judgment,” Psychological Science 17: 476-477. 
 
WARNOCK, G. J. (1967). Contemporary Moral Philosophy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
WEDGWOOD, R. (2007). The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
WHEATLEY, T. AND HAIDT, J. (2005). “Hypnotically Induced Disgust Makes Moral 
Judgments More Severe,” Psychological Science 16: 780-784. 
 
WILSON, T. AND NISBETT, R. (1978). “The Accuracy of Verbal Reports About the Effects 
of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior,” Social Psychology 41(2): 118-131. 
 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
YOUNG, L., BECHARA, A., TRANEL, D., DAMASIO, H., HAUSER, M., AND DAMASIO, A. 
(2010). Damage to Prefrontal Cortex Impairs Judgment of Harmful Intent,” 
Neuron 65: 845-851. 
 
ZAGZEBSKI, L. (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the 
Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
ZAJONC, R. B., MURPHY, S. T., AND MCINTOSH, D. N. (1989). “Feeling and Facial 
Efference: Implications of the Vascular Theory of Emotion,” Psychological 
Review 96: 395-416. 
 
